为什么疫情在武汉爆发， 外星球生物干的。。。。

[GuardianAngel]

这四个目标，有三个已经绝大部分完成或正在进行时。
-沉重打击中国核心的科研重镇，武汉和湖北如此被迫隔离，就沉重打击80%以上中国科研和工业物质，技能和知识供应链。
-在民众中造成恐惧和对现政府的怨恨
-造成中华民族内部人民按区域分化和内讧。现在各地围堵武汉人本身对中华民族来说是非常痛心的。



武汉这么被重创，国子头的大型科研，国防，航空航天，战略项目80%受影响，75%项目进度被拖延至少12-18个月。
另外两点大家在微信群中应该已经看出来了。

这个怪谁呀？本来只有40几个人感染，很容易控制的事，死人率也不高，自己管理砸了，就来什么"美帝亡我之心不死"？

 

[冰中取火]

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系。
自己查去。这种公开信息是个人都能查到

正是因为随便不能查到靠谱的资料，很多就类似我们CFC上的主观观点，这个不能算靠谱权威数据，所以我也没法相信。你几次提到白人比例不少，你总是看到哪里有比较可靠的资料吧？

 

[GuardianAngel]

正是因为随便不能查到靠谱的资料，很多就类似我们CFC上的主观观点，这个不能算靠谱权威数据，所以我也没法相信。你几次提到白人比例不少，你总是看到哪里有比较可靠的资料吧？

随便就能查到靠谱的资料。
这种公开信息是个人都能查到。 看 Wikipedia. Ok?

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只有要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

 

[冰中取火]

随便就能查到靠谱的资料。
这种公开信息是个人都能查到

没有说不少。我说有。所以跟基因没有关系，只有要是个有接触的人就能传染上，不管是白人，黑人，大陆人，香港人，。。

中学生写个报告也得基本是：1.自己实验或常规科学推理计算啥的；2.直接证据；3间接证据等。我也很想知道多点真相，你所说的个人很容易查到，我随便一查没得到靠谱有用的资料，就是当参考资料根本都不合格的。你有这样的资料提供给大家，也可减少很多不必要的质疑了。

 

[GuardianAngel]

非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。

 

[GuardianAngel]

非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。



非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。


非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。


非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。

 

[冰中取火]

非典时有不只一个白人感染致死的。从一开始就有。并不是只感染中国人华人。

这是我的论点。我认为这种基本常识，有兴趣的人应该自己去查。

我是对教你写报告之类的学校和老师佩服地一塌糊涂，没别的可说了。

 

[GuardianAngel]

我是对教你写报告之类的学校和老师佩服地一塌糊涂，没别的可说了。

写报告？ 没人给我钱我写什么报告？

对非典时的事，自己懒得查，想找免费劳工？

 

[GuardianAngel]

SARS - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

关于非典的链接。有兴趣的人看看
看看是否是针对华人基因的，有没有白人医生被感染牺牲，是谁让世界卫生组织引起重视的

 

[向问天]

这个怪谁呀？本来只有40几个人感染，很容易控制的事，死人率也不高，自己管理砸了，就来什么"美帝亡我之心不死"？

加拿大已经确诊3个了。
这是正在步中国的后尘。

中国首先遇到这种新病毒，没有经验借鉴，所以措手不及。加拿大明知危险而不采取措施，这就是体制问题了。

 

[知更鸟]

我无法相信有人居然相信鲍威尔拿了一瓶洗衣粉证明伊拉克有生化武器，那是普京的玩笑话，艺术调侃，不是科学。还有阿波罗号没有登上月球等等。有那个时间干点实事，中国也能强得让人心服口服。
我也是无聊的回这种无聊贴。

 

[lindamy]

中学生写个报告也得基本是：1.自己实验或常规科学推理计算啥的；2.直接证据；3间接证据等。我也很想知道多点真相，你所说的个人很容易查到，我随便一查没得到靠谱有用的资料，就是当参考资料根本都不合格的。你有这样的资料提供给大家，也可减少很多不必要的质疑了。

我同意你的观点，有人提出一个说法，别人有兴趣追问，如果方便为人提供一个根据，哪怕是林克也好，因为别人好知道和你探讨的是同一个问题，自己狗到的可能有偏差，难以讨论。可惜很多时候，刚一问，可能就被告知：你不会自己查啊？还要别人喂？只好尽量避免提问，人家也没义务。

 

[冰中取火]

我同意你的观点，有人提出一个说法，别人有兴趣追问，如果方便为人提供一个根据，哪怕是林克也好，因为别人好知道和你探讨的是同一个问题，自己狗到的可能有偏差，难以讨论。可惜很多时候，刚一问，可能就被告知：你不会自己查啊？还要别人喂？只好尽量避免提问，人家也没义务。

问题是有一类人常常是喊口号式的发表自己的主观观点，我是对他们的信用度有怀疑，所以不会轻易信他们所说的。也许他们是文艺青年出身，不知道简单论点论据之类的概念。

 

[ert0000]

我无法相信有人居然相信鲍威尔拿了一瓶洗衣粉证明伊拉克有生化武器，那是普京的玩笑话，艺术调侃，不是科学。还有阿波罗号没有登上月球等等。有那个时间干点实事，中国也能强得让人心服口服。
我也是无聊的回这种无聊贴。

Feb 5, 2003 鲍威尔在联合国，

Lie After Lie: What Colin Powell Knew About Iraq 15 Years Ago and What He Told the U.N.

The evidence is irrefutable: Colin Powell consciously deceived the world in his 2003 presentation making the case for war with Iraq.

theintercept.com

LIE AFTER LIE: WHAT COLIN POWELL KNEW ABOUT IRAQ 15 YEARS AGO AND WHAT HE TOLD THE U.N.

Jon Schwarz
February 6 2018, 8:38 a.m.

COLIN POWELL DELIVERED his presentation making the case for war with Iraq at the United Nations 15 years ago, on February 5, 2003.
As much criticism as Powell received for this — he’s called it “painful” and something that will “always be a part of my record” — it hasn’t been close to what’s justified. Powell, who was secretary of state under President George W. Bush, was much more than just horribly mistaken: He fabricated “evidence” and ignored repeated warnings that what he was saying was false.
Unfortunately, Congress never investigated Powell’s use of the intelligence he was given, so we don’t know many of the specifics. Even so, what did reach the public record in other ways is extremely damning. While the corporate media has never taken a close look at this record, we can go through Powell’s presentation line by line to demonstrate the chasm between what he knew and what he told the world. As you’ll see, there’s quite a lot to say about it.
Powell’s speech can be found on the State Department website here. All other sources are linked below.
Public Certainty, Private Doubt
On that February 5 in front of the U.N. Security Council, was Colin Powell certain what he was saying was accurate? He certainly was:

POWELL: My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.

Later, regarding whether Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program, he said:

POWELL: There is no doubt in my mind …

That’s in public. What about in private? According to Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, here’s what Powell was thinking at the time:

WILKERSON: [Powell] had walked into my office musing and he said words to the effect of, ‘I wonder how we’ll all feel if we put half a million troops in Iraq and march from one end of the country to the other and find nothing.’

Unambiguous Lies
This is some of what Powell said about the infamous aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq, supposedly meant for their covert nuclear weapons program:

POWELL: It strikes me as quite odd that these [aluminum] tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so.

Powell’s own intelligence staff, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepared two memos commenting on drafts of the presentation. They were later quietly released as appendices to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on WMD intelligence.
The second INR memo, written on February 3, 2003, told Powell this:

Our key remaining concern is the claim that the tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that “far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.” In fact, the most comparable U.S. system is a tactical rocket — the U.S. Mark 66 air-launched 70mm rocket — that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances. Note that the Mk 66 specifications are unclassified, and the Department is planning to share them with the [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Fabricated Evidence
Powell played an intercept of a conversation between Iraqi army officers about the U.N. inspections. However, when he translated what they were saying, he knowingly embellished it, turning it from evidence Iraq was complying with U.N. resolutions to evidence Iraq was violating them. This appears in Bob Woodward’s book “Plan of Attack”:

Powell had decided to add his personal interpretation of the intercepts to the rehearsed script, taking them substantially further and casting them in the most negative light. … Concerning the intercept about inspecting for the possibility of “forbidden ammo,” Powell took the interpretation further: “Clean out all of the areas. … Make sure there is nothing there.” None of this was in the intercept.

Here’s the conversation as Powell presented it at the U.N. As Woodward reported, the bold sentences were simply added by Powell:

POWELL: “They’re inspecting the ammunition you have, yes.”
“Yes.”
“For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.”
“For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?”
“Yes.”
“And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas yesterday to clean out all of the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.”

Powell then explained:

This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind.

According to the official State Department translation (and confirmed for me by Imad Khadduri), the Iraqi soldier merely said:

“And we sent you a message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.”

And it’s no surprise the Iraqi said this. Here’s what the CIA’s report on Iraq’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction found out about what was going on within the Iraqi government just before the January 30 intercepted conversation:

The NMD director met with Republican Guard military leaders on 25 January 2003 and advised them they were to sign documents saying that there was no WMD in their units, according to a former Iraqi senior officer. Husam Amin told them that the government would hold them responsible if UNMOVIC found any WMD in their units or areas, or if there was anything that cast doubt on Iraq’s cooperation with UNMOVIC. Commanders established committees to ensure their units retained no evidence of old WMD.

Again: Powell took evidence of the Iraqis doing what they were supposed to do — i.e., searching their gigantic ammunition dumps to make sure they weren’t accidentally holding onto banned chemical weapons — and doctored it to make it look as if Iraq were hiding banned weapons.
Since the State Department was questioned about this by journalist Gilbert Cranberg, the translation at variance with Powell’s version has disappeared from its site. It’s now available only via archive.org.
Deception by Omission
Powell’s presentation left out extremely important information, as here:

POWELL: Iraq’s record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced 4 tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s late son-in-law.

As far as this went, this was accurate. However, Kamal, the head of Iraq’s WMD programs, defected in 1995. Iraq had produced this VX before the Gulf War, in 1991 — and according to Kamel, Iraq had secretly destroyed it soon after the war. Then they lied about ever producing it (until his defection). But according to Kamel, they weren’t lying when they said they no longer had it.
Indeed, in the U.N.’s notes from Kamel’s debriefing, he says Iraq had no remaining WMD of any kind:

KAMEL: All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons — biological, chemical, missiles, nuclear — were destroyed.

And if that weren’t enough, Kamel also said this in an interview on CNN with correspondent Brent Sadler:

SADLER: Can you state here and now — does Iraq still to this day hold weapons of mass destruction?
KAMEL: No. Iraq does not possess any weapons of mass destruction. I am being completely honest about this.

But in 1996, Kamel returned to Iraq, where he was killed by Saddam’s regime. Thus the U.S. could safely take a witness who truthfully had said Iraq had no remaining banned weapons and pretend his testimony indicated the exact opposite.
Did Powell know what he was doing at the time? It’s unclear. Here’s a transcript of an exchange between Powell and Sam Husseini of the Institute for Public Accuracy in Washington in December 2006, with video below:

HUSSEINI: You cited Hussein Kamel in your U.N. testimony. Did you know he said there were no WMDs?
POWELL: I only knew what the intelligence community told me.
HUSSEINI: But did you know that fact?
POWELL: Of course not!
HUSSEINI: You didn’t know that, even though it was reported?
POWELL: I’ve answered your question!

As you can see in the video, Powell was not happy to explore this line of questioning. (He’s also never shown any inclination to find out who purportedly steered him wrong; when asked by Barbara Walters who was responsible for the mistakes in the overall presentation, Powell stated, “I don’t have the names.”)

Ignored Warnings
As mentioned above, the State Department’s intelligence staff, called the INR, prepared two memos on the presentation. They directly contradicted Powell on the aluminum tubes issue, but also warned him many of his claims were “weak,” “not credible,” or “highly questionable.” Here are some of the examples the memos give.
Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: We know that Saddam’s son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam’s numerous palace complexes.

The first INR memo, from January 29, 2003, flagged this claim as “WEAK”:

second bullet. WEAK. Qusay order to remove prohibited items from palaces.

Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: [K]ey files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection.

The first INR memo:

last bullet. WEAK. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. Plausibility open to question.

This claim was again flagged in the second INR memo, from February 3, 2003:

Page 4, last bullet, re key files being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors. This claim is highly questionable and promises to be targeted by critics and possibly UN inspection officials as well.

Powell at the U.N:

POWELL: [W]e know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing [sic] rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq.

January 29, 2003 INR memo:

last bullet. WEAK. Missiles with biological warheads reportedly dispersed. This would be somewhat true in terms of short-range missiles with conventional warheads, but is questionable in terms of longer-range missiles or biological warheads.

February 3, 2003 INR memo:

Page 5. first para, claim re missile brigade dispersing rocket launchers and BW warheads. This claim too is highly questionable and might be subjected to criticism by UN inspection officials.

At the U.N., Powell described a satellite picture this way:

The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions…The truck you […] see is a signature item. It’s a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.

January 29, 2003 INR memo:

***/WEAK. We support much of this discussion, but we note that decontamination vehicles–cited several times in the text–are water trucks that can have legitimate uses……Iraq has given UNMOVIC what may be a plausible account for this activity–that this was an exercise involving the movement of conventional explosives; presence of a fire safety truck (water truck, which could also be used as a decontamination vehicle) is common in such an event.

Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: These are facts, corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries.

February 3, 2003 INR memo:

Numerous references to humint as fact. (E.g., “We know that…) We have been told that some are being adjusted, but we gather some others — such as information involving multiple-corroboration – will stay…In the Iraq context, “multiple corroboration” hardly guarantees authenticity of information.

Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: n mid-December weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there.

January 29, 2003 INR memo:

last bullet. **/WEAK. Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. Such claims are not credible and are open to criticism, particularly by the UN inspectorates.

Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: A dozen [WMD] experts have been placed under house arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein’s guest houses.

January 29, 2003 INR memo:

second bullet. WEAK. 12 experts reportedly under house arrest… Highly questionable.

Powell at the U.N.:

POWELL: UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons.

January 29, 2003 INR memo:

… the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are “an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons” is WEAK.

Now, with that for context, it’s useful to look back at what Powell said in a November, 2005 interview with Barbara Walters:

There was some people in the intelligence community who knew at that time that some of these sources were not good and shouldn’t be relied upon, and they didn’t speak up. That devastated me.

That can be contrasted with this October 2003 exchange from 60 Minutes II with Greg Thielmann, who headed the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in the INR until September 2002:

PELLEY: If the secretary took the information that his own intelligence bureau had developed and turned it on its head, which is what you’re saying, to what end?
THIELMANN: I can only assume that he was doing it to loyally support the president of the United States and build the strongest possible case for arguing that there was no alternative to the use of military force.

Clearly, Powell’s loyalty to Bush extended to being willing to deceive the world: the United Nations, Americans, and the coalition troops about to be sent to kill and die in Iraq. He’s never been held accountable for his actions, and it’s extremely unlikely he ever will be.
Top photo: Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the United Nations Security Council. Wielding dramatic satellite photos and intelligence intercepts, he cited “irrefutable and undeniable” evidence that Iraq still conceals massive quantities of terror weapons. Seated in the row behind Powell is CIA Director George Tenet.

 

[言者无罪]

当然是原创，该不会把我抓起来吧，我就是一个算命的。

你在CFC这个公共网络平台上从国家安全的角度造谣，散布谣言攻击美国，已经触犯法律。看在都是同胞的份上，老夫善意提醒你一句：赶快悬崖勒马。否则迟早被抓捕并引渡去美国受审。