北京现象:开玛莎拉蒂做UBER司机

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(Updates previous version of this story.)


By Christopher Beam

(Bloomberg) -- Emerging from a nightclub near Workers’

Stadium in Beijing at 1:30 a.m. on a Saturday in June, Mikael

Hveem ordered an Uber. He selected the cheapest car option and

was surprised when the vehicle that rolled up was a dark blue

Maserati. The driver, a young, baby-faced Chinese man,

introduced himself as Jason. Hveem asked him why he was driving

an Uber—he obviously didn’t need the cash. Jason said he did it

to meet people, especially girls. Driving around late at night

in Beijing’s nightclub district, he figured he’d find the kind

of woman who would be charmed by a clean-cut 22-year-old in a

sports car.

When I heard this story from a friend who had also been in

the car, I asked for the driver’s contact info. I introduced

myself to Jason over WeChat, China’s popular mobile app, and

asked for an interview. He replied immediately with a screen

shot that included photos of women in various states of undress.

“Best hookers in bj :),” he added. I explained there had been a

misunderstanding, and we arranged to have coffee.

When we met at a cafe in Beijing’s business district, it

was clear that Jason, whose surname is Zhang, was different from

other young Chinese. He had a job, at a media company that

produced reality TV shows, but didn’t seem especially busy. He’d

studied in the U.S., but at a golf academy in Florida, and he’d

dropped out after two years. His father was the head of a major

HR company, and his mother was a government official. He wore a

$5,500 IWC watch because, he said, he’d lost his expensive one.

I asked him how much money he had. “I don’t know,” he said.

“More than I can spend.” So this was it: I had found, in the

wild, one of the elusive breed known in China as the fuerdai, or

“second-generation rich.”

As portrayed in the local press, fuerdai are to China what

Paris Hilton was to the U.S. a decade ago, only less tasteful.

Every few months there’s a fuerdai scandal, whether it’s a photo

of a woman about to set fire to a pile of 100-yuan ($16) notes;

members of the much derided Sports Car Club posing beside their

Lamborghinis; or someone pulling a gun during a street race. In

2013 reports of a fuerdai sex party at the beach resort of Sanya

provoked a nationwide finger-wag. Two prominent rich kids got

into a public arms race over who had the bigger stash: The

widely despised socialite Guo Meimei posted photos online of

herself with 5 million yuan worth of casino chips; her rival

responded with a screen shot of his bank statement, which

appeared to contain 3.7 billion yuan. (Guo was sentenced to five

years in prison for running a gambling den.) Recently, the son

of Wang Jianlin, a real estate mogul and the richest man in

China, trolled the nation by posting a photo of his dog wearing

two gold Apple Watches, one on each forepaw. Fuerdai outrages

occasionally feature government intrigue, such as a 2012 Ferrari

crash in Beijing involving two young women and the son of a

high-level official, all of whom were at least partially naked

when they were thrown from the car. The man’s father, a top aide

to then-president Hu Jintao, was later arrested and charged with

corruption.

The fuerdai (pronounced foo-arr-dye) aren’t just an

embarrassment. The Communist Party seems to consider them an

economic or even political threat. President Xi Jinping himself

spoke out this year, advising the second generation to “think

about the source of their wealth and how to behave after

becoming affluent.” An article published by the United Front

Work Department, the bureau that manages relations between the

party and nonparty elite, warned: “They know only how to show

off their wealth but don’t know how to create wealth.” Some

local governments have taken steps to reeducate their wealthy

elite. In June, according to Beijing Youth Daily, 70 heirs to

major Chinese companies attended lectures on filial piety and

the role of traditional values in business.

While Xi’s anticorruption campaign has curbed some of the

most outrageous wealth-flaunting, the gap between rich and poor

is still evident to anyone on a Beijing street weaving between

fruit vendor carts and black Audis. Now, as the economy slows

and the party looks for scapegoats, the fuerdai are in the

precarious position of having to justify their existence and

show that China’s future leaders aren’t just money-igniting,

Ferrari-wrecking layabouts. Not all of them, anyway.

After a few weeks of nosing around, I persuaded a crew of

fuerdai to invite me to one of their occasional dinners. When I

arrived, I wondered if I’d come to the wrong place. It was an

outdoor barbecue spot in northern Beijing, with locals sitting

on stools so low they were almost squatting, swilling Yanjing

beer and chewing on lamb skewers. Identifying the

centimillionaire scions among the riffraff was difficult. The

fuerdai trickled in, dressed the same as everyone else in the

restaurant—in tank tops, button-downs, jeans, flip-flops. The

only giveaway was the liquor they brought: French Champagne and

a bottle of Maotai, the choicest brand of baijiu. Martin Hang,

the gregarious organizer of the dinner and editor of a magazine

called Fortune Generation(no relation to the U.S. publication),

introduced everyone. The dozen guests included Wang Daqi, 30,

son of a famous business consultant, who had recently written a

book about rich kids in China; Albert Tang, 20, a philosophy

student at Bard whose father runs a major Beijing publishing

house; and Sophia Cheng, 27, the only woman in the group. It

still wasn’t clear to me what threshold of wealth one needed to

exceed to be fuerdai, but Cheng assured me she qualified. (Hang

disagreed.) Her parents had given her a vast amount—more than

100 million yuan, she said—which she invested in film, mobile-

gaming, and meat-processing companies.

Drinking began in earnest before the food arrived. We

toasted as a group, then in pairs, then in subgroups, then in

pairs again, until everyone was so shattered that it felt like

we’d known each other forever. Conversation volleyed between

business and gossip. One member of the group was dubbed the

Champagne Prince for his ordering habits at clubs. Another

attendee, Lin Xin, 30, talked up his company’s technology for

authenticating antiques. Someone joked about how wannabe rich

kids would go to clubs and rent bottles of expensive liquor to

display on their table to make it look like they had money.

(“But what if a girl wants to drink it?” another person

wondered.) Cheng mentioned that she had a few spare chickens in

her car; did anyone want to try some? Tang, the philosophy

student, pulled me aside and asked what I knew about the

Freemasons.

At the center of it all was Hang, who, as editor of Fortune

Generation and a prominent member of the Relay China Elite

Association, a nonprofit that serves as a social club for the

second-generation rich, functions as a connector among China’s

children of privilege. Hang, 31, explained how Relay works.

“We’re trying to help the second generation do better together,”

he said, speaking carefully and with precision, even after many

drinks. Founded in 2008, Relay was created to help fuerdai meet

other fuerdai, who might be facing similar challenges of wealth.

There’s an initiation fee of 200,000 yuan, and members must

prove that their family businesses pay at least 50 million yuan

in annual taxes. At forums held several times a year, the heirs

listen to lectures on topics such as how to minimize taxes or

maximize profit (“All legal stuff,” one member assured me) and

visit each other’s companies. “Most of the time the forum is

very boring,” Hang said. He rolled out the magazine in 2011,

hoping to promote a more positive image of fuerdai than the

decadent wastrels usually portrayed in the media. It was a

rebranding: Relay’s members dropped the fu (“wealthy”) from

fuerdai and started to refer to themselves using a new term,

chuangerdai, which means “second-generation entrepreneurs,” or

just erdai, “second generation.” Each month the magazine cover

features a different child of privilege, usually male, wearing a

suit and striking a casually authoritative pose—for the July

issue, while leaning on an Audi. (The two-page ad immediately

following the cover is also for Audi.)

“They know only how to show off their wealth but don't know

how to create wealth”

The purpose of the organization, Hang said, is to encourage

second-generation kids to take over the family business or at

least play a role in its management. Such companies are crucial

to the Chinese economy, he said: Not only do they make up 85

percent of non-state-owned enterprises, they also put long-term

success ahead of quarterly results.

The downside is that family-run companies are, well, run by

families, and most kids in China don’t relish the idea of

working alongside their parents. Hang took issue with the

statistic, released by Shanghai Jiaotong University in 2012,

that 82 percent of second-generation heirs aren’t willing to

take over their family business. He didn’t dispute the data so

much as the semantics: “They aren’t willing to do it, but they

still have to.”

It’s a distinction that Hang knows well. His father’s

advertising agency, started in 1993, is one of the largest of

its kind in Jiangxi province. After graduating from college,

Hang avoided the agency. He studied financial management in the

Netherlands and bought the rights to Norron, a Norse god-themed

online game. He was cocky about his business acumen. “I thought

I was awesome,” he said. “I was a fuerdai—I wasn’t interested in

talking to other people.” When the game failed to take off, Hang

decided to join his father’s company. “I had a choice,” he said.

“I could do something else, but it would make my parents work

very hard. They never said I had to, but I thought it was

necessary.”

All fuerdai face a version of the same problem: They have

everything but the ability to surpass their own parents.

Whatever they achieve will be credited to their family, not to

themselves. Hang described always being introduced as “the son

of Mr. Hang.” When Wang, the author, found a publisher for his

book, he didn’t know if they wanted to publish it because it was

good, or because of his famous father. “People will always say

your only competence is that you were reincarnated into a good

family,” he said. He told me about the difficulty of explaining

the burdens of inheritance to the nonwealthy. “They never

understand—‘Why are you in pain?’ ” said Wang. “I say it’s not

relevant. The amount of wealth doesn’t determine how happy you

are. You can only know by experiencing it.”

It’s no surprise that most fuerdai, after summering in Bali

and wintering in the Alps, reading philosophy at Oxford and

getting MBAs from Stanford, are reluctant to take over the

family toothpaste cap factory. Ping Fan, 36, who serves as

executive deputy director of Relay, moved to Shanghai to start

his own investment firm rather than work at his father’s real

estate company in Liaoning province. He picked Shanghai, he

said, “because it was far from my family.” After graduating from

Columbia University, Even Jiang, 28, briefly considered joining

her mother’s diamond import business, but they disagreed about

the direction of the company. Instead, she went to work at

Merrill Lynch, then returned to Shanghai to start a concierge

service, inspired by the American Express service she used when

living in Manhattan. Liu Jiawen, 32, whose parents own a

successful clothing company in Hunan province, tried to start

her own clothing line after graduating. “I wanted to show I

could do it on my own,” she said. The company failed.

Along with riches, fuerdai often inherit a surplus of

emotional trauma. The first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs

came of age during a time that rewarded callousness. “They were

the generation of the Cultural Revolution,” said Wang. “During

that time, there was no humanity.” His grandfather, the

principal of a middle school in Guizhou province, was humiliated

by Red Guards. “They were raised cruelly—there was no mercy. It

was survival of the fittest.” Many fuerdai have their parents’

same coldness, Wang said: “They’re really hard to be friends

with.”

Zhang, the Uber driver, was sent to boarding school

starting in kindergarten, even though his parents lived only a

short distance from the school. Perhaps to compensate for their

inattention, they gave him everything he wanted, including

hundreds of toy cars. Last Christmas he bought himself the

Maserati. “It’s like their childhood has not ended,” Wang said

of his fellow rich kids. “Their childhood was not fully

satisfied, so they always want to prolong the process of being

children.” Thanks to China’s one-child policy, most fuerdai grew

up without siblings. That’s why so many travel in packs on

Saturday nights, Wang said. “They want to be taken care of. They

want to be loved.”

For Zhang, partying is a way of staving off boredom. He

used to go out clubbing five nights a week. “If I didn’t go, I

couldn’t sleep,” he said. He doesn’t lack for companionship, he

added. Two or three times a week, he’ll hire a high-end sex

worker—a “booty call,” in his words—for $1,000 or more. Zhang

prefers paying for sex to flirting with a girl under the

pretense that he might date her. “This way is more direct,” he

said. “I think this is a way of respecting women.” But some

nights, sitting at home alone, he scrolls through the contacts

on his phone only to reach the bottom without finding anyone he

wants to call. When we first spoke, he said he had a girlfriend

of three years who treated him well, but that he didn’t love

her. “You’re the first person I’ve told that to,” he said.

Most fuerdai don’t talk about their problems so openly.

“They have trust issues,” said Wayne Chen, 32, a second-

generation investor from Shanghai. “They need a place to talk.

They need a group.” Relay offers a setting in which they can

speak honestly, without having to pretend. “It’s similar to a

rehab center,” he said.

In July, Jiang noticed that business at a barbecue

restaurant she owns in Shanghai was slower than usual. “It was

only half of the crowd,” she said. The stock market had been

falling since June and was down 38 percent from its peak by the

end of the summer. Over dinner at the restaurant, I asked Jiang

and Chen, who are a couple, as well as Hang, if fuerdai had felt

the pain of the market crash. “Of course,” Jiang said. “A lot of

their family companies are listed.” She herself had bought

stocks, she said, but pulled out when the market got too bumpy.

Chen said his family money was invested in a “risk-averse way,”

much of it in fixed-income assets and funds of funds.

Still, the volatility—and more important, the government’s

clumsy response to it—signaled a deeper discord within China’s

slowing economy, which affects the fuerdai as much as anyone.

Raising money is tougher than before, said Jiang. Hang said the

slowdown has hurt ad sales at the magazine, particularly from

real estate companies.

Many fuerdai have moved money overseas—Boston Consulting

Group put the amount of Chinese money invested abroad at $450

billion in 2013—often with the goal of gaining foreign

citizenship. A survey conducted in 2013 found that 64 percent of

Chinese high-net-worth individuals had emigrated or wanted to

emigrate overseas. I asked Hang, Chen, and Jiang if fuerdai

worry about their money. “Some do,” Hang said. “His dad sent him

to the U.S.” He laughed and pointed at Chen, who is now an

American citizen. Hang, who is married and has a 4-year-old son,

said he hasn’t ruled out emigrating.

It’s not just China’s stock market drop that makes fuerdai

jittery. “It’s society, too,” said Chen. “Like the Occupy Wall

Street protests.” There’s always been a tendency in Chinese

society to “hate the rich,” Hang said. It’s the same sentiment

that fueled the Cultural Revolution, and was once practically

the Communist Party’s mission statement. (Emphasis on “was.”)

Exacerbating the problem, most fuerdai don’t mix much with

the working classes. “When we were children, we went to the best

schools, so we didn’t encounter a lot of poor people,” Hang

said. “This is very dangerous for society.” Relay is therefore

planning to start a program fostering ties between fuerdai and

children from the countryside. It also organizes charity drives.

After a chemical factory exploded in Tianjin in August, killing

more than 100 people, its members donated 1.5 million yuan

through the local government. To hear Hang explain it,

philanthropy is about more than just social responsibility—it’s

about social stability.

That said, when I asked Jiang if she thought inequality was

a problem in China, she was ambivalent. “I don’t know,” she

said. “There are two groups of poor people. One is, you don’t

work hard. You deserve to be poor because you don’t work hard.

Second is, you work hard but can’t succeed. I think we should

help the second group of people. … There’s a saying, jiu ji bu

jiu pin—‘We’ll help you if you have an emergency, but we cannot

help you if you’re poor.’ ”

The search for meaning is arguably harder for fuerdai than

it is for most people

One day this summer, at the urging of a friend, Wang

decided to call his father and tell him he loved him. Wang

senior picked up the phone. “I love you, Dad,” Daqi said. There

was a pause. “Are you drunk?” his father asked. Wang told this

story at a gathering at his father’s complex on a Friday night

in August. The guests were friends he had met through

Lifespring, a self-help company that, with introductory classes

costing upward of $1,000, caters largely to fuerdai. (The

original Lifespring was the subject of numerous lawsuits in the

U.S. in the 1980s and ’90s, including charges of wrongful death,

and went out of business in 1998.) Wang said the group has

helped him reconcile his feelings about his father and has also

provided the support and community he was unable to find at,

say, the club.

With instant gratification never more than a credit card

swipe away, the search for meaning is arguably harder for

fuerdai than it is for most people. Some, like Jiang and Wang,

feel most purposeful when deviating from their parents’ path.

For others, returning to the family business is, to their

surprise, a source of satisfaction. Liu said she’s glad she took

over her family’s clothing company because it made her parents

happy—a sentiment her former rebellious self would probably have

scoffed at.

Not everyone has discovered a purpose. Zhang, the Uber

driver, said his job at the TV production company is hardly his

ideal career. But he’s not sure what is. “As a kid, I had a lot

of dreams,” he said when we met up at the cafe near his office.

“I wanted to be a golfer or a race car driver or a doctor,

something like that. … But when you get older, you see more, and

you see that some goals are just a dream.” He lit up a

cigarette—now illegal indoors in Beijing—barely casting a glance

to see if a waiter would stop him. Zhang never had any

limitations, which was perhaps itself a limitation. “I don’t

really have a plan,” he said. “Probably it’s a sad thing, but

it’s the truth.” When I asked him if he’s happy, he said it’s

all a question of attitude. “You can find a million reasons to

be sad,” he said, “but you only have to find one reason to be

happy. Every day I find one.” I asked him what today’s reason

was. “Today, I meet you,” he said. “It’s a happy thing.”


To contact the author of this story:

Christopher Beam in at jcbeam@gmail.com

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Nick Summers at nsummers1@bloomberg.net
 
助人为乐。
 
文章太长, 估计是为了泡妹子 ...
 
这有什么。我曾经认识的开宝马给人送外卖的小留都不下两三个。
 
这有什么。我曾经认识的开宝马给人送外卖的小留都不下两三个。
宝马算豪华车么?
 
你肯定没看文章
忒长,还英文。。。楼主不能这么赚钱法。 :monster:
黄主任讲话,消耗他人时间等于谋财害命。
 
看了一下,是为了泡妞。
 
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