The referendum reads:
In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, thus making Taiwan an international orphan. In order to strongly express the will of the Taiwanese people, and to elevate Taiwan's international status and international participation, do you agree with the government to use the name "Taiwan" to enter the United Nations?
One basic argument for the referendum is that it will deepen the sense of Taiwanese identity, strengthening democracy and reinforcing the people's will to resist pressures and blandishments from the Mainland. Another is that it will present to the international community the formally expressed demand of the people of Taiwan that they have a right to international identity and representation separate from the PRC.
It is argued that, because the referendum does not change the formal "national moniker" and is not a "declaration of independence" through constitutional change, it neither violates promises Chen Shui-bian has made, including to President Bush, to eschew formal independence nor is it a step across a PRC "red line" triggering the use of force. As President Chen has put it, the day after the referendum passes, if it passes, "nothing will change." Taiwan will not be able to join the United Nations and the constitution will remain intact.
On the other hand, the PRC sees this referendum as one more step in the consistent push toward "Taiwan independence" over Chen Shui-bian's entire tenure. But different from all of the other "unacceptable" steps Chen has taken, Beijing argues, it would be the first time the people of Taiwan would be formally expressing themselves on a question related to Taiwan's status within a constitutional and legal framework. Beijing cites the DPP's own explanation document about the referendum, in which the results of a referendum are characterized as having greater authority than law or even the constitution. Thus, the PRC says, while the question put to the people of Taiwan seems innocent and straight-forward, the DPP's explanation as well as various statements by Chen Shui-bian make clear that the goal is not just about joining the UN but about establishing a legal and political foundation for pressing ahead with formal independence.
That Beijing makes this argument, of course, does not mean it is right; in terms of the assessment that the referendum would create a legal basis for moving ahead to de jure independence, I believe it is wrong. But it is hard to argue with the assertion that the political intention of the sponsors is to create a mandate for pushing Taiwan's separate identity and status further not just domestically but internationally. However right and just the specifics of the referendum may seem to its supporters in principle, we live in the real world where actions have consequences and an action of this sort could ultimately prove disastrous.
To be frank, I do not believe that Beijing intends to attack Taiwan in some sort of final showdown if the referendum passes. But I think that we would be burying our heads in the sand if we did not take seriously that there is a great deal of thinking-and planning-going on right now on the Mainland about how to impose a cost for such a development, a cost that is significant enough to deter further steps toward independence but restrained enough not to trigger U.S. intervention and an all-out war. That such thinking is going on is very disturbing, but it is a sobering reality to which we should all pay attention.
Some would argue that all of this is bluster, merely designed on the one hand to scare Taiwan into abandoning-or rejecting-the referendum, and on the other to pressure the United States into playing the role of the "heavy," the "enforcer," the one to bring Taiwan "to heel" and to impose "pragmatic" limits on its democracy. There is no doubt in my mind that this latter aspect is part of the PRC's plan. But the U.S. objections to the referendum spring from Washington's own assessment of the dangers, not from any PRC demands or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, collaboration with Beijing. And a part of that assessment is that, like it or not, if the PRC feels provoked to the extent that it decides it must act, the likelihood of things getting out of control are not insignificant.
Thus, in a crescendo of statements, Washington has made known that, while the United States does not oppose referenda in principle, it opposes-not simply "does not support," but opposes-referenda that could upset cross-Strait peace and stability. This referendum is opposed because it could have such an effect due to the way it uses the name "Taiwan."
It is not persuasive to argue, as the DPP and President Chen do, that this proposal is simply like many other instances in which Taiwan does not use its formal name to participate in the international community. This is not "Chinese Taipei" in the Olympics or even a "customs territory" in APEC.
Despite his occasional claims that use of "Taiwan" has no special importance, President Chen has also argued that using "Taiwan" in the UN context in fact is an instance of "rectification of Taiwan's name" and that it is explicitly designed to help persuade the international community to accept "Taiwan" as a separate, sovereign state.
Having earlier said, on resuming the chairmanship of the DPP, that his "only focus" would be on passing the referendum, in only the past twenty-four hours he has asserted again that the drive for UN membership, and for the referendum, is a "symbol that manifests Taiwan's national sovereignty" as a country that is "different" from China.
And while that is not the same as formalizing independent status by amending the constitution, it is an effort to change the status quo.
Quite different from previous efforts by Taipei's friends at the UN since 1993 simply to place a "Taiwan" item on the General Assembly agenda, this year, in addition, Chen Shui-bian twice wrote directly to the UN Secretary General seeking admission as a "new member" on the explicit grounds that "Taiwan" is a sovereign, independent state. He signed both letters "Chen Shui-bian, President, Taiwan." Not only that, but he sent a letter to PRC UN Representative Wang Guangya, who was in his final day as rotational Security Council president, and signed it the same way. One has to wonder about Chen's thoughts as he signed that letter, and Wang's as he received it.
A few days ago, President Chen said he thought that, under the influence of the referendum's passage and the subsequent public backlash he anticipated in the United States against excluding Taiwan from the United Nations, the White House and Congress would eventually, as he put it, "feel the pinch" of public opinion and move to support Taiwan's UN bid. More broadly, he even claimed that it would force the United States to review its "one China" policy and move toward recognizing both the PRC and Taiwan. Looking to the west, he said he thought that the PRC would have to rethink the "failure" of its Taiwan policy and drop the acceptance of the "one China" principle as a precondition for a cross-Strait peace agreement.
Setting aside the extreme unlikeliness he is right regarding the PRC, it is truly worrisome if he so misreads the United States as to believe that Americans' natural instinct toward universal representation in international organizations will translate into acceptance of a "one China, one Taiwan" policy and that he pushes the referendum on that assumption.
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen put it recently in a speech I would urge everyone to read:
[A]s much as we oppose Beijing's threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.
And no use of force. To avoid misunderstanding, I think the other side of the coin also bears repeating, that is, regarding the possible use of force by Beijing. As Mr. Christensen put it: "The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable."
Challenging the "one China" policy
The U.S. dedication to peaceful management of cross-Strait relations applies, of course, to ultimate resolution of Taiwan's relations with the Mainland. But that is something that can only come over a considerable period of time and, if it is to be successful, with great wisdom and effective leadership on the part of all parties.
The issue facing us today is what U.S. policy should be toward managing the relationship until we arrive at resolution. Do we need to adjust or even abandon the "one China" policy to account for the rising strength of the PRC, on the one hand, or the deepening of democracy and the evolution of attitudes in Taiwan, on the other?
In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, thus making Taiwan an international orphan. In order to strongly express the will of the Taiwanese people, and to elevate Taiwan's international status and international participation, do you agree with the government to use the name "Taiwan" to enter the United Nations?
One basic argument for the referendum is that it will deepen the sense of Taiwanese identity, strengthening democracy and reinforcing the people's will to resist pressures and blandishments from the Mainland. Another is that it will present to the international community the formally expressed demand of the people of Taiwan that they have a right to international identity and representation separate from the PRC.
It is argued that, because the referendum does not change the formal "national moniker" and is not a "declaration of independence" through constitutional change, it neither violates promises Chen Shui-bian has made, including to President Bush, to eschew formal independence nor is it a step across a PRC "red line" triggering the use of force. As President Chen has put it, the day after the referendum passes, if it passes, "nothing will change." Taiwan will not be able to join the United Nations and the constitution will remain intact.
On the other hand, the PRC sees this referendum as one more step in the consistent push toward "Taiwan independence" over Chen Shui-bian's entire tenure. But different from all of the other "unacceptable" steps Chen has taken, Beijing argues, it would be the first time the people of Taiwan would be formally expressing themselves on a question related to Taiwan's status within a constitutional and legal framework. Beijing cites the DPP's own explanation document about the referendum, in which the results of a referendum are characterized as having greater authority than law or even the constitution. Thus, the PRC says, while the question put to the people of Taiwan seems innocent and straight-forward, the DPP's explanation as well as various statements by Chen Shui-bian make clear that the goal is not just about joining the UN but about establishing a legal and political foundation for pressing ahead with formal independence.
That Beijing makes this argument, of course, does not mean it is right; in terms of the assessment that the referendum would create a legal basis for moving ahead to de jure independence, I believe it is wrong. But it is hard to argue with the assertion that the political intention of the sponsors is to create a mandate for pushing Taiwan's separate identity and status further not just domestically but internationally. However right and just the specifics of the referendum may seem to its supporters in principle, we live in the real world where actions have consequences and an action of this sort could ultimately prove disastrous.
To be frank, I do not believe that Beijing intends to attack Taiwan in some sort of final showdown if the referendum passes. But I think that we would be burying our heads in the sand if we did not take seriously that there is a great deal of thinking-and planning-going on right now on the Mainland about how to impose a cost for such a development, a cost that is significant enough to deter further steps toward independence but restrained enough not to trigger U.S. intervention and an all-out war. That such thinking is going on is very disturbing, but it is a sobering reality to which we should all pay attention.
Some would argue that all of this is bluster, merely designed on the one hand to scare Taiwan into abandoning-or rejecting-the referendum, and on the other to pressure the United States into playing the role of the "heavy," the "enforcer," the one to bring Taiwan "to heel" and to impose "pragmatic" limits on its democracy. There is no doubt in my mind that this latter aspect is part of the PRC's plan. But the U.S. objections to the referendum spring from Washington's own assessment of the dangers, not from any PRC demands or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, collaboration with Beijing. And a part of that assessment is that, like it or not, if the PRC feels provoked to the extent that it decides it must act, the likelihood of things getting out of control are not insignificant.
Thus, in a crescendo of statements, Washington has made known that, while the United States does not oppose referenda in principle, it opposes-not simply "does not support," but opposes-referenda that could upset cross-Strait peace and stability. This referendum is opposed because it could have such an effect due to the way it uses the name "Taiwan."
It is not persuasive to argue, as the DPP and President Chen do, that this proposal is simply like many other instances in which Taiwan does not use its formal name to participate in the international community. This is not "Chinese Taipei" in the Olympics or even a "customs territory" in APEC.
Despite his occasional claims that use of "Taiwan" has no special importance, President Chen has also argued that using "Taiwan" in the UN context in fact is an instance of "rectification of Taiwan's name" and that it is explicitly designed to help persuade the international community to accept "Taiwan" as a separate, sovereign state.
Having earlier said, on resuming the chairmanship of the DPP, that his "only focus" would be on passing the referendum, in only the past twenty-four hours he has asserted again that the drive for UN membership, and for the referendum, is a "symbol that manifests Taiwan's national sovereignty" as a country that is "different" from China.
And while that is not the same as formalizing independent status by amending the constitution, it is an effort to change the status quo.
Quite different from previous efforts by Taipei's friends at the UN since 1993 simply to place a "Taiwan" item on the General Assembly agenda, this year, in addition, Chen Shui-bian twice wrote directly to the UN Secretary General seeking admission as a "new member" on the explicit grounds that "Taiwan" is a sovereign, independent state. He signed both letters "Chen Shui-bian, President, Taiwan." Not only that, but he sent a letter to PRC UN Representative Wang Guangya, who was in his final day as rotational Security Council president, and signed it the same way. One has to wonder about Chen's thoughts as he signed that letter, and Wang's as he received it.
A few days ago, President Chen said he thought that, under the influence of the referendum's passage and the subsequent public backlash he anticipated in the United States against excluding Taiwan from the United Nations, the White House and Congress would eventually, as he put it, "feel the pinch" of public opinion and move to support Taiwan's UN bid. More broadly, he even claimed that it would force the United States to review its "one China" policy and move toward recognizing both the PRC and Taiwan. Looking to the west, he said he thought that the PRC would have to rethink the "failure" of its Taiwan policy and drop the acceptance of the "one China" principle as a precondition for a cross-Strait peace agreement.
Setting aside the extreme unlikeliness he is right regarding the PRC, it is truly worrisome if he so misreads the United States as to believe that Americans' natural instinct toward universal representation in international organizations will translate into acceptance of a "one China, one Taiwan" policy and that he pushes the referendum on that assumption.
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen put it recently in a speech I would urge everyone to read:
[A]s much as we oppose Beijing's threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.
And no use of force. To avoid misunderstanding, I think the other side of the coin also bears repeating, that is, regarding the possible use of force by Beijing. As Mr. Christensen put it: "The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable."
Challenging the "one China" policy
The U.S. dedication to peaceful management of cross-Strait relations applies, of course, to ultimate resolution of Taiwan's relations with the Mainland. But that is something that can only come over a considerable period of time and, if it is to be successful, with great wisdom and effective leadership on the part of all parties.
The issue facing us today is what U.S. policy should be toward managing the relationship until we arrive at resolution. Do we need to adjust or even abandon the "one China" policy to account for the rising strength of the PRC, on the one hand, or the deepening of democracy and the evolution of attitudes in Taiwan, on the other?
