3。14的真相到底是什么?

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这些日子,CFC上革命热情高涨,除了农夫的帖子有点理智思考外,余者无不和GCD的正面宣传一个调子
诸位,在去国会山显示爱国心之前,诸位是否能告诉大家,3。14西藏事件的真相到底是什么?
如果真如GCD宣传的那样全是达赖及藏独的错,为什么要在事发时赶走所有外国记者及外国游客?
难道要全世界都象全中国一样转人民日报CCTV的NEWS吗?
如果一定要选择是相信独裁的ZGGCD的新闻媒体,还是相信民主西方的新闻媒体,恐怕生活在西方的人都会偏向后者吧?
这恐怕也是千万华人选择离开故土来加拿大生活的一个原因吧?
当我们无法知道真相时,我们恐怕也只能根据几十年在中国生活的经验及对GCD宣传机器的认识,选择相信多国媒体吧
再谈奥运会,这么多届下来,传圣火传成这样,不值得思考吗?
以前没听说要派主办国武警战士组成互卫队,以后其它国家是否也要效仿呢?
 
刚在本坛看到此贴,比我帖子说得好多了,拍砖之前,化5分钟读一读再拍不迟

西藏:真相与民族主义情绪


作者: 长平

拉萨事件发生以后,小道消息迅速传开,但是国内媒体照例噤声。连续几天,各家媒体上都只有西藏自治区负责人的简短通报和谈话。通报中,对于事件的描述只有一句:“近日,拉萨极少数人进行打、砸、抢、烧破坏活动。”相当于一个标题新闻。民众从谈话对达赖集团的严厉谴责中,已经知道此事非同小可,自然愿闻其详。依循过去的经验,很多人通过境外媒体来获取更多消息。此时,几个揭露境外媒体虚假报道的帖子和视频却在网上流传开来,很快就酿成了一场中国民众愤怒声讨西方媒体的网络事件,出现了一些命名为“反 CNN”、“反BBC”、“反美国之音”的网站。

根据网民搜集的材料,包括德国、美国、英国和印度在内的一些国家的媒体对拉萨事件的报道中出现了明显的事实错误。从新闻职业规范来看,有些错误非常低级,甚至有刻意误导的嫌疑。尽管有几家媒体进行了道歉和更正,但是失实新闻造成的伤害既成事实,难以得到中国民众的谅解。跟任何虚假新闻一样,这个伤害首先指向媒体自身的公信力,一万个真实也挽救不了一个谎言。在此事的后续报道中,在将来的其他重大事件中,倘或中国媒体同样不能自由报道,而境外媒体又变得面目可疑,那么真相从何处来呢?

一些揭露境外媒体虚假报道的网民宣称,他们要用行动让世人看到拉萨事件的真相。这个说法逻辑不通,因为他们的行动只能让人看见西方媒体报道不实的这个真相。拉萨究竟发生了什么?大多数中国人看到的只有政府在封锁消息几天之后统一发布的新闻。对于任何来源单一的垄断性新闻发布,我不敢说它是假的,但是也不能确认它是真的。事实上,境外媒体大多称之为“中国政府精心编织的真相”。随后政府组织外国记者赴藏采访,他们的报道大多也没有翻译过来。由于声讨西方媒体热浪当头,即便翻译过来也没多少人相信。

愤怒仍在扩散。尽管“反CNN”网站声明,“我们并不反对媒体本身,我们只反对某些媒体的不客观报道;我们并不反对西方人民,但是我们反对偏见”,但事实并非总是如此,很多网民走到了相反的方向,甚至一开始就站在相反的方向:他们并不真的在乎新闻的客观公正,而在乎媒体本身的立场;偏见未必是不能接受的,关键是看你偏向哪一边。如果真的站在新闻价值的立场,那么他们就不会仅仅揭露西方媒体的虚假报道,而且应该质疑中国政府对消息源和国内媒体的双重控制。毫无疑问,后者对新闻价值的伤害更甚于前者。正如已经发生的事实,对个体媒体虚假报道的矫正相对容易,几个耐心细致的中国网民就可以做到;对新闻控制的抗议面对的是国家权力,全世界都徒唤奈何。

一些中国民众已经看到,虚假报道和偏见并不是最可怕的,只要有一个开放的舆论环境,允许充分的揭示和讨论,它们就有走向真相和公义的机会。这次网民对于境外媒体的成功反击,就是一个很好的例子。最早发现问题并及时反应的,是海外的中国留学生。他们制作的揭发图像在BBS上自由流传,也在Youtube这样的著名网站上火热播放。假如这些网络媒体都受到限制,那么揭发进程就会遇到很多困难。

这些虚假报道对新闻价值的最大伤害,在于让很多人进一步放弃了对客观公正的信赖,而选择了狭隘民族主义立场。他们从中得出结论说,普世价值都是骗人的玩意儿,只有国家利益的你争我夺。他们甚至以此为依据说,撒谎也是一种“国际惯例”,从而对自己身边或者历史上的谎言予以谅解。当然,一些人本来就是这样想的,这次媒体事件让他们又找到一个证据,从而去对别人宣讲而已。

但是我也看到,有很多中国人借此机会进行了更广泛的讨论和更深入的思考。他们发现,西方人对中国的偏见,源自一种居高临下的文化优越感。那么应该警惕的是,汉人在面对少数民族时,有没有这样一种由文化优越感而导致的偏见呢?西方人对中国的歪曲报道,源自不愿意倾听和了解,沉迷于萨义德说的那种东方主义想象,那么我们对少数民族又如何呢?如果我们以民族主义为武器来反抗西方,那么怎样说服少数民族放弃民族主义,加入到主流的国家建设中来呢?达赖喇嘛要求政府对他重新评价,那么他到底是一个怎样的人呢?除了官方的定性之外,能不能允许媒体自由讨论以进一步揭示真相?

(本文作者长平,资深媒体工作者,曾任《南方周末》新闻部主任,《外滩画报》副总编辑,现为《南都周刊》副总编辑。)
 
See an article from the March 19 Economist

Indeed, we gain more in the long-run if we give all journalists free access because there are always honest reporters who tell the truth, and those who make malicious reports will lose their credibality eventually. 中国要走向世界,也要让世界走向中国。不用怕家丑外扬。

One piece of truth may be found from the March 19 Economist -- a widely trusted journal in western countries.

See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10875823&CFID=1954237&CFTOKEN=27052508

Below is the text.


TRASHING THE BEIJING ROAD
Mar 19th 2008


Our Beijing correspondent happened to be in Lhasa as the riots broke
out. Here is what he saw

ETHNIC-Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa's old Tibetan quarter knew better than the security forces that the city had become a tinder-box. As word spread rapidly through the narrow alleyways on March 14th that a crowd was throwing stones at Chinese businesses, they shuttered up their shops and fled. The authorities, caught by surprise, held back as the city was engulfed by its biggest anti-Chinese protests in decades.

What began, or may have begun (Lhasa feeds on rumour), as the beating of a couple of Buddhist monks by police has turned into a huge political test for the Chinese government. Tibet has cast a pall over preparations to hold the Olympic games in Beijing in August. Protests in Lhasa have triggered copycat demonstrations in several monasteries across a vast swathe of territory in the "Tibet Autonomous Region" of China and in areas around it (see map). Not since the uprising of 1959, during which the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, fled to India, has there been such widespread unrest across this oxygen-starved expanse of mountains and plateaus.


Years of rapid economic growth, which China had hoped would dampen
separatist demands, have achieved the opposite. Efforts to integrate
the region more closely with the rest of China, by building the world's
highest railway connecting Beijing with Lhasa, have only fuelled ethnic
tensions in the Tibetan capital. The night before the riots erupted, a
Tibetan government official confided to your correspondent that Lhasa
was now stable after protests by hundreds of monks at monasteries near the city earlier in the week. He could not have been more wrong.

It was, perhaps, a sign of the authorities' misreading of Lhasa's anger
that a foreign correspondent was in the city at all. Foreign
journalists are seldom given permission to visit. In January 2007, in
preparation for the Olympics, the central government issued new
regulations that supposedly make it much easier for them to travel
around the country. Travel to Tibet, however, still requires a permit.
THE ECONOMIST's visit was approved before the monks protested on March 10th and 11th, but the authorities apparently felt sufficiently in
control to allow the trip to go ahead as planned from March 12th. As it
turned out, several of the venues on the pre-arranged itinerary became scenes of unrest.

Rioting began to spread on the main thoroughfare through Lhasa, Beijing Road (a name that suggests colonial domination to many a Tibetan ear), in the early afternoon of March 14th. It had started a short while earlier outside the Ramoche Temple, in a side street close by, after two monks had been beaten by security officials. (Or so Tibetan residents believe; the official version says it began with monks
stoning police.) A crowd of several dozen people rampaged along the
road, some of them whooping as they threw stones at shops owned by ethnic Han Chinese--a group to which more than 90% of China's
population belongs--and at passing taxis, most of which in Lhasa are
driven by Hans.

The rioting quickly fanned through the winding alleyways of the city's
old Tibetan area south of Beijing Road. Many of these streets are lined
with small shops, mostly owned by Hans or Huis, a Muslim ethnic group that controls much of Lhasa's meat trade. Crowds formed, seemingly spontaneously, in numerous parts of the district. They smashed into non-Tibetan shops, pulled merchandise onto the streets, piled it up and set fire to it. Everything from sides of yak meat to items of laundry was thrown onto the pyres. Rioters delighted in tossing in cooking-gas canisters and running for cover as they exploded. A few yelled "Long live the Dalai Lama!" and "Free Tibet!"

For hours the security forces did little. But the many Hans who live
above their shops in the Tibetan quarter were quick to flee. Had they
not, there might have been more casualties. (The government, plausibly, says 13 people were killed by rioters, mostly in fires.) Some of those who remained, in flats above their shops, kept the lights off to avoid detection and spoke in hushed tones lest their Mandarin dialect be heard on the streets by Tibetans. One Han teenager ran into a monastery for refuge, prostrating himself before a red-robed Tibetan abbot who agreed to give him shelter.

The destruction was systematic. Shops owned by Tibetans were marked as such with traditional white scarves tied through their shutter-handles. They were spared destruction. Almost every other one was wrecked. It soon became difficult to navigate the alleys because of the scattered merchandise. Chilli peppers, sausages, toys (child looters descended on those), flour, cooking oil and even at one spot scores of small-denomination bank notes were ground underfoot by triumphant Tibetan residents into a slippery carpet of filth.

During the night the authorities sent in fire engines, backed by a
couple of armoured personnel-carriers laden with riot police, to put
out the biggest blazes. By dawn they had also sealed off the Tibetan
quarter with a ring of baton-carrying troops and stationed officers
with helmets and shields in the square in front of the Jokhang temple,
Tibet's most sacred shrine, in the heart of the old district. But they
did not move into the alleys, where rioting continued for a second day.
Residents within the security cordon attacked the few Han businesses
left unscathed and set new fires among the piles of debris.

THE RISKS OF CRACKDOWN
Han Chinese in Lhasa were baffled and enraged by the slow reaction of
the security forces. Thousands of people probably lost most, if not
all, of their livelihoods (the majority of Lhasa's small businesses
have no insurance, let alone against rioting). But the authorities were
clearly hamstrung by the political risks involved. Going in with guns
blazing--the tactic used to suppress the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and the last serious outbreak of anti-Chinese unrest in Lhasa
earlier that year--would risk inciting international calls for a
boycott of the Olympic games. Instead they chose to let the rioters
vent their anger, then gradually tighten the noose.

On March 15th occasional rounds of tear-gas fired at stone-throwing
protesters eventually gave way to a more concerted effort to clear the
streets. Paramilitary police began moving into the alleys, firing
occasional bullets: not bursts of gunfire, but single deliberate shots,
probably more in warning than with intent to kill. They also moved from rooftop to rooftop to deter residents from gathering on terraces
overlooking the alleys. Rumours abounded of Tibetans killed by security forces in isolated incidents during the earlier rioting, but not during the final push to reassert control over the city. By Chinese standards (not high when it comes to riot control), that effort appeared relatively measured.

By late on March 15th the alleys were quiet. Patrols firing the odd
bullet kept most of them deserted the next day, too. A Western student said she saw six Tibetan boys hauled out of their homes by troops, pushed to the ground, kicked and beaten with batons. The boys were then bundled into a bus and driven away. Troops covered up the bloodstains on the road with a white substance, she said. The Tibetan quarter is now gripped by fears of widespread and indiscriminate arrests as the authorities attempt to find "ringleaders". China's official news agency says 105 rioters have surrendered to the police.

When residents began venturing out more normally on March 17th, the extent of the rioting became clear. Numerous Han Chinese-owned premises well beyond the Tibetan quarter had been attacked. Several buildings had been gutted by fire. The gate of the city's main mosque was charred, and the windows of the guard-house of the TIBET DAILY, the region's Communist Party mouthpiece, had been smashed.

The city was under martial law in all but name. The government said
that only police were involved in the security operation, but there
were many military-looking vehicles on the streets with their tell-tale
licence-plates covered up or removed. Some troops refused to say what force they belonged to. Two armoured personnel-carriers were parked in front of the Potala Palace, Lhasa's most famous tourist attraction on the side of the hill overlooking the city, which is now closed. Troops with bayonets were deployed along roads leading to the city's main monasteries, which have been sealed off by police. The rioting on March 14th and 15th involved mainly ordinary citizens, but monks are often at the forefront of separatist unrest in Tibet.

THE APPROACHING FLAME
The government's decision not to declare martial law, or any emergency restrictions, reflected its concern about the Olympics. In March 1989 the authorities imposed martial law in Lhasa to quell separatist unrest. Its measures were barely distinguishable from those now in force in the city. The old Tibetan area has been sealed off by
gun-carrying troops, but officials prefer to refer euphemistically to
"special traffic-control measures". This time foreign tourists in Lhasa
have been "advised" rather than ordered to leave. On March 18th police and troops began moving the 100 or so remaining tourists to hotels far from the site of the riots. In 1989 foreign journalists were expelled from Lhasa. This time your correspondent was allowed to stay, but only until his permit expired on March 19th. No others were allowed in.

For all the government's attempts to appear unruffled, the recent
unrest in Tibet exceeds the challenge it faced in 1989. Since March
10th protests have been reported not only in Lhasa's main monasteries (Drepung, Sera and Ganden), but also at Samye Monastery about 60km east of Lhasa, Labrang Monastery in Gansu province, Kirti Monastery in Sichuan province and Rongwo Monastery in Qinghai province. Tibet's traditional boundaries stretch into these provinces. Outside Labrang Monastery Tibetans attacked Han Chinese shops on March 15th. TibetInfoNet[1], a news service based in Britain, reported several protests in various parts of Gansu on March 16th. Unlike in the ethnic violence in Lhasa, it said, the protesters' main targets were symbols of state power and government-owned properties.

The challenge is partly a security one. The martial-law regulations
imposed in Lhasa in March 1989 were not lifted until May the following
year. This time China will need to move faster to restore a semblance
of normality. On June 20th the Olympic flame, having been carried up
the Tibetan side of Mount Everest the previous month, is due to arrive
in Lhasa, where a big ceremony is planned. Barring journalists and
flooding Lhasa's streets with troops would be embarrassing. More so
would be cancelling the event.

But easing the clampdown would be risky. Many Tibetans see the Olympics as a golden opportunity to bring the world's attention to their problems under Chinese rule. Tibetans living outside China,
particularly in India, have been taking advantage of the Olympics to
step up their publicity efforts. This is an annoyance to India, which
does not want to disrupt relations with China by appearing to condone
efforts to disrupt the games. Indian police have blocked efforts,
launched on March 10th by hundreds of dissident Tibetans, to stage a
march across the mountains into their homeland.

China worries too about the possibility that other ethnic minorities in
China, particularly Muslim Uighurs in the far western region of
Xinjiang, may be emboldened by Tibetan activism if it is left
unchecked. The Chinese authorities have played up reports about recent alleged terrorist activities in Xinjiang (as an excuse to suppress
peaceful dissent, say sceptics), including what officials say was an
attempt by a Uighur woman to start a fire on board a flight bound for
Beijing on March 7th.

RICHER, BUT NOT HAPPIER
The longer-term challenge for China is to rethink its Tibet policy. One
reason why Chinese officials appeared so surprised by the unrest is
that Tibet has not behaved like the rest of China, where rapid economic growth appears to have staved off a repeat of Tiananmen-style protests. A surge of government spending on infrastructure in recent years and strong growth in Tibet's tourism industry (made easier by the new infrastructure, especially the rail link, which was opened in 2006) have helped the region's GDP growth rate stay above 12% for the past seven years. In 2007 it was 14%, more than two points higher than the national rate.

Incomes have been rising fast too. Officials predict a 13% increase
this year for rural residents, a sixth straight year of double-digit
growth. Urban residents enjoyed a 24.5% increase in disposable income last year. Robbie Barnett of America's Columbia University says a new middle class has emerged in Lhasa in recent years. But, he says, this has made very little difference to what Tibetans think about politics.


In the old Tibetan quarter, many see the Han Chinese as the biggest
beneficiaries of economic growth. Hans not only run most of the shops, but are moving into the Tibetan part of the city. Some Tibetans believe Han Chinese now make up around half of the city's population, with the railway bringing in ever more. (An official, however, points out that it is now also easier for Tibetans to reach Lhasa from distant parts of the plateau.)

The economic statistics may be misleading. Incomes may have been
growing fast on average, but in the countryside averages have been
skewed by soaring demand in the rest of China for a type of traditional
medicine known as caterpillar fungus. Tibetans in rural areas where
this fungus grows have seen their incomes rocket (and fights have
broken out among them over the division of fungus-producing land). In the cities, many complain about fast-rising prices of goods imported
from other parts of China. Inflation is a big worry elsewhere in China
too, but Tibetan bystanders watching the riots said that Chinese
officials had promised the rail link would help bring prices down. The
near-empty expanse of the Lhasa Economic and Technological Development Area suggests that officials are having trouble replicating in Tibet the manufacturing boom seen elsewhere in China.

Tibetans also resent the hardline policies of Tibet's party chief,
Zhang Qingli. Mr Zhang, who is a Han (China apparently does not yet
trust Tibetans to hold this crucial post), was appointed in 2005 after
a spell spent crushing separatism in Xinjiang. When he took charge,
neglected rules banning students and the families of civil servants
from taking part in religious activities began once more to be
rigorously enforced. Mr Zhang also stepped up official invective
against the Dalai Lama, who is widely revered. (Many Tibetans in Lhasa
defiantly hang portraits of him in their homes, or did until the troops
moved in.) Mr Zhang urged more "patriotic education" in monasteries,
part of which involves denouncing the Dalai Lama. He banned the display of portraits of the Karmapa Lama, who fled to India in 1999 and enjoys a devoted following in Tibet.

THE DALAI LAMA'S ROLE
Chinese officials have been divided over whether greater contact with
the Dalai Lama would help to pacify Tibet. Between 2002 and July last
year Chinese officials held six rounds of talks with the Dalai Lama's
representatives. Laurence Brahm, an American author who has tried to
mediate, says the discussions reached a high point in 2005 when the
Chinese appeared to recognise that the Dalai Lama was crucial to
resolving Tibet's tensions. At one stage the Chinese even considered
allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Wutai Mountain in Shanxi province as a
confidence-building measure, but they got cold feet. Talks eventually
foundered over China's refusal to accept the Dalai Lama's statements
that all he wants is Tibet's autonomy within China.

With troops on the streets, dialogue looks unlikely in the near future.
China has accused the "Dalai Lama clique" of organising the riots. The
Dalai Lama has denied involvement and has accused the Chinese of
carrying out "cultural genocide" in his homeland. But he also needs to
worry about the future of Han Chinese in Tibet. Many Han business
people in Lhasa say they are planning to leave. Tourism from the
interior, crucial to Lhasa's economy, is likely to be hard hit too. In
the end, China may have a point with its obsession about economics. The recent boom has not won the loyalty or affection of Tibetans, but a slump would make them all the more angry.
 
这些日子,CFC上革命热情高涨,除了农夫的帖子有点理智思考外,余者无不和GCD的正面宣传一个调子
诸位,在去国会山显示爱国心之前,诸位是否能告诉大家,3。14西藏事件的真相到底是什么?
如果真如GCD宣传的那样全是达赖及藏独的错,为什么要在事发时赶走所有外国记者及外国游客?
难道要全世界都象全中国一样转人民日报CCTV的NEWS吗?
如果一定要选择是相信独裁的ZGGCD的新闻媒体,还是相信民主西方的新闻媒体,恐怕生活在西方的人都会偏向后者吧?
这恐怕也是千万华人选择离开故土来加拿大生活的一个原因吧?
当我们无法知道真相时,我们恐怕也只能根据几十年在中国生活的经验及对GCD宣传机器的认识,选择相信多国媒体吧
再谈奥运会,这么多届下来,传圣火传成这样,不值得思考吗?
以前没听说要派主办国武警战士组成互卫队,以后其它国家是否也要效仿呢?

中国政府为什么要相信西方政府?
 
。。。。。
如果一定要选择是相信独裁的ZGGCD的新闻媒体,还是相信民主西方的新闻媒体,恐怕生活在西方的人都会偏向后者吧?
。。。。。
对于西方政府来说,3。14西藏事件的真相并不重要。
西方政府和新闻媒体基本观点是,中国在1950年侵略了西藏这个国家。
可惜当你相信民主西方的胡说八道时,西方政府正把你当间谍看。
 
楼上的,先看清帖子再批呀
没人要求中国ZF相信西方ZF
如果说西方是胡说八道,那么独裁GCD的新闻还可以相信吗?
 
楼主如果不是用心险恶,那我只好原谅你无知了。
中国清朝末年是惹着谁了,为什么要受到世界列强的侵略?
中国人权问题,民族问题比30年前还差?
1944年的美国军方媒体明确说西藏是中国的,为什么现在突然不是了?
伊拉克的大规模武器在哪儿?为什么要死掉几十万伊拉克人?
西方难道不和中国有任何经济往来了,为什么拿奥运开刀?
中国的人民币为什么要升值?中国的公司为什么被廉价收购?
美国的核武器零件为什么能误送到台湾?
中国依赖的石油和大米为什么突然涨价?
还有更多。

如果你能明白以上的问题,起码你也不会有第一楼那样幼稚的问题了。
 
是否不同看法就是用心险恶?
一个普通百姓就是用心险恶又有个P用
不要动不动就那么激动好不好?
那么多大道理太难懂
我只问个简单的,诸位不要回避,就是3。14真相到底是什么,你们能告诉大家,再呼吁大家去游行吗?
 
我倒是把楼主和此人转的帖子都看了,看来是个有思想的人,问的问题也有些难度。那么,思想者,您在我们去国会山表决心前,告诉我们3。14的真相到底是什么?传圣火传成这样,当然值得深思,谁的错?把体育和人权整到一起,或者和政治整到一起,好像不怎么地道。

只看共产党的报道,楼主肯定觉得看不到西藏的真相,那么我们是不是应该看大计元呢?那可是见天都在国会山见人就说“你想知道真相吗?”

得,最后问一句楼主:3。14的真相到底是什么?
 
估计原文对热血青年太长,摘抄吧

“拉萨究竟发生了什么?大多数中国人看到的只有政府在封锁消息几天之后统一发布的新闻。对于任何来源单一的垄断性新闻发布,我不敢说它是假的,但是也不能确认它是真的”

“一些中国民众已经看到,虚假报道和偏见并不是最可怕的,只要有一个开放的舆论环境,允许充分的揭示和讨论,它们就有走向真相和公义的机会。”

“他们发现,西方人对中国的偏见,源自一种居高临下的文化优越感。那么应该警惕的是,汉人在面对少数民族时,有没有这样一种由文化优越感而导致的偏见呢?”
 
是否不同看法就是用心险恶?
一个普通百姓就是用心险恶又有个P用
不要动不动就那么激动好不好?
那么多大道理太难懂
我只问个简单的,诸位不要回避,就是3。14真相到底是什么,你们能告诉大家,再呼吁大家去游行吗?

3。14的真相就是西藏发生了恐怖分子袭击平民老百姓。造成人员伤亡。老共媒体和西方媒体都有报道。所不同的是,老共报道的死亡人员都有据可查。达赖集团报的死亡人名单根本就不存在。

你不去没人邀请你。也没人呼吁大家去。是大家自发地想去。如果不意外的话,我希望在我们的队伍对面看到你。
 
我倒是把楼主和此人转的帖子都看了,看来是个有思想的人,问的问题也有些难度。那么,思想者,您在我们去国会山表决心前,告诉我们3。14的真相到底是什么?传圣火传成这样,当然值得深思,谁的错?把体育和人权整到一起,或者和政治整到一起,好像不怎么地道。

只看共产党的报道,楼主肯定觉得看不到西藏的真相,那么我们是不是应该看大计元呢?那可是见天都在国会山见人就说“你想知道真相吗?”

得,最后问一句楼主:3。14的真相到底是什么?

我不知道,所有我问诸位
要让大家不偏见,起码不要垄断新闻吧
如果象GCD的做法,谁能知道真相?

也不要说这么大的事了
小到简单到一个华南纸老虎,在GCD的体制下都能屹立不到,所谓指鹿为马也不过如此吧
 
估计原文对热血青年太长,摘抄吧

“拉萨究竟发生了什么?大多数中国人看到的只有政府在封锁消息几天之后统一发布的新闻。对于任何来源单一的垄断性新闻发布,我不敢说它是假的,但是也不能确认它是真的”


看来你是不看报,不看电视的英语文盲。从西藏回来的西方旅游者有采访,有录像。都证实了藏独分子的暴乱。为什么说是单一媒体?你不知道是因为你无知。
 
是否不同看法就是用心险恶?
一个普通百姓就是用心险恶又有个P用
不要动不动就那么激动好不好?
那么多大道理太难懂
我只问个简单的,诸位不要回避,就是3。14真相到底是什么,你们能告诉大家,再呼吁大家去游行吗?

你都说gcd独裁了,你还关心真相干嘛?
已经相信西方民主了,还问什么真相?全听他们的不就得了,看着假图片,听着假新闻,你不就觉得民主了吗?
你心已经偏,索性泥沙都不信,岂不更好!
出国的,留学的,或许是想出来见见世面,看看世界,
一不小心让大家看到西方比起gcd 也没强到那里去!
6Xsi 的那帮傻大大,开来都被利用
 
楼上的,先看清帖子再批呀
没人要求中国ZF相信西方ZF
如果说西方是胡说八道,那么独裁GCD的新闻还可以相信吗?
应该看具体事实。西方新闻媒体认为中国在1950年侵略了西藏这个国家。是不是胡说八道?
还有个很好的例子,独裁GCD说你是加拿大人了,可加拿大媒体说可能有成千上万的华人间谍,可能有你哟。你相信谁?
 
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