解封了，怎么还是排大队做核酸，还是收费的
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我同学珠海说检测确实收费2.5元
每个省不一样，有松有紧。河北每天感染数都减少，呵呵。
河北211例(石家庄150 秦皇岛41 廊坊8 邯郸3 张家口2 沧州2 衡水2 承德1 保定1 雄安新区1)
河北走在全国最前面，直接没有数据了。那么就看河北省各地级市医院有没有消息
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文茜的世界周报报道，中国结束清零任重道远，至少需要一年时间，原因很多，最主要的几个：
中国30多年来，过于注重经济发展，各位领袖，包括习，一直忽视医疗系统的发展和人员的配备。台湾的医疗体系在世界上名列前茅，病床比例高于大陆将近100倍，最近半年疫情严重，依然发生挤兑，不少各种重症病人无法就医，高新冠死亡率。甚至蒙古国的病床率比大陆高一倍。
中国老人疫苗率不够高，而且大陆的疫苗明显不如辉瑞和Modena，这是大陆无法放弃清零政策的最大障碍。中国这三年来，把大量的钱花在核酸测试和封城隔离上，中国的宣传称，每天可达一亿管核酸测试，平均每管混检10人，一天可以检测10亿，可靠性，准确率难以掌控，最近不断暴露的张珊珊，张核子等一系列核酸检测公司丑闻。
根据西方各国，以及新西兰，台湾，新加坡等国的经验，中国没有准备好Plan B，如要开放必须迅速提高老年人的疫苗率。
几天前，纽约时报刊登诺贝尔奖获得者，Paul Krugman 的文章：How China Lost the Covid War? 指出中国的封城在初期是非常正确的措施，但错在没有与时共进调整政策。中国在疫情初期很优效，但是专制统治的特点是不承认错误，不肯接受他们不喜欢的证据。
最后10分钟讲中国疫情。
By Paul Krugman
Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Do you remember when Covid was going to establish China as the world’s dominant power? As late as mid-2021, my inbox was full of assertions that China’s apparent success in containing the coronavirus showed the superiority of the Chinese system over Western societies that, as one commentator put it, “did not have the ability to quickly organize every citizen around a single goal.”
At this point, however, China is flailing even as other nations are more or less getting back to normal life. It’s still pursuing its zero-Covid policy, enforcing draconian restrictions on everyday activities every time new cases emerge. This is creating immense personal hardship and cramping the economy; cities under lockdown account for almost 60 percent of China’s G.D.P.
In early November many workers reportedly fled the giant Foxconn plant that produces iPhones, fearing not just that they would be locked in but that they would go hungry. And in the last few days many Chinese, in cities across the nation, have braved harsh repression to demonstrate against government policies.
I’m not a China expert, and I have no idea where this is going. As far as I can tell, actual China experts don’t know, either. But I think it’s worth asking what lessons we can draw from China’s journey from would-be role model to debacle.
Crucially, the lesson is not that we shouldn’t pursue public health measures in the face of a pandemic. Sometimes such measures are necessary. But governments need to be able to change policy in the face of changing circumstances and new evidence.
And what we’re seeing in China is the problem with autocratic governments that can’t admit mistakes and won’t accept evidence they don’t like.
In the first year of the pandemic, strong, even draconian restrictions made sense. It was never realistic to imagine that mask mandates and even lockdowns could prevent the coronavirus from spreading. What they could do, however, was slow the spread.
At first, the goal in the U.S. and many other countries was to “flatten the curve,” avoiding a peak in cases that would overwhelm the health care system. Then, once it became clear that effective vaccines would become available, the goal was or should have been to delay infections until widespread vaccination could provide protection.
You could see this strategy at work in places like New Zealand and Taiwan, which initially imposed stringent rules that held cases and deaths to very low levels, then relaxed these rules once their populations were widely vaccinated. Even with vaccines, opening up led to a large rise in cases and deaths — but not nearly as severe as would have happened if these places had opened up earlier, so that overall deaths per capita have been far lower than in the United States.
China’s leaders, however, seem to have believed that lockdowns could permanently stomp out the coronavirus, and they have been acting as if they still believe this even in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.
At the same time, China utterly failed to develop a Plan B. Many older Chinese — the most vulnerable group — still aren’t fully vaccinated. China has also refused to accept foreign-made vaccines without unreasonable conditions that were rejected by the manufacturers, even though its homegrown vaccines, which don’t use mRNA technology, are less effective than the shots the rest of the world is getting.
All of this leaves Xi Jinping’s regime in a trap of its own making. The zero-Covid policy is obviously unsustainable, but ending it would mean tacitly admitting error, which autocrats never find easy. Furthermore, loosening the rules would mean a huge spike in cases and deaths.
Not only have many of the most vulnerable Chinese remained unvaccinated or received inferior shots, but because the coronavirus has been suppressed, few Chinese have natural immunity, and the nation also has very few intensive care beds, leaving it without the capacity to deal with a Covid surge.
It’s a nightmare, and nobody knows how it ends. But what can the rest of us learn from China?
First, autocracy is not, in fact, superior to democracy. Autocrats can act quickly and decisively, but they can also make huge mistakes because nobody can tell them when they’re wrong. At a fundamental level there’s a clear resemblance between Xi’s refusal to back off zero Covid and Vladimir Putin’s disaster in Ukraine.
Second, we’re seeing why it’s important for leaders to be open to evidence and be willing to change course when they’ve been proved wrong.
Ironically, in the United States the politicians whose dogmatism most resembles that of Chinese leaders are right-wing Republicans. China has rejected foreign mRNA vaccines, despite clear evidence of their superiority; many Republican leaders have rejected vaccines in general, even in the face of a huge partisan divide in death rates linked to differential vaccination rates. This contrasts with Democrats, who have in general followed something like New Zealand’s approach, if much less effectively — restrictions early on, relaxed as vaccination spread.
In short, what we can learn from China is broader than the failure of specific policies; it is that we should beware of would-be autocrats who insist, regardless of the evidence, that they’re always right.
www.nytimes.com
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www.deccanherald.com
中国30多年来，过于注重经济发展，各位领袖，包括习，一直忽视医疗系统的发展和人员的配备。台湾的医疗体系在世界上名列前茅，病床比例高于大陆将近100倍，最近半年疫情严重，依然发生挤兑，不少各种重症病人无法就医，高新冠死亡率。甚至蒙古国的病床率比大陆高一倍。
中国老人疫苗率不够高，而且大陆的疫苗明显不如辉瑞和Modena，这是大陆无法放弃清零政策的最大障碍。中国这三年来，把大量的钱花在核酸测试和封城隔离上，中国的宣传称，每天可达一亿管核酸测试，平均每管混检10人，一天可以检测10亿，可靠性，准确率难以掌控，最近不断暴露的张珊珊，张核子等一系列核酸检测公司丑闻。
根据西方各国，以及新西兰，台湾，新加坡等国的经验，中国没有准备好Plan B，如要开放必须迅速提高老年人的疫苗率。
几天前，纽约时报刊登诺贝尔奖获得者，Paul Krugman 的文章：How China Lost the Covid War? 指出中国的封城在初期是非常正确的措施，但错在没有与时共进调整政策。中国在疫情初期很优效，但是专制统治的特点是不承认错误，不肯接受他们不喜欢的证据。
最后10分钟讲中国疫情。
How China Lost the Covid War
Nov. 28, 2022By Paul Krugman
Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Do you remember when Covid was going to establish China as the world’s dominant power? As late as mid-2021, my inbox was full of assertions that China’s apparent success in containing the coronavirus showed the superiority of the Chinese system over Western societies that, as one commentator put it, “did not have the ability to quickly organize every citizen around a single goal.”
At this point, however, China is flailing even as other nations are more or less getting back to normal life. It’s still pursuing its zero-Covid policy, enforcing draconian restrictions on everyday activities every time new cases emerge. This is creating immense personal hardship and cramping the economy; cities under lockdown account for almost 60 percent of China’s G.D.P.
In early November many workers reportedly fled the giant Foxconn plant that produces iPhones, fearing not just that they would be locked in but that they would go hungry. And in the last few days many Chinese, in cities across the nation, have braved harsh repression to demonstrate against government policies.
I’m not a China expert, and I have no idea where this is going. As far as I can tell, actual China experts don’t know, either. But I think it’s worth asking what lessons we can draw from China’s journey from would-be role model to debacle.
Crucially, the lesson is not that we shouldn’t pursue public health measures in the face of a pandemic. Sometimes such measures are necessary. But governments need to be able to change policy in the face of changing circumstances and new evidence.
And what we’re seeing in China is the problem with autocratic governments that can’t admit mistakes and won’t accept evidence they don’t like.
In the first year of the pandemic, strong, even draconian restrictions made sense. It was never realistic to imagine that mask mandates and even lockdowns could prevent the coronavirus from spreading. What they could do, however, was slow the spread.
At first, the goal in the U.S. and many other countries was to “flatten the curve,” avoiding a peak in cases that would overwhelm the health care system. Then, once it became clear that effective vaccines would become available, the goal was or should have been to delay infections until widespread vaccination could provide protection.
You could see this strategy at work in places like New Zealand and Taiwan, which initially imposed stringent rules that held cases and deaths to very low levels, then relaxed these rules once their populations were widely vaccinated. Even with vaccines, opening up led to a large rise in cases and deaths — but not nearly as severe as would have happened if these places had opened up earlier, so that overall deaths per capita have been far lower than in the United States.
China’s leaders, however, seem to have believed that lockdowns could permanently stomp out the coronavirus, and they have been acting as if they still believe this even in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.
At the same time, China utterly failed to develop a Plan B. Many older Chinese — the most vulnerable group — still aren’t fully vaccinated. China has also refused to accept foreign-made vaccines without unreasonable conditions that were rejected by the manufacturers, even though its homegrown vaccines, which don’t use mRNA technology, are less effective than the shots the rest of the world is getting.
All of this leaves Xi Jinping’s regime in a trap of its own making. The zero-Covid policy is obviously unsustainable, but ending it would mean tacitly admitting error, which autocrats never find easy. Furthermore, loosening the rules would mean a huge spike in cases and deaths.
Not only have many of the most vulnerable Chinese remained unvaccinated or received inferior shots, but because the coronavirus has been suppressed, few Chinese have natural immunity, and the nation also has very few intensive care beds, leaving it without the capacity to deal with a Covid surge.
It’s a nightmare, and nobody knows how it ends. But what can the rest of us learn from China?
First, autocracy is not, in fact, superior to democracy. Autocrats can act quickly and decisively, but they can also make huge mistakes because nobody can tell them when they’re wrong. At a fundamental level there’s a clear resemblance between Xi’s refusal to back off zero Covid and Vladimir Putin’s disaster in Ukraine.
Second, we’re seeing why it’s important for leaders to be open to evidence and be willing to change course when they’ve been proved wrong.
Ironically, in the United States the politicians whose dogmatism most resembles that of Chinese leaders are right-wing Republicans. China has rejected foreign mRNA vaccines, despite clear evidence of their superiority; many Republican leaders have rejected vaccines in general, even in the face of a huge partisan divide in death rates linked to differential vaccination rates. This contrasts with Democrats, who have in general followed something like New Zealand’s approach, if much less effectively — restrictions early on, relaxed as vaccination spread.
In short, what we can learn from China is broader than the failure of specific policies; it is that we should beware of would-be autocrats who insist, regardless of the evidence, that they’re always right.
Opinion | How China Lost the Covid War (Published 2022)
What the rest of us can learn from the zero-Covid disaster.
How China lost the Covid war
At this point, however, China is flailing, even as other nations are more or less getting back to normal life
www.deccanherald.com
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中国若“全面放开”可能有多少人死于新冠?为什么?
03.12.2022
在严格的“动态清零”防疫政策引发民众不满乃至抗议示威之后，包括北京和深圳在内的多个城市开始逐步放松防疫措施。不过由于中国疫苗接种率相对较低和缺乏群体免疫力，“全面放开”可能带来的公共健康后果和医疗系统所面临的挑战也令人担忧。
（德国之声中文网）中国在加快放松防疫措施的步伐，北京居民对于政府取消新冠病毒测试点表示欢呼，而深圳则不再要求人们在乘坐交通工具或者出入公共场所时出示核酸检测阴性的证明。尽管近日来中国单日新增感染病例数量不断地刷新纪录，一些城市仍然放松了在核酸检测和隔离方面的规定。路透社指出，中国希望让自己的“动态清零”防疫政策更具有针对性。
在社交媒体上，不少人分享了关于北京等地放松防疫措施的内容。其中一段显示工人用起重机将核酸检测设备搬到卡车上的视频广为传播。居住在北京的作家高瑜也发推文表示，自己居住的住宅楼已经解封，负责站岗的“大白”防疫人员也撤走了。
对“全面解封”既期待又担忧
路透社指出，面对严格的“清零”防疫政策开始逐渐松动，民众的心情是宽慰和担忧交织，因为全面解封可能带来的健康后果和对医疗体系的影响尚未可知。不少医学研究者已经对中国如果全面放开防疫措施，将会有多少人死于新冠肺炎进行了分析。其中大多数专家都认为，疫苗接种率相对较低和缺乏群体免疫力，是中国面对新冠病毒最主要的弱点。
02:12 分钟。
时政风云 | 30.11.2022
上海老年人如何看待动态清零？
对于“全面放开”可能造成的死亡人数，存在各种不同的估计。广西疾控中心主任医师卓家同上个月在《上海预防医学》杂志上发表论文指出，如果参照香港今年的疫情发展，中国内地在放开防疫规定的情况下，可能面临200万人死于新冠肺炎。根据他的预测，感染新冠病毒的人数将会激增至超过2.33亿。今年5月，由中国和美国研究人员共同在专业杂志《自然-医学》（Nature Medicine）上发表的文章，如果中国放弃“清零“政策，同时又不采取其它保障措施比如加强疫苗接种和改善治疗条件，那么将有超过150万人因感染新冠而死亡。
根据他们的预测，参照全球收集的数据，在上述情况下，感染高峰时期对重症监护的需求将会超过现有容量的15倍。不过，这些专家也指出，如果能够在疫苗接种方面有所突破，那么这个150万的死亡数字有望得到明显减少。
（路透社等）
© 2022年德国之声版权声明：本文所有内容受到著作权法保护，如无德国之声特别授权，不得擅自使用。任何不当行为都将导致追偿，并受到刑事追究。
https://amp.dw.com/zh/中国若全面放开可能有多少人死于新冠为什么/a-63975921
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文茜的世界周报报道，中国结束清零任重道远，至少需要一年时间，原因很多，最主要的几个：
中国30多年来，过于注重经济发展，各位领袖，包括习，一直忽视医疗系统的发展和人员的配备。台湾的医疗体系在世界上名列前茅，病床比例高于大陆将近100倍，最近半年疫情严重，依然发生挤兑，不少各种重症病人无法就医，高新冠死亡率。甚至蒙古国的病床率比大陆高一倍。
中国老人疫苗率不够高，而且大陆的疫苗明显不如辉瑞和Modena，这是大陆无法放弃清零政策的最大障碍。中国这三年来，把大量的钱花在核酸测试和封城隔离上，中国的宣传称，每天可达一亿管核酸测试，平均每管混检10人，一天可以检测10亿，可靠性，准确率难以掌控，最近不断暴露的张珊珊，张核子等一系列核酸检测公司丑闻。
根据西方各国，以及新西兰，台湾，新加坡等国的经验，中国没有准备好Plan B，如要开放必须迅速提高老年人的疫苗率。
几天前，纽约时报刊登诺贝尔奖获得者，Paul Krugman 的文章：How China Lost the Covid War? 指出中国的封城在初期是非常正确的措施，但错在没有与时共进调整政策。中国在疫情初期很优效，但是专制统治的特点是不承认错误，不肯接受他们不喜欢的证据。
浏览附件1073974
最后10分钟讲中国疫情。
How China Lost the Covid War
Nov. 28, 2022
By Paul Krugman
Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Do you remember when Covid was going to establish China as the world’s dominant power? As late as mid-2021, my inbox was full of assertions that China’s apparent success in containing the coronavirus showed the superiority of the Chinese system over Western societies that, as one commentator put it, “did not have the ability to quickly organize every citizen around a single goal.”
At this point, however, China is flailing even as other nations are more or less getting back to normal life. It’s still pursuing its zero-Covid policy, enforcing draconian restrictions on everyday activities every time new cases emerge. This is creating immense personal hardship and cramping the economy; cities under lockdown account for almost 60 percent of China’s G.D.P.
In early November many workers reportedly fled the giant Foxconn plant that produces iPhones, fearing not just that they would be locked in but that they would go hungry. And in the last few days many Chinese, in cities across the nation, have braved harsh repression to demonstrate against government policies.
I’m not a China expert, and I have no idea where this is going. As far as I can tell, actual China experts don’t know, either. But I think it’s worth asking what lessons we can draw from China’s journey from would-be role model to debacle.
Crucially, the lesson is not that we shouldn’t pursue public health measures in the face of a pandemic. Sometimes such measures are necessary. But governments need to be able to change policy in the face of changing circumstances and new evidence.
And what we’re seeing in China is the problem with autocratic governments that can’t admit mistakes and won’t accept evidence they don’t like.
In the first year of the pandemic, strong, even draconian restrictions made sense. It was never realistic to imagine that mask mandates and even lockdowns could prevent the coronavirus from spreading. What they could do, however, was slow the spread.
At first, the goal in the U.S. and many other countries was to “flatten the curve,” avoiding a peak in cases that would overwhelm the health care system. Then, once it became clear that effective vaccines would become available, the goal was or should have been to delay infections until widespread vaccination could provide protection.
You could see this strategy at work in places like New Zealand and Taiwan, which initially imposed stringent rules that held cases and deaths to very low levels, then relaxed these rules once their populations were widely vaccinated. Even with vaccines, opening up led to a large rise in cases and deaths — but not nearly as severe as would have happened if these places had opened up earlier, so that overall deaths per capita have been far lower than in the United States.
China’s leaders, however, seem to have believed that lockdowns could permanently stomp out the coronavirus, and they have been acting as if they still believe this even in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.
At the same time, China utterly failed to develop a Plan B. Many older Chinese — the most vulnerable group — still aren’t fully vaccinated. China has also refused to accept foreign-made vaccines without unreasonable conditions that were rejected by the manufacturers, even though its homegrown vaccines, which don’t use mRNA technology, are less effective than the shots the rest of the world is getting.
All of this leaves Xi Jinping’s regime in a trap of its own making. The zero-Covid policy is obviously unsustainable, but ending it would mean tacitly admitting error, which autocrats never find easy. Furthermore, loosening the rules would mean a huge spike in cases and deaths.
Not only have many of the most vulnerable Chinese remained unvaccinated or received inferior shots, but because the coronavirus has been suppressed, few Chinese have natural immunity, and the nation also has very few intensive care beds, leaving it without the capacity to deal with a Covid surge.
It’s a nightmare, and nobody knows how it ends. But what can the rest of us learn from China?
First, autocracy is not, in fact, superior to democracy. Autocrats can act quickly and decisively, but they can also make huge mistakes because nobody can tell them when they’re wrong. At a fundamental level there’s a clear resemblance between Xi’s refusal to back off zero Covid and Vladimir Putin’s disaster in Ukraine.
Second, we’re seeing why it’s important for leaders to be open to evidence and be willing to change course when they’ve been proved wrong.
Ironically, in the United States the politicians whose dogmatism most resembles that of Chinese leaders are right-wing Republicans. China has rejected foreign mRNA vaccines, despite clear evidence of their superiority; many Republican leaders have rejected vaccines in general, even in the face of a huge partisan divide in death rates linked to differential vaccination rates. This contrasts with Democrats, who have in general followed something like New Zealand’s approach, if much less effectively — restrictions early on, relaxed as vaccination spread.
In short, what we can learn from China is broader than the failure of specific policies; it is that we should beware of would-be autocrats who insist, regardless of the evidence, that they’re always right.
也许需要注册Opinion | How China Lost the Covid War (Published 2022)
What the rest of us can learn from the zero-Covid disaster.
How China lost the Covid war
At this point, however, China is flailing, even as other nations are more or less getting back to normal life
文茜的这视频我也看了。她的病床比例台湾是大陆的百倍，我确实吓了一跳。还做了研究和搜索。
台湾在亚洲地区在医疗的投入占GDP比例确实是亚洲第一。
ICU 的比例确实很高，每万人icu 数是大陆的6倍左右
病床数比例。有不同来源。中国是千人中4-6.2个。台湾是6.9
说出百倍，就开始用一种新的谎言来给自己站台了。
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