大陆和台湾在1949年两岸分治时各自的财政资源和外援

[dreamland]

都是中立的CHATGPT分析调查所得

国民党从大陆退往台湾： 从大陆的各地的政府金库，拿走相当于 113–115 metric tons 公吨的黄金的外汇储备， 按当时的价值，是 1.3-1.5亿美元
共党把国民党赶走后，接手的时候在大陆各地总共拿到 232公斤的黄金的外汇， 相当于当时 260-300万美元

就是说， 当时的中国（共党+国民党）全部拥有的外汇贮备也就估计就在1.326-1.53亿美元，可见当时的中国在经历百年屈辱和百年战争后的积弱。而国民党从当时的中国的国库拿走了99%的外汇储备

1949年后， 10几年间两岸各自发展，有趣的是都是1949-1963
美国累计给台湾13-15亿美元的GRANT （是财政资助）， 没有利息，不需要还利息和本金。
苏联在同样的时期，给大陆共党政府累计给了3亿美元的低息贷款 （1%）， 大陆在1963年前给苏联全部还清所有利息和本金


对比国民党从大陆带去的价值1.3-1.5亿美元的外汇，和美国接近10倍的资助，就可以基本理解美国对台湾的重要的作用和现在的心态

台湾相当时间内人均GDP发展比大陆高很多，有个重要因素就是这个财政基础。
- 退守的时候，从大陆拿走99%的当时中国的外汇留底
- 美国在之后的10来年，又给了10倍于此的美国无偿外援。

Here’s what solid, citable sources say about what the Nationalist government (ROC) actually got out of the mainland in 1948–49 and what it meant for Taiwan’s economy:

What was taken to Taiwan (cashable assets)​

• Gold: credible published figures disagree on the exact amount moved from Shanghai/Xiamen to Taiwan. Reported numbers include:
  
  • ~800,000 taels used to back the first New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) issue, plus US$10 million in cash. That reserve reportedly backed the initial NT$200 million issue in 1949. South China Morning Post中國國民黨全球資訊網
  • ~2.27 million taels total moved, according to later KMT statements summarized in press coverage. MINING.COM
  • ~113–115 metric tons (≈ 3.65–3.70 million troy oz) is the tonnage range given in modern summaries of the 1948–49 transfer. (At the then‐fixed US$35/oz, that’s roughly US$128–130 million in 1950 dollars.) Wikipedia
  • Some Taiwanese and academic references cite ~4.5 million taels (≈ 168.8 tons), while others estimate ~3 million taels; these higher figures are debated. nthu-en.site.nthu.edu.twKURENAI
  • Conversion note: 1 tael ≈ 37.5 g (the measure commonly used in these sources). 800,000 taels ≈ 30 t; 2.27 million taels ≈ 85.1 t; 4.5 million taels ≈ 168.8 t.
    
• Foreign exchange & silver: Alongside gold, the ROC evacuated hard currency (≈US$10 million noted above) and other precious metals; exact totals for foreign exchange vary by source and are much less consistently documented than the gold tonnage itself. South China Morning Post中國國民黨全球資訊網

Why the figures differ​

Shipments occurred in multiple batches under wartime secrecy; memoirs, press accounts, party statements, and later scholarship drew on different archives. Modern summaries coalesce around ~113–115 tons, while KMT- or Taiwan-based narratives sometimes cite 800,000 taels used immediately for currency stabilization and larger totals for the entire evacuation. WikipediaSouth China Morning Post中國國民黨全球資訊網nthu-en.site.nthu.edu.tw

Immediate economic impact in Taiwan (1949–1952)​

1. Currency reform & ending hyperinflation
   
   • The gold (and US$ cash) gave credibility to introduce the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) in 1949 at 1 NTD = 40,000 Old Taiwan Dollars, helping arrest post-war hyperinflation. Contemporary accounts explicitly link ~800,000 taels + US$10m to the first NT$ issue. WikipediaSouth China Morning Post
2. Bridge financing for the state
   
   • The relocated reserves let the ROC keep government and military functions running on Taiwan during 1949–50, before external support resumed. Wikipedia
3. But stabilization quickly leaned on U.S. aid
   
   • After the Korean War (June 25, 1950), U.S. economic aid resumed and became the primary macro-stabilizer and import backstop. Scholarly estimates put U.S. economic aid at about US$1.4–1.5 billion (1951–65), with additional military aid, far exceeding the one-off value of the evacuated gold. Scholars Crossing+1ketagalanmedia.com

Medium-term development impact (1950s–1960s)​

• Land reform & rural reconstruction (via the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, JCRR) lifted farm output and incomes, creating the surplus and domestic market that fed early industrialization. This is repeatedly highlighted in the development literature as more important for growth than the gold windfall. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung LibraryCGSpaceBrill
• Policy evolution from early import-substitution to export promotion by the late 1950s/early 1960s (guided by technocrats like K. Y. Yin) underpinned the “Taiwan Miracle.” Again, this relied on policy and aid, not just reserves. PIIE

Bottom line​

• How much? Depending on the source, the ROC moved about 800,000 taels used immediately for currency backing and total evacuated gold in the ballpark of 85–115+ metric tons (with higher claims up to ~169 t). In 1950-dollar terms, that’s roughly US$95–130+ million (potentially up to ~US$190 million if the highest figure were correct). South China Morning PostMINING.COMWikipedianthu-en.site.nthu.edu.tw
• What did it do? It bought time—providing the hard-asset credibility to launch the New Taiwan Dollar and stop hyperinflation in 1949–50.
• What sustained growth? From 1950 onward, U.S. aid (≈US$1.4–1.5 billion), land reform, and policy changes were the decisive drivers of Taiwan’s 1950s-60s growth—not the gold alone. Scholars Crossing+1Brill

At 1949 when Communist took the power in mainland, how much value worth of these cashable asset , gold, foreign reserve are available for communist China givernment available?

ChatGPT said:​

Thought for 39s
Short answer: essentially very little. By the time the Communists took the mainland in 1949, the Nationalists had already removed most of the state’s liquid assets (gold, silver, hard currency). Contemporary takeovers of key financial centers found only token amounts left in official vaults, and the new regime had to rely on tight foreign-exchange controls, emergency collections from the private sector, and (from early 1950) Soviet credits.

What the PRC actually found on the mainland (illustrative snapshots)​

• Shanghai (mid-1949): when the Central Bank vault there was handed over, records cited in Chinese scholarship say about 6,180 taels of gold (≈ 232 kg) and ≈ 200,000 silver dollars remained—trivial by national standards. Guancha
• Multiple Chinese and Western summaries agree the KMT had already moved most official gold/silver/FX out of the mainland before major coastal cities fell, leaving the PRC with only scattered residues in captured banks. WikipediaWyzxwkWenxue City

Because these were chaotic, city-by-city seizures, there isn’t a single authoritative nationwide total for 1949 “available reserves” published by the PRC. What is well-documented is that central, usable foreign reserves at founding were near zero and the government immediately imposed strict FX controls and state monopoly over foreign trade. Bank of ChinaYNUFE

How the shortfall was bridged (1950–1952)​

• Soviet credit: On Feb 14, 1950 the PRC secured a US$300 million low-interest loan from the USSR, which became the first substantial hard-currency backstop for imports and reconstruction. Office of the HistorianWikipediaChina Knowledge
• Foreign-exchange sources: early 1950s FX came mainly from merchandise exports and overseas-Chinese remittances, which PRC policy actively channeled through state banks. CIAOxford AcademicJSTOR

Bottom line​

• Available, central gold/FX inside the mainland in 1949: tiny—only scattered amounts in captured vaults (e.g., Shanghai’s ~6,180 taels of gold), with no credible evidence of a large national hoard left for the PRC to use. Guancha
• Practical implication: the new government stabilized finance via administrative control of FX and trade, emergency collections from the private sector, and—critically—Soviet credits beginning in 1950.

the bulk of U.S. economic aid to Taiwan (1950s–1960s) was essentially grant aid, not loans.


Here’s the breakdown:

1. Nature of the aid​

• The aid was administered first under the U.S. China Aid Act (1948) and then (after the Korean War) through the Mutual Security Act (1951).
• Most funds delivered to Taiwan were non-repayable grants for:
  
  • Essential imports (food, fuel, fertilizer, industrial raw materials)
  • Infrastructure and rural development (land reform, irrigation, seeds, tools)
  • Technical assistance and advisory missions
  • Example: The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) used U.S. grant aid to finance land reform and agricultural productivity programs.
    

2. Amounts​

• Between 1951–1965, Taiwan received about US$1.4–1.5 billion in U.S. economic aid (not counting military assistance, which was separate and also substantial).
• On a per capita basis, this was one of the highest levels of U.S. aid anywhere in Asia at the time.

3. Repayment​

• Economic aid = no repayment, essentially free grants.
• Military aid (arms, training) was also largely free, though later in the 1970s Taiwan began to shift to more commercial military sales.

4. Strategic reason​

The U.S. provided aid not as charity but as part of the Cold War strategy:

• Keep the Nationalist regime on Taiwan viable
• Demonstrate a “capitalist development model” in Asia (contrast with PRC)
• Ensure Taiwan could serve as a stable anti-communist ally

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So, when we talk about the US$1.4–1.5 billion, it was grant aid (free, no interest, no repayment) — effectively an external subsidy that gave Taiwan the breathing space to stabilize its economy and invest in reforms.


Would you like me to also contrast this with the US$300 million Soviet loan to the PRC in 1950 (which was a loan with repayment terms)? That could highlight the different starting points of Taiwan vs. mainland China in the early 1950s.

You're absolutely right to notice that the US$300 million extended by the Soviet Union to the PRC in 1950 was a loan, not a grant. We can break down its terms and repayment timeline based on declassified documents and historical treaties:

---

Loan Terms​

• Interest rate: The loan was offered at a very favorable 1% per annum. This applies to the principal amount disbursed, and interest began accruing from the date of use. The low rate was typical for intra-Communist bloc arrangements but far below Western market terms of the time.
  Wikipediacommonprogram.scienceCIAChinaKnowledge
• Repayment schedule:
  • Repayments were structured over 10 equal annual installments, starting in 1954 and ending in 1963—i.e., one-tenth per year.
  • The first installment was due by December 31, 1954, and the final one by December 31, 1963.
  • Payments could be made not just in dollars but in raw materials, tea, cash, or U.S. dollars, per special agreements between China and the USSR.
    commonprogram.scienceCIA+1SpringerLink

---

Timeline & Completion​

• Repayment began in 1954, with annual payments of approximately US$30 million plus interest.
  CIAOffice of the Historian
• According to a reliable historical summary, China fully repaid the loan—including interest—by 1963, as planned.
  commonprogram.scienceSpringerLink
• By 1964, all Soviet loans and associated interest from the 1950s were cleared one year ahead of schedule. At that point, China had effectively eliminated the debt entirely.
  SpringerLink

---

Summary Table​

Item	Details
Loan amount	US$300 million
Interest rate	1% per annum, from date of use
Repayment period	10 years (1954–1963), annual installments
Repayment in kind	Allowed — e.g., raw materials, tea, USD
Loan fully repaid	By end of 1963 (ahead of schedule by 1964)

---

Final Takeaways​

• This loan was not free aid—it had to be repaid with interest.
• The interest rate was minimal (1%), easing the burden on China.
• China adhered to the agreement, completing repayment by 1963, slightly ahead of full loan term.
• In contrast to many Western loan arrangements, this was a low-cost, relatively smooth financial arrangement between aligned governments.

 

[chicago666]

結論，台灣割了一撥美國的韭菜，而中國大陸，把自己的金主打發走了以後，新開了十幾億人礦。

 

[chicago666]

元結論，還是社會主義好啊！

 

[dreamland]

結論，台灣割了一撥美國的韭菜，而中國大陸，把自己的金主打發走了以後，新開了十幾億人礦。

结论是台湾是不可能独立了。 如果台湾不和大陆统一，不管从哪个角度看，台湾都难逃武统的结局。

这整个财务分析就看出，1949年，占当时中国的载体（中华民国）人口2%的台湾和逃亡台湾的国民党残部，拿走了中华民国98%的资产。

如果台湾还认可自己是中国（或中华民国）的一部分, 还认可自己是中华民国的传承，这问题完全是内部问题，兄弟矛盾，就是谁是正统的问题。 即使走向战争，双方之间还不至于毫无顾忌，毕竟名义上还是兄弟。

如果台湾开始走台独的道路，刻意切割和中华民国的联系和传承，这2%的台湾人1949年拿走他不认可的大陆的98%的资产，这算什么呢？ 这和以往外族包括日本近代史对中国的侵略掠夺，有何区别，如果台湾想独立，那就是把台湾自己往日本一起站队，那这笔帐就要好好算算了，一旦开战，大陆就毫无顾忌了，血流成河逃不过去了。

 

[pattern]

结论是台湾是不可能独立了。 如果台湾不和大陆统一，不管从哪个角度看，台湾都难逃武统的结局。

这整个财务分析就看出，1949年，占当时中国的载体（中华民国）人口2%的台湾和逃亡台湾的国民党残部，拿走了中华民国98%的资产。

如果台湾还认可自己是中国（或中华民国）的一部分, 还认可自己是中华民国的传承，这问题完全是内部问题，兄弟矛盾，就是谁是正统的问题。 即使走向战争，双方之间还不至于毫无顾忌，毕竟名义上还是兄弟。

如果台湾开始走台独的道路，刻意切割和中华民国的联系和传承，这2%的台湾人1949年拿走他不认可的大陆的98%的资产，这算什么呢？ 这和以往外族包括日本近代史对中国的侵略掠夺，有何区别，如果台湾想独立，那就是把台湾自己往日本一起站队，那这笔帐就要好好算算了，一旦开战，大陆就毫无顾忌了，血流成河逃不过去了。

台湾现在已经事实独立了。 再过10年20年这一批老人都死了，没人care台湾是否独立，国内的精英阶层的年轻人对台湾根本没兴趣。

 

[红红枫叶]

结论是台湾是不可能独立了。 如果台湾不和大陆统一，不管从哪个角度看，台湾都难逃武统的结局。

这整个财务分析就看出，1949年，占当时中国的载体（中华民国）人口2%的台湾和逃亡台湾的国民党残部，拿走了中华民国98%的资产。

如果台湾还认可自己是中国（或中华民国）的一部分, 还认可自己是中华民国的传承，这问题完全是内部问题，兄弟矛盾，就是谁是正统的问题。 即使走向战争，双方之间还不至于毫无顾忌，毕竟名义上还是兄弟。

如果台湾开始走台独的道路，刻意切割和中华民国的联系和传承，这2%的台湾人1949年拿走他不认可的大陆的98%的资产，这算什么呢？ 这和以往外族包括日本近代史对中国的侵略掠夺，有何区别，如果台湾想独立，那就是把台湾自己往日本一起站队，那这笔帐就要好好算算了，一旦开战，大陆就毫无顾忌了，血流成河逃不过去了。

台湾最新影片：零日攻击。

 

[dreamland]

其实武统与否的开关在台湾和美国手上。

大陆其实没有选择，除非老共彻底认怂。

和平其实有可能，就是
-台积电变美积电。毕竟美国在台湾的现代化建设中有重大作用。中国和美国达成默契。中国默认台积电迁往美国。
-愿意离开台湾的人员放行，保护其在台湾的财产拥有权和处置权
-台湾主权回归大陆。大陆驻军。台湾以类似香港身份在国际活动。台币保留。70年不用上交大陆任何税。

否则三方都会血流成河。最后大陆惨胜占领台湾。