中国顶着美国制裁压力和伊朗，俄罗斯做被美国制裁的油气交易，总共获利320-450亿美元

[dreamland]

中国是唯一一个国家能顶住美国制裁压力和被制裁的俄罗斯和伊朗交易石油和天然气。 中国获利巨丰，总共从巨大低于国家市场价格，估计总共获利 320-450亿美元。而中国对被制裁的伊朗总投资额就是40-50亿美元

Great question — we can actually estimate this fairly well, but you should know:
There is no official dataset (because trade is hidden),
So we must combine:

• shipment estimates (EIA / Vortexa / Reuters)
• discount ranges ($5–20/barrel)

I’ll give you a transparent calculation so you can judge it.

---

1) Key data we will use​

Estimated China-bound Iranian oil (million barrels/year)​

From tanker tracking (EIA / analysts):

• 2018: ~1.4 mb/d
• 2019: ~0.4 mb/d
• 2020: ~0.06 mb/d
• 2021: ~0.14 mb/d
• 2022: ~0.16 mb/d
• 2023: ~0.14 mb/d
• 2024: ~1.3–1.4 mb/d (recovery) (U.S. Energy Information Administration)

2023 also reported ~441 million barrels total (~1.2 mb/d) (INSS)

---

Discount per barrel​

• Typical: $5–15/barrel
• Sometimes up to $20 (U.S. Energy Information Administration)
• Recent average: about $7–8 (Reuters)

---

2) Year-by-year estimate (discount value)​

I’ll use conservative average discount = $10/barrel
(so numbers are not exaggerated)

---

2018 (pre-full sanctions)​

• Volume: ~1.4 mb/d → 511 million barrels
• Discount small (~$3–5), assume $4

Savings ≈ $2.0 billion

---

2019 (sanctions hit)​

• Volume: ~0.4 mb/d → 146 million barrels
• Discount rises (~$8–10)

≈ $1.3 billion

---

2020 (collapse year)​

• Volume: ~0.06 mb/d → 22 million barrels
• Discount high (~$10–15)

≈ $0.25 billion

---

2021 (recovery begins)​

• Volume: ~0.14 mb/d → 51 million barrels

≈ $0.5 billion

---

2022​

• Volume: ~0.16 mb/d → 58 million barrels

≈ $0.6 billion

---

2023 (major rebound)​

• Volume: ~441 million barrels

≈ $4.4 billion

---

2024 (full recovery, peak China buying)​

• Volume: ~1.3 mb/d → 475 million barrels
• Discount ~$7–10

≈ $4.0–4.8 billion

---

2025 (similar level)​

• Volume: ~1.3–1.4 mb/d
• Discount ~$7–8 (Reuters)

≈ $3.5–4.0 billion

---

3) Total estimated discount (2018–2025)​

Year	Estimated savings
2018	$2.0B
2019	$1.3B
2020	$0.25B
2021	$0.5B
2022	$0.6B
2023	$4.4B
2024	$4.5B
2025	$3.8B

---

Total (2018–2025):​

≈ $17–22 billion USD saved

---

4) Important insight (this is key)​

The pattern is very clear:​

• 2019–2022: low volume → small savings
• 2023–2025: massive surge → most of the gains

Over 60% of total savings happened after 2023

---

5) Why this matters geopolitically​

This explains a lot:

• China gets multi-billion annual energy subsidy
• Iran gets a guaranteed buyer
• Both are incentivized to continue the system despite sanctions

---

Final takeaway​

• China likely saved ~$20B (± a few billion) from discounted Iranian oil since sanctions tightened
• Today, it’s saving ~$4B per year ongoing

---

 

[dreamland]

This is a very important point — and also one of the most misunderstood geopolitical claims.
The “$400 billion China–Iran deal” is real, but
the actual money invested so far is tiny compared to that headline number.
Let’s break it down clearly.

---

1) What is the “$400B deal” really?​

• Originally discussed around 2016–2017
• Formally signed in 2021 as a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement

Key idea:

• China would invest up to $400 billion over 25 years
• In exchange for:
  • long-term oil supply
  • discounted prices
  • strategic influence

(Brandeis University)
So:

• It is NOT a cash payment
• It is a long-term intention / framework (MOU-style)

---

2) How much has China ACTUALLY invested?​

This is the critical reality:

Best available estimate (very credible)​

• Total Chinese investment in Iran since ~2007:
  less than $5 billion total

(Reuters)

• Official Chinese data:
  about $3.9 billion cumulative by 2023

(Reuters)

---

3) Compare promise vs reality​

Item	Amount
Headline deal	$400 billion (over 25 years)
Actual invested	~$4–5 billion
% delivered	~1% or less

That’s the key takeaway:
The deal is mostly NOT implemented.

---

4) Where did that small investment go?​

Examples of real projects:

Energy​

• Sinopec:
  • ~$2B Yadavaran oil field
• CNPC:
  • South Pars gas field (later withdrew under sanctions)
  • North Azadegan oil field (~$2B)

---

Infrastructure​

• Railways (~$700M+ projects)
• Tehran–Mashhad electrified railway (~$1.5B, stalled)
• Tramway and regional rail projects

---

Industry & energy​

• Steel plant (~$350M)
• Solar plant (~€1B planned)

(Reuters)

---

5) Why is actual investment so low?​

This is the key geopolitical constraint:

1) Fear of U.S. sanctions​

• Even Chinese state-owned companies pulled out
• Example:
  • CNPC withdrew from South Pars in 2019

---

2) Financial system risk​

• Big Chinese banks:
  • rely on USD system
  • avoid Iran exposure

---

3) Political & business risk in Iran​

• Sanctions instability
• Payment difficulties
• Currency issues

---

4) China prefers “low-visibility engagement”​

Instead of investing heavily, China:

• buys discounted oil
• uses:
  • shadow shipping
  • indirect trade

This is lower risk, faster profit

---

6) What China actually gains instead​

Even without big investment:

• China secures:
  • ~80–90% of Iran’s oil exports
• Pays:
  • discounted price (as we calculated earlier)

So China’s real benefit is:

• cheap energy, not infrastructure control (yet)

---

7) Important insight (very key)​

The $400B deal is best understood as:
“Strategic option”, not “executed investment”

• It signals:
  • long-term partnership
  • geopolitical alignment
• But:
  • actual capital deployment is very cautious

---

Final takeaway​

• Yes — China proposed a $400B long-term deal
• But in reality:
  • Only ~$4–5B has been invested so far
  • That’s about ~1% of the headline number

Meanwhile, China’s real gain comes from discounted oil, not large-scale investment.

---

 

[dreamland]

Yes — we can estimate China’s gains from Russian sanctioned oil & gas, and here the data is actually better than Iran because more trade is visible.
I’ll give you a clear year-by-year calculation (2022–2025) based on credible studies + recent 2026 data.

---

1) First — what changed in 2022?​

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine:

• EU + G7 imposed:
  • oil embargo
  • $60 price cap
• Russia had to redirect oil to China & India
• Result:
  forced discounts to China

---

2) Verified total savings (key anchor data)​

From a recent 2026 study:

• 2022: $4.44B
• 2023: $3.85B
• 2024: $1.45B
• 2025: $2.2B

Total (2022–2025):
≈ $12 billion saved by China (The Moscow Times)

---

3) Cross-check with independent estimate​

Another study shows:

• 2022: $6.6B savings
• 2023 (half-year): ~$4B
• Total ~18 months: ~$19B (~$18B euro) (Banque de France)

This is higher because:

• includes re-exported oil via Malaysia
• uses broader pricing assumptions

---

4) Final reconciled estimate (most realistic)​

Combining both datasets:

Year	Conservative estimate	High estimate
2022	$4.4B	$6–7B
2023	$3.8–8B	$8–10B
2024	$1.4–2B	$2–3B
2025	$2.0–2.5B	$2–3B

---

Total (best range)​

$12B (low estimate) → ~$20–25B (realistic upper range)

---

5) Why the discount shrank after 2023​

You’ll notice:

• 2022–2023: very large savings
• 2024–2025: smaller

Reasons:

1) Russia found more buyers​

• India increased imports
• sanctions became “normalized”

---

2) Price cap stabilized market​

• Russian oil often trades closer to cap ($60)

---

3) China bargaining power decreased slightly​

• competition for cheap oil increased

---

6) Discount level (per barrel)​

Typical Russian discount to China:

• 2022 peak: ~15–20% below Brent (Banque de France)
• 2025: ~$5–6 per barrel (Reuters)

Much smaller than Iran discounts

---

7) What about Russian GAS?​

This is important:
China does NOT get big discounts on Russian gas

• Pipeline gas (Power of Siberia):
  • long-term contract pricing
• LNG:
  • sometimes discounted, but:
  • sometimes even higher than market (Banque de France)

So:

• Oil = big savings
• Gas = little or no savings

---

8) Big picture comparison​

Source	China savings
Iran oil	~$20B (2018–2025)
Russia oil	~$12–25B (2022–2025)

Russia discounts are:

• larger per year (peak years)
• but shorter time period

---

9) Key insight (very important)​

China’s strategy is very clear:
Buy from sanctioned suppliers:

• Russia
• Iran

Outcome:

• tens of billions in savings
• lower inflation pressure
• stronger industrial competitiveness

---

Final takeaway​

• Since 2022, China likely saved:
  ~$12B (minimum) to ~$20–25B (realistic)
  from discounted Russian oil
• Almost all of that comes from:
  2022–2023 shock period

---

 

[welcomelm]

中国老百姓加的油比美国，加拿大都贵，中国获的利跑哪去了，是不是都让装杨兰兰之流的口袋里去了。

习近平之姐齐桥桥垄断委内瑞拉及伊朗低价石油 一年净赚近 4000亿

 

[擒屎皇]

艹，原来神棍是傻子，土共投资了40-50亿，赚了神棍几百亿，牛逼大了

 

[rottenmelon]

很多东西看透不能说透，鳖要是说神棍用石油换了各种新式武器的零配件还有战争物资，那早就掀桌子了，还能扛到现在？

 

[一心无住]

贪官牺牲国家和老百姓的利益和美国对抗赚了几百亿。

 

[TESLA]

赚再多亿也不影响老百姓支付高油价。

 

[dreamland]

很多东西看透不能说透，鳖要是说神棍用石油换了各种新式武器的零配件还有战争物资，那早就掀桌子了，还能扛到现在？

中国妥妥的闷声大发财。 而且没有卷进军事冲突。
之前崩溃论说的中国4000亿美元栽在伊朗纯属胡说八道。
现在是俄罗斯军事介入伊朗，中国还在看戏。

 

[dreamland]

贪污？ 笑死

几次回国聚会当地熟人私下说胡温时期才是捞钱最高峰，日进斗金

到了习大时期，清水衙门，连工作日出去公务吃饭都小心翼翼，贪官都恨死习大了

 

[dreamland]

自美以伊战争开战后，各国民众民生密切相关的汽油零售价格涨幅对比



Here’s a data-driven snapshot of retail gasoline price increases since the start of the 2026 Iran war (Feb 28 → roughly end of March / early April 2026).
Important:

• Data is fragmented and fast-changing
• Most reliable comparisons use Feb 23 → Mar 23, 2026
• I’ll give you % increases + key price moves where available

---

Global overview (key context)​

• Oil prices jumped ~50% in March (The Wall Street Journal)
• At least 85–95 countries saw fuel price increases (Al Jazeera)
• Shock driven by:
  • Strait of Hormuz disruption (~20% global oil) (Wikipedia)

---

Country-by-country retail gasoline increase​

United States​

• ~$2.98 → ~$4.02 per gallon
  +34–35% increase (TIME)
• Some states:
  • California > $5

---

Canada​

• Reported increase:
  ~+25–30% (Al Jazeera)

---

United Kingdom​

• Petrol:
  • +20p → ~152.8p/L
    ~+15%
• Diesel:
  • +30–40% spike
    (The Times)

---

France​

• Exact % varies by region
  ~+15–25% (estimated EU range)
• Reports of protests & fuel theft rising (The Washington Post)

---

Germany​

~+15–25% (EU average range)

• Strongly impacted due to import dependence

---

Japan​

~+20–30%

• High dependence on Middle East oil
  (The Washington Post)

---

South Korea​

~+20–30%

• Similar exposure as Japan

---

Taiwan​

~+20–30%

• LNG + oil import dependent
  (Wikipedia)

---

Singapore​

~+25–35%

• Highly exposed trading hub
• Strong LNG dependency

---

India​

~+20–30%

• Government trying to cushion via subsidies
  (The Washington Post)

---

China​

~+10–20% (lower than global average)
Reason:

• Uses:
  • Russian discounted oil
  • Iranian discounted oil

This buffers domestic price increases

---

Vietnam​

~+50% (one of the highest globally) (Al Jazeera)

---

Clean comparison table​

Country	Increase
US	~+35%
Canada	~+25–30%
UK	~+15–30%
France	~+15–25%
Germany	~+15–25%
Japan	~+20–30%
South Korea	~+20–30%
Taiwan	~+20–30%
Singapore	~+25–35%
India	~+20–30%
China	~+10–20%
Vietnam	~+50%

---

Key insight (very important)​

1) Biggest increases:​

• Southeast Asia (Vietnam, etc.)
• Countries with:
  • weak subsidies
  • high import dependence

---

2) Moderate increases:​

• US, Canada, India, Japan
• Mix of:
  • domestic production
  • policy buffering

---

3) Lowest increases:​

• China
  Because of:
• discounted Russian + Iranian oil (as we discussed earlier)

---

Final takeaway​

• The Iran war triggered a global fuel shock comparable or worse than 2022 Ukraine war
• Most countries saw:
  +20–35% increase in just 1 month
• Extremes:
  • Vietnam: ~+50%
  • China: lowest (~+10–20%)

---

If you want, I can go deeper into:
absolute price per litre in each country (CAD / USD comparison)
or how much this adds to monthly household cost in each country.