My own answer is that there is no sound reason to alter or abandon our "one China" policy, that, as difficult as it is to implement it well, there is no better alternative. Let me devote my remaining time to examining why I believe this is so.
Taiwan, the plucky little democracy. On one side of the argument for change is the proposition that Taiwan today is not the Taiwan of the 1960s, 70s or 80s. It is no longer a tightly-run little island but a vibrant democracy in which the people not only demand the right to express themselves but have a responsibility to do so. And so the United States should support that development. And it does.
But democracy is not an excuse for irresponsibility, and the political leaders of Taiwan, of whatever political color, have a responsibility to look out for the security and well-being of the 23 million people they lead. Clearly, a frontal challenge to the PRC through a formal action to sever Taiwan's constitutional link with the Mainland would bring tragedy down on the heads of the people of Taiwan. And virtually all political leaders in Taiwan today understand that and would avoid taking such action.
The problem in recent times has been that there seems to be a growing belief in some circles that they can get away with tweaking the dragon's tail as long as they don't poke him in the eye. That is, it's all right to openly seek to establish a quasi-formal independent identity for Taiwan in the international community, and an outspokenly separate identity domestically, as long as you do not change the constitutional name from "Republic of China" to "Taiwan." As understandable as the instinct underlying that position may be, at a very minimum it is tempting fate; at worst, it could bring tragedy to the very people whose ambitions this approach aspires to articulate and advance.
International reaction. Not only will these efforts not be successful, but they will even cause those inclined to support Taiwan's practical participation in the international community to pull in their heads, or as we have seen at the WHO and the UN, even to openly side with Beijing if forced to take sides. It's hard to see how this helps Taiwan.
PRC reaction. Moreover, although Beijing is clearly not spoiling for a fight, no one should mistake that, if it concludes that Taiwan is in fact irrevocably closing the door to any prospect of ultimate unification, it will act. And even if it comes at a great cost, it will act. Whether it is before or after the Olympics, before or after the Shanghai World Expo, before or after it has achieved the modern economic state to which it aspires, or even before or after it is assured of military success, it will act.
Is the "One China" Policy Working?
Some people have described the U.S. "one China" policy as designed simply to "kick the can down the road," putting off any denouement over ultimate resolution of cross-Strait relations. I certainly agree that is one element, at least as long as the alternative to kicking the can down the road could be war.
But, as I have tried to stress, the U.S. "one China" policy also contains within it the prospect that the United States will support progress toward any peaceful, non-coercive arrangements worked out by the two sides. This was not a proposition without opponents when it was first developed, and it is not a proposition without opponents now.
Still, the principles behind the policy are sound. Moreover, the policy has worked in that it has facilitated a broad and deep U.S. relationship with the PRC based on respect for the rising power and influence of China at the same time it has protected the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan.
South Korean students have sometimes berated me for the fact that the United States prevented the unification of Korea in the late 1940s. Well, yes, I have responded, our refusal to allow a Soviet takeover did prevent conquest of the South by Kim Il Sung. So did our involvement in the Korean War. But, I have added, looking at the history of the past 60 years, and looking at North Korea and South Korea today, I doubt most South Koreans would really have preferred the alternative.
Similarly with Taiwan, while we did accept terms for Normalization that put the ROC's diplomatic status into limbo, I believe we have contributed in vital ways to shoring up the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan in a democratic and prosperous society that, for all of the frustrations, inconveniences and affronts to their dignity, functions quite well in the international community. Although Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations with only twenty-four countries today-and that number may shrink-it has substantive ties with over 140 other countries. It is not part of the UN system, but according to the latest information I could find, it is an active member of 26 intergovernmental organizations and holds observer or associate membership status with 17 others, not to mention membership by Taiwan institutions in innumerable non-governmental organizations. Per capita GDP is over $16,000 and Taiwan is a major player in global trade and investment, including in high-end services and high-tech manufacturing, and it is thoroughly connected to the rest of the world through extensive air and sea links.
Absent the "one China" policy over the past 30 plus years, where would things stand today? I daresay not in such good shape.
Does Taiwan's current situation have problems? Sure, especially in terms of joining international organizations and regimes where only states are members or where, in recent times, the PRC has reacted to Taipei's "envelope pushing" by squeezing harder even in non-state organizations. Moreover, we are all familiar with the heated debate in Taiwan today about the right policies for maintaining or restoring the island's robust economic performance.
So my point is not that there cannot be improvements internally or externally; my point is that in the past three decades Taiwan has done remarkably well under the protection of the current "one China" policy of the United States. And even given all of Taiwan's frustrations, it is hard to understand why anyone would put this at risk, especially when the prospects for success on the specific issue at hand are zero.
Change is possible
Saying that the policy works is not the same thing as saying that it can't change. Beijing and Taipei both have it within their power to take such irresponsible steps that they could alter the entire framework in which the policy operates. Should Taiwan's inability to rein in its own worst instincts lead to war, the U.S. reaction cannot be predicted. Similarly, should the PRC resort to force, American tolerance should not be taken for granted. This is the essence of what is called "strategic ambiguity": Taiwan should not assume that if it provokes war, the United States will necessarily get into it; the PRC should not assume that if it attacks Taiwan, the United States will stay out of it.
In either of those circumstances, arguments will certainly be put forward for changing the "one China" policy one way or the other. Even if not totally predictable, the outcome will likely be scenario-driven.
On the one hand, Mr. Chen may be correct in predicting that the referendum could eventually precipitate a change in U.S. policy. But if that is the driving force my guess is that it will drive policy, not in the direction of recognizing Taiwan's sovereign, independent status, but in the other direction.
On the other hand, a PRC resort to force could also spark a change. Recall, if you will, the Taiwan Relations Act's pronouncement that "the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." And the caution by President Clinton's secretary of state, Warren Christopher, that the "one China" policy "is predicated on the PRC's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing."
On a more constructive note, some people have advocated, if not a substantive change in the "one China" policy, then introducing a greater degree of American activism. Behind this lies the fear that, whatever the sense of relative calm today, the current situation is inherently unstable. And so, rather than leaving things totally to fate, the argument goes, the United States should take a hand in stimulating or at least facilitating a cross-Strait negotiation that would, for the foreseeable future, involve a trade-off of a Taiwan pledge not to move toward independence for a PRC pledge not to use force.
Taiwan, the plucky little democracy. On one side of the argument for change is the proposition that Taiwan today is not the Taiwan of the 1960s, 70s or 80s. It is no longer a tightly-run little island but a vibrant democracy in which the people not only demand the right to express themselves but have a responsibility to do so. And so the United States should support that development. And it does.
But democracy is not an excuse for irresponsibility, and the political leaders of Taiwan, of whatever political color, have a responsibility to look out for the security and well-being of the 23 million people they lead. Clearly, a frontal challenge to the PRC through a formal action to sever Taiwan's constitutional link with the Mainland would bring tragedy down on the heads of the people of Taiwan. And virtually all political leaders in Taiwan today understand that and would avoid taking such action.
The problem in recent times has been that there seems to be a growing belief in some circles that they can get away with tweaking the dragon's tail as long as they don't poke him in the eye. That is, it's all right to openly seek to establish a quasi-formal independent identity for Taiwan in the international community, and an outspokenly separate identity domestically, as long as you do not change the constitutional name from "Republic of China" to "Taiwan." As understandable as the instinct underlying that position may be, at a very minimum it is tempting fate; at worst, it could bring tragedy to the very people whose ambitions this approach aspires to articulate and advance.
International reaction. Not only will these efforts not be successful, but they will even cause those inclined to support Taiwan's practical participation in the international community to pull in their heads, or as we have seen at the WHO and the UN, even to openly side with Beijing if forced to take sides. It's hard to see how this helps Taiwan.
PRC reaction. Moreover, although Beijing is clearly not spoiling for a fight, no one should mistake that, if it concludes that Taiwan is in fact irrevocably closing the door to any prospect of ultimate unification, it will act. And even if it comes at a great cost, it will act. Whether it is before or after the Olympics, before or after the Shanghai World Expo, before or after it has achieved the modern economic state to which it aspires, or even before or after it is assured of military success, it will act.
Is the "One China" Policy Working?
Some people have described the U.S. "one China" policy as designed simply to "kick the can down the road," putting off any denouement over ultimate resolution of cross-Strait relations. I certainly agree that is one element, at least as long as the alternative to kicking the can down the road could be war.
But, as I have tried to stress, the U.S. "one China" policy also contains within it the prospect that the United States will support progress toward any peaceful, non-coercive arrangements worked out by the two sides. This was not a proposition without opponents when it was first developed, and it is not a proposition without opponents now.
Still, the principles behind the policy are sound. Moreover, the policy has worked in that it has facilitated a broad and deep U.S. relationship with the PRC based on respect for the rising power and influence of China at the same time it has protected the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan.
South Korean students have sometimes berated me for the fact that the United States prevented the unification of Korea in the late 1940s. Well, yes, I have responded, our refusal to allow a Soviet takeover did prevent conquest of the South by Kim Il Sung. So did our involvement in the Korean War. But, I have added, looking at the history of the past 60 years, and looking at North Korea and South Korea today, I doubt most South Koreans would really have preferred the alternative.
Similarly with Taiwan, while we did accept terms for Normalization that put the ROC's diplomatic status into limbo, I believe we have contributed in vital ways to shoring up the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan in a democratic and prosperous society that, for all of the frustrations, inconveniences and affronts to their dignity, functions quite well in the international community. Although Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations with only twenty-four countries today-and that number may shrink-it has substantive ties with over 140 other countries. It is not part of the UN system, but according to the latest information I could find, it is an active member of 26 intergovernmental organizations and holds observer or associate membership status with 17 others, not to mention membership by Taiwan institutions in innumerable non-governmental organizations. Per capita GDP is over $16,000 and Taiwan is a major player in global trade and investment, including in high-end services and high-tech manufacturing, and it is thoroughly connected to the rest of the world through extensive air and sea links.
Absent the "one China" policy over the past 30 plus years, where would things stand today? I daresay not in such good shape.
Does Taiwan's current situation have problems? Sure, especially in terms of joining international organizations and regimes where only states are members or where, in recent times, the PRC has reacted to Taipei's "envelope pushing" by squeezing harder even in non-state organizations. Moreover, we are all familiar with the heated debate in Taiwan today about the right policies for maintaining or restoring the island's robust economic performance.
So my point is not that there cannot be improvements internally or externally; my point is that in the past three decades Taiwan has done remarkably well under the protection of the current "one China" policy of the United States. And even given all of Taiwan's frustrations, it is hard to understand why anyone would put this at risk, especially when the prospects for success on the specific issue at hand are zero.
Change is possible
Saying that the policy works is not the same thing as saying that it can't change. Beijing and Taipei both have it within their power to take such irresponsible steps that they could alter the entire framework in which the policy operates. Should Taiwan's inability to rein in its own worst instincts lead to war, the U.S. reaction cannot be predicted. Similarly, should the PRC resort to force, American tolerance should not be taken for granted. This is the essence of what is called "strategic ambiguity": Taiwan should not assume that if it provokes war, the United States will necessarily get into it; the PRC should not assume that if it attacks Taiwan, the United States will stay out of it.
In either of those circumstances, arguments will certainly be put forward for changing the "one China" policy one way or the other. Even if not totally predictable, the outcome will likely be scenario-driven.
On the one hand, Mr. Chen may be correct in predicting that the referendum could eventually precipitate a change in U.S. policy. But if that is the driving force my guess is that it will drive policy, not in the direction of recognizing Taiwan's sovereign, independent status, but in the other direction.
On the other hand, a PRC resort to force could also spark a change. Recall, if you will, the Taiwan Relations Act's pronouncement that "the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." And the caution by President Clinton's secretary of state, Warren Christopher, that the "one China" policy "is predicated on the PRC's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing."
On a more constructive note, some people have advocated, if not a substantive change in the "one China" policy, then introducing a greater degree of American activism. Behind this lies the fear that, whatever the sense of relative calm today, the current situation is inherently unstable. And so, rather than leaving things totally to fate, the argument goes, the United States should take a hand in stimulating or at least facilitating a cross-Strait negotiation that would, for the foreseeable future, involve a trade-off of a Taiwan pledge not to move toward independence for a PRC pledge not to use force.
