期待:中国与沟谷的双赢

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我昨天说抛BAIDU没人听吧?
 
沟谷扫描的不过是图书目录而已,

有关图书扫描好像被韩寒误导了。

扫描的是全书, 然后放入它检索库, 当你检索时进行全书检索,
然后只给你看扫描片断或目录。 所谓的预览。
 
有关图书扫描好像被韩寒误导了。

扫描的是全书, 然后放入它检索库, 当你检索时进行全书检索,
然后只给你看扫描片断或目录。 所谓的预览。

好像是这样。下面是一篇相关文章

Google强割了中国作家的“庄稼”?2009年11月02日 09:52:22 南方都市报

 最近“Google图书搜索”成了热门的话题,在过去的10多天里,“谷歌图书”、 “Google图书”等词的搜索频率大大提高。原因是中国一些作家、作协和CCTV联合起来,认为Google擅自将有著作权的图书扫描上网侵犯了作家们的权利。一些不明真相的记者也随之附和。更有评论者如刘戈之流还打出个贻笑大方的比喻“比如说有一大块地,长满了庄稼,现在成熟了,有一个人过来不跟任何人打招呼把庄稼全割了。”一时间,平日里“圈养”的中国作家纷纷将自己打扮成“维权志士”,其“向国际强权要权利”的秀逗,估计只有起《儒林外史》于地下,方可描绘!
  正方
  Google侵权,还挖了条沟让你掉
  和讯网友“郑渝川”认为,Google“数字图书馆”计划本身是G oogle新兴商业模式的重要组成部分。“即便是让用户免费读书,也能通过用户黏性而以其他产品、服务或广告交换等形式获利,这等于是彻底破坏了信息生产和传播的价值链,把这个链条中本来合理均沾的利益全部收拢到Google一家手里。这就像某个酒店抢光附近农地,拿来做成几锅菜、免费赠予餐客,然后以酒水、其他菜品获利,你能说农户不该让酒店付清菜钱吗?”
  新浪网友“游云庭”认为,谷歌公布的和图书作者的有关期限及赔偿、删除等协议内容是无效的,“虽然谷歌的协议是在美国法院主持下和相关的出版机构协会和作者协会达成的,但中国的作者并非这些协会的参加者,不受上述协议的约束。一个问题就可以把这个协议驳倒:谁同意你搬我们家彩电了?谷歌未经许可扫描享有版权的图书并将扫描版对外商业运营,本身就是侵权行为,这种行为不会因为附加了一份协议而合法化。”
  个人博客“王小峰”认为,“股沟就是不想挨家挨户地毯式签约授权,那样多浪费时间和成本啊,唯一的方式就是我先抢过来,”全世界的人都到美国来打官司吧,并且你肯定会赢,但是你在美国请个律师就是为了60美元的侵权费?你缺心眼啊!事实上,股沟会输掉官司,并且赔你60美元,你虽胜犹败,它虽败犹荣。这就是他们为什么叫‘股沟’,在这里挖了一条沟让你掉进去。“
  反方
  Google没侵权,你的庄稼长得很好
  个人博客“楚望台”认为,央视领衔热炒的“谷歌图书侵权门”指的多是谷歌在未经著作权人许可的情况下,索引其作品并进行摘录呈现,该行为符合著作权法22条2款的合理使用诸要件。“任何国家的版权法,都是在作者权利和社会公益间找平衡。而对是否具‘公益性’的判断,只能是以行为和客观效果为依据,而非以行为主体具有商业属性为依据。‘Google是商业公司,故Google的产品是商业产品,故其不符合伯尔尼公约公平使用原则……’这样的逻辑很低级。”
  杭州网网友“周曦”认为,收录作品是个相当浩瀚的工程。“要某一家公司挨个找作者签署同意书,就算是富得流油的谷歌,也承受不起其中的代价。等作者找公司,而不是公司找作者,是最经济、直接、有效的方式。况且,谷歌从来没有逃避过版权费用的问题,只要作者愿意,随时可以向公司讨要那笔钱。”
  可能吧网友“Jason Ng”认为,Google没有提供有著作权的图书的全书预览,反而提供其中的片段和简介,方便搜索者决定是否购买,如果这种做法也是侵权,那提供图书目录的当当网、提供书籍简介的豆瓣网是否也有侵权之嫌?“是的,Google和当当网不同,Google还将图书扫描存档了。但是,就像个人购买图书一样,我们可以私下扫描图书、将图书存档到电脑里,这都是允许的,因为我们没有将这些资料用于商业行为。在权利人没有允许的情况下,它们提供比当当网还少的图书简介和预览。”
http://pl.cqnews.net/cj/200911/t20091102_3726836.htm
 
这些图书全文被google利用来从事它的主要商业活动: 检索

韩寒没有搞清状况冒傻了。

沟谷的做法在中国是否算侵权,我们就留个中国的法院好了。韩寒作为一个老百姓没有搞清状况冒傻也情有可原。
 
如果沟谷留下,并且是在中国政府大幅度放宽网络管制的前提下留在中国,那将是中国和沟谷的双赢。我辈应该弹冠相庆,为两边喝彩!

搂主的帖子题目,即所谓的“双赢”,就是一个伪命题。股购撒泼要的是中国治外法权。中国政府再窝囊,难道敢放弃主权,屈服于一个外国公司,做丧权辱国之事?

彭德怀说过“帝国主义在东方一个国家门口架上几门大炮就可以征服整个国家的时代一去不复返了!”这话,整天哈美舔洋股沟的民运教徒们可能没听到过------他们满眼满耳都是西方填的屎。

还什么“中国政府大幅度放宽网络管制”,这熟悉的调调不就是海外民运整天哼唧的嘛。
 
我更尊重沟谷。或者说,经此一役,我开始尊重沟谷。

和政府特别是和掌握着自己命运的中央集权的政府叫板是要点勇气的。我尊重这样的汉子,包括沟谷、包括刘晓波。

按此逻辑,拉登敢于和米国政府特别是唯一的超级大国可以入侵任何一个不听话的小国的超强帝国叫板,搂主这个基督徒一定是尊重的紧了?!
 
看看美国的主流媒体是怎么说的,有助于看穿搂主贴子的欺骗性和虚伪:


美国《新闻周刊》:跟中国作对,没有任何机会

美国《新闻周刊》1月25日(提前出版)文章,原题:跟中国作对,没有任何机会

过去30年,西方对中国的预测十有八九都是错误的,这已是一个板上钉钉的事实。他们声称:中国经济增长率被夸大;一场大危机迫在眉睫;国家的控制将逐渐减弱;全球媒体的影响将一步步削弱共产党的权力。西方人预测中国之所以表现如此糟糕,是因为他们总是用西方模式和经验来解释中国。但除非我们试着着眼于中国自身来认识它,否则对中国的看法将一错再错。

谷歌事件在很大程度上说明中国的现在及将来。在西方,互联网一直被视为思想和信息自由交换的最典型表达。但中国政府让世人看到,互联网可以被有效监控。谷歌欲“整合全球信息,使人人皆可访问并从中受益”的抱负,与中国统治者怀有的控制之必要和责任的古老观念相抵触。这场战役只有一个赢家:中国。谷歌要么接受中国监管,要么退出世界最大的互联网市场。

我们日益清晰地看到,中国注定会成为世界最大经济体,并有可能超过美国。权力平衡在向中国转移。对于一个公司来说,占据美国市场大份额曾是角逐全球的前提条件,而这个角色将越来越由中国市场充当,只是中国的分量要大得多,因为它的人口是美国的4倍。而且随着中国经济影响力的扩大,其政府所享有的全球权威也快速上升。

中国截然不同于西方,做事方式或思维习惯迥异于我们。直面这个事实远不如想象的那么简单。尽管种种预言预测其终结,但国家在中国人生活中仍无所不在,仍然拥有大多数大型企业,善于找到新办法抵御美国的全球媒体影响。西方观察家通常认为中国政府的这种介入出于恐惧,但国家为什么在中国社会中扮演如此重要的角色有更深层原因。在中国人看来,国家不是一种异己的存在,而是社会的化身和守护者。原因深藏于中国历史。中国至少2000年前就已是一个文明国家。维护中国文明的完整被视为最重要的政治任务和国家的神圣使命,因而国家在中国具有与西方不可比拟的独一无二的角色。

中国的现代性将不会像西方的现代性,一个由中国主宰的世界将不同于我们自己的世界。一个结果已经在发展中世界出现:国家重新变得流行,华盛顿共识黯然失色。在这个崭新的世界中,中国人的思维方式(从儒家价值及国家观到家庭和子女抚养)将越来越有影响力。谷歌的命运是未来世界的一个征兆,我们越早认识到一个由中国主宰的世界的本质,也就越能更好地与之打交道。▲(作者马丁•雅克,汪析译)

http://post.news.tom.com/s/34000AB32071.html?source=HP_LATEST
 
美国《新闻周刊》:跟中国作对,没有任何机会

不确定中文稿翻译是否严谨,找来原文粗略过了一下,觉得翻译基本准确。不过看英文原汁原味,更能感觉到字里行间的深刻寓意。

看了一个西方人的议论,颇感政治上的顽固不化是多么的无知与愚昧。

http://www.newsweek.com/id/231130
No Chance Against China

Google's defeat foretells the day when Beijing rules the world.


By Martin Jacques | NEWSWEEK
Published Jan 16, 2010
From the magazine issue dated Jan 25, 2010

The blunt truth is that most Western forecasters have been wrong about China for the past 30 years. They have claimed that Chinese economic growth was exaggerated, that a big crisis was imminent, that state controls would fade away, and that exposure to global media, notably the Internet, would steadily undermine the Communist Party's authority. The reason why China forecasting has such a poor track record is that Westerners constantly invoke the model and experience of the West to explain China, and it is a false prophet. Until we start trying to understand China on its own terms, rather than as a Western-style nation in the making, we will continue to get it wrong.

The Google affair tells us much about what China is and what it will be like. The Internet has been seen in the West as the quintessential expression of the free exchange of ideas and information, untrammeled by government interference and increasingly global in reach. But the Chinese government has shown that the Internet can be successfully filtered and controlled. Google's mission, "to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful," has clashed with the age-old presumption of Chinese rulers of the need and responsibility to control. In this battle, there will be only one winner: China. Google will be obliged either to accept Chinese regulations or exit the world's largest Internet market, with serious consequences for its long-term global ambitions. This is a metaphor for our times: America's most dynamic company cannot take on the Chinese government—even on an issue like free and open information—and win.

Moreover, as China becomes increasingly important as a market and player, what happens to the Internet in China will have profound consequences for the Internet globally. It is already clear that the Google model of a free and open Internet, an exemplar of the American idea of the future, cannot and will not prevail. China's Internet will continue to be policed and controlled, information filtered, sites prohibited, noncompliant search engines excluded, and sensitive search words disallowed. And where China goes, others, also informed by different values, are already and will follow. The Internet, far from being a great big unified global space, will be fragmented and segmented. Another Western shibboleth about the future will thereby fall. It will not signal the end of the free flow of information—notwithstanding all the controls, the Internet has transformed the volume and quality of information available to Chinese citizens—but it will take place more on Chinese than Western terms.

If we want to understand the future, we need to go back to the drawing board. China—as we can see with increasing clarity—is destined to become the world's largest economy and is likely in time to far outdistance the U.S. This process will remorselessly shift the balance of power in China's favor. Just as once a large share of the American market was a precondition for a firm being a major global player, this mantle will increasingly be assumed instead by the Chinese market, except to a far greater extent because its population is four times the size. Furthermore, China's expanding economic clout means that its government is enjoying rapidly growing global authority. It can even take on Google and be sure of victory.

Facing up to the fact that China is very different from the West, that it simply does not work or think like us, is proving far more difficult. A classic illustration is the West's failure to understand the strength and durability of the Chinese state, which defies all predictions of its demise, remains omnipresent in Chinese lives, still owns most major firms, and proves remarkably adept at finding new ways to counter the influence of the U.S. global media. Western observers typically explain the intrusiveness of the Chinese government in terms of paranoia—and in a huge and diverse country the rulers have always seen instability as an ever-present danger—but there is a deeper reason why the state enjoys such a high-profile role in Chinese society.

It is seen by the Chinese not as an alien presence to be constantly pruned back, as in the West, especially the U.S., but as the embodiment and guardian of society. Rather than alien, it is seen as an intimate, in the manner of the head of the household. It might seem an extraordinary proposition, but the Chinese state enjoys a remarkable legitimacy among its people, greater than in Western societies. And the reason lies deep in China's history. China may call itself a nation-state (although only for the past century), but in essence it is a civilization-state dating back at least two millennia. Maintaining the unity of Chinese civilization is regarded as the most important political priority and seen as the sacred task of the state, hence its unique role: there is no Western parallel.

Chinese modernity will not resemble Western modernity, and a world dominated by China will not resemble our own. One consequence is already apparent in the developing world: the state is back in fashion; the Washington Consensus has been eclipsed. In this new world, Chinese ways of thinking—from Confucian values and their notion of the state to the family and parenting—will become increasingly influential. Google's fate is a sign of the world to come, and the sooner we come to appreciate the nature of a world run by China, the better we will be able to deal with it.

Jacques is the author of When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order
 
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