路透社:美国情报机构与硅谷合作密切

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路透社:http://cn.reuters.com/article/CNAnalysesNews/idCNCNE96306A20130704

路透旧金山7月3日(Joseph Menn) - 硅谷试图拉开与斯诺登所披露的美国监控项目的距离,但是科技企业与情报机构之间的紧密合作由来已久。

前美国官员和情报消息人士称,科技行业和情报机构间的合作比大多数人认识到的更加广泛和深入,并且能追溯到硅谷成立的年代。

美国情报机构加大获取新技术的努力,并为网络安全研究提供资金,他们投资了创业企业,鼓励企业任命更多退伍兵和前情报人员进入董事会,并与大型科技企业高管建立了广泛的个人关系网络。

官员们称,情报机构利用这些关系开展间谍任务,同时与科技行业共同努力避免合作招致外国客户的愤怒。

Joel Harding在20世纪90年代是美国参谋长联席会议的一名情报人员,后来前往大型国防承包商Computer Sciences Corp(CSC.N: 行情)和SAIC(SAI.N: 行情)工作。Harding指出,情报机构有时能说服企业更改他们的硬件和软件产品,从而对外国目标进行监控。

Harding称,几年前,一家情报机构向一家科技企业的主管支付了5万美元,在卖给一个外国客户的机器中安装修改过的电脑芯片,从而进行间谍活动。“那些机器看起来和原来一模一样,但是芯片被更换。”

一名现役美国情报人员匿名称,政府经常通过第三方操作,部分原因是一旦行动败露,能够防止大型科技企业受到冲击。

他提到了10多年前的一件事,政府秘密创建了一家转售电脑的企业,向亚洲政府销售笔记本电脑。该企业从一家名叫Tadpole Computer的企业购买笔记本,Tadpole生产的笔记本基于Sun Microsystems处理器。这家转售电脑的企业安装了秘密软件,使情报人员可以远程登录这些机器。

Tadpole于2005年被国防承包商General Dynamics Corp(GD.N: 行情)收购,而Sun则被甲骨文(ORCL.O: 行情)收购。General Dynamics和甲骨文都拒绝置评。

前情报官员和公司高管们称,虽然有这些秘密合作,但海外客户对美国科技产品包含只有美国国家安全局或美国中央情报局能够使用的“后门”的担忧是夸大的。他们表示,入侵电脑和海外通信是通过其他方法,包括上述笔记本电脑转售商等第三方机构和情报机构开发的特殊软件等。

路透获得的一个被称为行业典型的产品目录显示,国防承包商向政府提供破解几乎所有主流软件提供商产品的方法。美国国家安全局拒绝置评。

一名曾在微软(MSFT.O: 行情)工作的前情报人员称,更大规模的合作很少见,因为大型科技企业面向很多国家销售,安装可能被发现的后门会让在中国等市场的太多业务处于危险中。

“微软技术上说是一家美国公司,但其实是一家国际性企业集团,拥有很多子公司,向中国销售是微软战略的一个主要部分,”该人士说道。微软发言人拒绝置评。(完)

编译:李富强 发稿:张家伟
 
Reuters:http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/usa-security-siliconvalley-idUSL2N0F91PO20130705

RPT-Strong ties bind spy agencies and Silicon Valley
By Joseph Menn

(Reuters) - Silicon Valley has tried to distance itself from the controversial U.S. surveillance programs exposed by Edward Snowden, but there is a long history of close cooperation between technology companies and the intelligence community.
Former U.S. officials and intelligence sources say the collaboration between the tech industry and spy agencies is both broader and deeper than most people realize, dating back to the formative years of Silicon Valley itself.

As U.S. intelligence agencies accelerate efforts to acquire new technology and fund research on cybersecurity, they have invested in start-up companies, encouraged firms to put more military and intelligence veterans on company boards, and nurtured a broad network of personal relationships with top technology executives.

And they are using those connections to carry out specific espionage missions, current and former officials say, even as they work with the tech industry to avoid overt cooperation that might raise the hackles of foreign customers.

Joel Harding, an intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1990s who went on to work at big defense contractors Computer Sciences Corp and SAIC, said spy agencies have at times persuaded companies to alter their hardware and software products to enable monitoring of foreign targets.

In one instance several years ago, an intelligence agency paid a tech company supervisor $50,000 to install tampered computer chips in machines bound for a customer in a foreign country so that they could be used for espionage, Harding said, declining to provide specifics. "They looked exactly the same, but they changed the chips," he said.

A current U.S. intelligence operative, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the government often works through third parties, in part to shield the big tech companies from fallout if the operations are discovered.

He cited a case more than a decade ago in which the government secretly created a computer reselling company to sell laptops to Asian governments. The reseller bought laptops from a company called Tadpole Computer, which made machines based on Sun Microsystems processors. The reseller added secret software that allowed intelligence analysts to access the machines remotely.

Tadpole was later bought by defense contractor General Dynamics Corp in 2005. General Dynamics declined to comment. Sun's new owner, Oracle Corp, did not respond to an inquiry.

Despite these secret collaborations, former intelligence officials and company executives say the great fear of overseas customers - that widely used U.S. technology products contain a "back door" accessible only to the National Security Agency or Central Intelligence Agency - is exaggerated. They said computers and communications overseas are captured by other means, including third parties such as the laptop reseller and special software developed by the agencies.

Defense contractors offer the government the means to break in to the products of virtually every major software vendor, according to a product catalogue reviewed by Reuters that was described as typical for the industry. The NSA did not respond to a request for comment.

More massive cooperation is rare because big tech companies sell to many countries and have too much business at stake in markets like China to risk installing a back door that could be discovered, said one intelligence veteran who had worked for Microsoft Corp.

"Microsoft is technically a U.S. company, but it's an international conglomerate with tons of subsidiaries," he said. "It's a major part of Microsoft strategy to sell to China." A spokeswoman for the company declined to comment.

Silicon Valley's relationship with U.S. intelligence agencies is under scrutiny after Snowden, a former contractor for the NSA, last month exposed a top secret Internet monitoring program known as Prism that relied on customer data supplied by major technology companies.

Google Inc, Microsoft, Facebook Inc and others scrambled to assure their customers that they only handed over data for specific intelligence investigations involving foreign targets, and they denied giving the NSA access to wholesale client data.

But last weekend, the European Union demanded that Washington explain its surveillance programs and some European politicians said there were grounds to break off trade talks. Others urged citizens to stop relying on U.S. providers.

HISTORY OF SHARED INTERESTS

The close and symbiotic relationship between U.S. tech companies and government defense and intelligence agencies is frequently underplayed in the mythology of Silicon Valley. Defense contracts were its lifeblood through much of the 1950s and 1960s. Frederick Terman, who led Allied radio-jamming efforts in World War II, came to Stanford University with grant money and counted the founders of Hewlett-Packard Co among his students.

Varian Associates and other startups, many with ties to Stanford, got their start in the 1950s with military contracts for microwave and vacuum-tube technologies that were used in aerospace projects. In the 1960s, government space and defense programs, especially the Minuteman missile effort, were the biggest customers for the Valley's expensive integrated circuit computer chips. Database software maker Oracle Corp's first customer was the CIA.

"The birth of Silicon Valley was solving defense problems," said Anup Ghosh, whose cybersecurity firm Invincea Inc was launched in 2009 with funding from the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

DARPA, which initially funded what became the Internet out of a desire for a communications network that would survive a nuclear attack, has intensified its work on Internet security in recent years and recently launched a "fast-track" program to get smaller amounts of money to startups more quickly.

Federal cybersecurity spending is expected to reach $11.9 billion next year, up from $8.6 billion in 2010, according to budget analysts at Deltek.

BUMPS IN THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between the Valley and the government has had its bumps. A low point came in the mid-1990s, when then-President Bill Clinton pressed the industry to include in its products a device called the Clipper Chip, which had an NSA-designed back door to allow for law enforcement eavesdropping if authorities obtained a warrant.

Civil liberties groups and such technology leaders as Microsoft and Apple Inc objected, in part because the code could be broken and presented a security risk, and eventually the administration backed down.

Stung by that setback, Washington tried harder to learn the Valley's language. Its most visible initiative was the creation of In-Q-Tel, a venture capital fund intended to finance companies whose products were of interest to the CIA and other agencies.

In-Q-Tel's portfolio now includes security companies such as FireEye and data analysis firms like Palantir Technologies, which counts the CIA as a major customer. In-Q-Tel often makes modest investments in exchange for companies adding specific features to their products, former employees said. In-Q-Tel declined to comment.

Government agencies often demand the right to review the software code of their technology vendors, said former McAfee Chief Technology Officer Stuart McClure. That could allow them to spot vulnerabilities that they can use to penetrate the software when it is installed at other locations.

In other cases, officials and executives said, companies give the government advance notice of software vulnerabilities, even before they have warned their own customers - information that could be used for defense, offense or both.

"The vulnerabilities that are discovered as well as the potential risks to the infrastructure are now shared at levels that have never had sharing before," said Dave DeWalt, chief executive of FireEye and chairman of closely held security firm Mandiant. DeWalt was previously CEO of No. 2 security software vendor McAfee, which he said gave early threat warnings to intelligence agencies.

Chuck Mulloy, a spokesman for current McAfee owner Intel Corp, said the organization works with governments around the world but declined to discuss specifics.

In a more formal effort at coordinated defense, NSA Director Keith Alexander is leading a regular gathering called the Enduring Security Framework, in which CEOs are given temporary security clearances.

One outcome of those meetings: a cross-industry effort to improve the security of the boot-up process on personal computers, say several people familiar with the project.

"It's a seriously dangerous game they all play," former Pentagon intelligence officer Harding said of the tech companies. "They want to help their government, but if it comes out, it's a serious problem. They are teetering and tottering, and if they teeter too far, they are going to lose."
 
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