目前中国经济不景气的原因是什么？懂的给简单分析一下

[一心无住]

X打击每一个行业，一打一个准，堪称千年奇才。

 

[jian dan]

美国当年打压日本广场协议，其实还包括了德国，协议本身是迫使日元马克升值以减少美国贸易逆差，说中国以成为老二了注定要被打压是不准确的，从历史上来看只能说对美占据巨额贸易顺差的国家要被打压。而且广场协议两年后就被替代了。

所谓中国被打压，始于川普的贸易战，但这个力度比广场协议要低得多，美国对中国的关税提高刚开始只是小部分产品，而广场协议迫使日元和马克都升值了一倍，等于对所有出口美国商品都大幅增加了关税。广场协议日本西德都屈服让步了，后来德国还好日本是由于自己房地产泡沫才有所谓的失去30年。贸易战川普其实原本也只是想中国多买些产品以减少逆差，中国不服跟美国以牙还牙，这才招来一波又一波的打击，而中国还击美国的招数在自己看来很厉害，实际上对美国不痛不痒，加上习在政治上的倒行逆施和对香港的愚蠢作派，不但招来美国打压，还招来英国的其他国家的群殴，所以中国处境是比当年日本德国要差得多。

 

[爱米]

中国的情况真有那么严重吗？
会不会是我们在海外看着一片狼藉，国内到处旅游歌舞升平？

 

[chicago666]

我昨天看了人大那个王文的文章，就是觉得一尊周围全部都是些胡说八道的人，怎么可能会有好的政策呢？

疫情期间越搞越糟也就算了，现在仍然是越搞越糟，看不到前途，要好好反思了。

当然，也没法反思，一帮溜须拍马的人，影响了习的观察。

 

[爱米]

弱弱地问，对加国华人会有什么影响呢？

 

[gocanoeing]

弱弱地问，对加国华人会有什么影响呢？

加币能换更多的人民币

 

[metropolis]

路透社前天的文章，哈佛学者认为，川普和拜登政府对中国贸易限制，付出不小的代价，现在很多商品只是从原来的直接从中国进口，变成了间接通过越南和墨西哥，中国减少了对美国的出口，而增加了对这些国家的贸易额，结果是很多商品成本升高，不断涨价。

Trump, Biden policies shifted trade from China at a cost, study shows​

By Howard Schneider
August 26, 202310:04 AM EDTUpdated 2 days ago

Trump, Biden policies shifted trade from China at a cost, study shows

U.S. trade has shifted away from China due to policies enacted by the Biden and Trump administrations, but U.S. reliance on China-linked supply chains has not necessarily been reduced and consumers have faced higher costs, according to new research presented on Saturday at a Federal Reserve...

www.reuters.com

 

[ottawatiger]

有些人把中国目前的囧境归于XI的无能。
要清君侧，然后就一片祥和了？

让我们把视线放回2018，19年，川大嘴加关税发动贸易战初期。重审老川提出的四，五点要求，可以避免美中贸易战。

站在美国的立场上，这要求过分吗？
站在中国的立场上，这要求可行吗？

克林顿当年的这句竞选口号精准，“笨蛋，是经济！”
用在中美关系上，可以改成：“笨蛋，是制度！”

叠加了多种不利因素的中国经济，下滑速度超出了多数人的想象。

 

[爱米]

加币能换更多的人民币

喔。不回国也用不上。防疫突然放开，老母亲不幸离世。没牵挂就不回国了。

 

[Michaels]

按老掐来看：

中国目前的经济和国内困境， 外因 20%， 内因 80%

外因很清楚，就是美国和西方对中国在高科技和供应链的围堵

内因：
- 政府过多无理干预经济。尤其是干预私营经济，粗暴用政府力量打压私营经济， 比如团灭教培， 干预农民基本的自救和正常农业活动 40%
- 政府主导的投资，效益低下，形成很多烂尾项目，比如雄安。。。。 25%
- 缺少法治，人民的基本非政治权利大幅削减， 10%
- 人为或懒政，对疫情前很正常的第三产业，境外入境旅游消费制造各种障碍，对很多障碍消极对待。目前境外非中国公民入境人数剧减，是疫情前2%。 5%


上面几个因素，除了外因20%和法治10%（涉及政治）占 30%， 其余70%完全应该正确对待，

中国没有"私营"企业，只有"民营"企业，所以"民营"企业都有党组织。50年代前是"公营"和"私营"，改革开放后是"国营"和"民营"

 

[chicago666]

Why China’s economy won’t be fixed​

An increasingly autocratic government is making bad decisions​

Aug 24th 2023
SaveShare
Give
Whatever has gone wrong? After China rejoined the world economy in 1978, it became the most spectacular growth story in history. Farm reform, industrialisation and rising incomes lifted nearly 800m people out of extreme poverty. Having produced just a tenth as much as America in 1980, China’s economy is now about three-quarters the size. Yet instead of roaring back after the government abandoned its “zero-covid” policy at the end of 2022, it is lurching from one ditch to the next.
Listen to this story. Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android.

The economy grew at an annualised rate of just 3.2% in the second quarter, a disappointment that looks even worse given that, by one prominent estimate, America’s may be growing at almost 6%. House prices have fallen and property developers, who tend to sell houses before they are built, have hit the wall, scaring off buyers. Consumer spending, business investment and exports have all fallen short. And whereas much of the world battles inflation that is too high, China is suffering from the opposite problem: consumer prices fell in the year to July. Some analysts warn that China may enter a deflationary trap like Japan’s in the 1990s .
Yet in some ways Japanification is too mild a diagnosis of China’s ills. A chronic shortfall in growth would be worse in China because its people are poorer. Japan’s living standards were about 60% of America’s by 1990; China’s today are less than 20%. And, unlike Japan, China is also suffering from something more profound than weak demand and heavy debt. Many of its challenges stem from broader failures of its economic policymaking—which are getting worse as President Xi Jinping centralises power.
A decade or so ago China’s technocrats were seen almost as savants. First they presided over an economic marvel. Then China was the only big economy to respond to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with sufficient stimulatory force—some commentators went as far as to say that China had saved the world economy. In the 2010s, every time the economy wobbled, officials defied predictions of calamity by cheapening credit, building infrastructure or stimulating the property market.
During each episode, however, public and private debts mounted. So did doubts about the sustainability of the housing boom and whether new infrastructure was really needed. Today policymakers are in a bind. Wisely, they do not want more white elephants or to reflate the property bubble. Nor can they do enough of the more desirable kinds of stimulus, such as pension spending and handouts to poor households to boost consumption, because Mr Xi has disavowed “welfarism” and the government seeks an official deficit of only 3% of gdp.
As a result, the response to the slowdown has been lacklustre. Policymakers are not even willing to cut interest rates much. On August 21st they disappointed investors with an underwhelming cut of 0.1 percentage points in the one-year lending rate.
This feeble response to tumbling growth and inflation is the latest in a series of policy errors. China’s foreign-policy swagger and its mercantilist industrial policy have aggravated an economic conflict with America. At home it has failed to deal adequately with incentives to speculate on housing and a system in which developers have such huge obligations that they are systemically important. Starting in 2020 regulators tanked markets by cracking down on successful consumer-technology firms that were deemed too unruly and monopolistic. During the pandemic, officials bought time with lockdowns but failed to use it to vaccinate enough people for a controlled exit, and then were overwhelmed by the highly contagious Omicron variant.
Why does the government keep making mistakes? One reason is that short-term growth is no longer the priority of the Chinese Communist Party (ccp). The signs are that Mr Xi believes China must prepare for sustained economic and, potentially, military conflict with America. Today, therefore, he emphasises China’s pursuit of national greatness, security and resilience. He is willing to make material sacrifices to achieve those goals, and to the extent he wants growth, it must be “high quality”.
Yet even by Mr Xi’s criteria, the ccp’s decisions are flawed. The collapse of the zero-covid policy undermined Mr Xi’s prestige. The attack on tech firms has scared off entrepreneurs. Should China fall into persistent deflation because the authorities refuse to boost consumption, debts will rise in real value and weigh more heavily on the economy. Above all, unless the ccp continues to raise living standards, it will weaken its grip on power and limit its ability to match America.
Mounting policy failures therefore look less like a new, self-sacrificing focus on national security, than plain bad decision-making. They have coincided with Mr Xi’s centralisation of power and his replacement of technocrats with loyalists in top jobs. China used to tolerate debate about its economy, but today it cajoles analysts into fake optimism. Recently it has stopped publishing unflattering data on youth unemployment and consumer confidence. The top ranks of government still contain plenty of talent, but it is naive to expect a bureaucracy to produce rational analysis or inventive ideas when the message from the top is that loyalty matters above all. Instead, decisions are increasingly governed by an ideology that fuses a left-wing suspicion of rich entrepreneurs with a right-wing reluctance to hand money to the idle poor.
The fact that China’s problems start at the top means they will persist. They may even worsen, as clumsy policymakers confront the economy’s mounting challenges. The population is ageing rapidly. America is increasingly hostile, and is trying to choke the parts of China’s economy, like chipmaking, that it sees as strategically significant. The more China catches up with America, the harder the gap will be to close further, because centralised economies are better at emulation than at innovation.
Liberals’ predictions about China have often betrayed wishful thinking. In the 2000s Western leaders mistakenly believed that trade, markets and growth would boost democracy and individual liberty. But China is now testing the reverse relationship: whether more autocracy damages the economy. The evidence is mounting that it does—and that after four decades of fast growth China is entering a period of disappointment. ■

 

[笑到荼蘼]

中国出口锐减，政府对房地产一直打压，但是房地产所涉及的产业链太多了，可谓一损俱损。国家现在又开始救房市。现在政策导向很明显，一定要想办法把股市搞起来。等待A股崛起。

 

[ert0000]

美国当年打压日本广场协议，其实还包括了德国，协议本身是迫使日元马克升值以减少美国贸易逆差，说中国以成为老二了注定要被打压是不准确的，从历史上来看只能说对美占据巨额贸易顺差的国家要被打压。而且广场协议两年后就被替代了。

所谓中国被打压，始于川普的贸易战，但这个力度比广场协议要低得多，美国对中国的关税提高刚开始只是小部分产品，而广场协议迫使日元和马克都升值了一倍，等于对所有出口美国商品都大幅增加了关税。广场协议日本西德都屈服让步了，后来德国还好日本是由于自己房地产泡沫才有所谓的失去30年。贸易战川普其实原本也只是想中国多买些产品以减少逆差，中国不服跟美国以牙还牙，这才招来一波又一波的打击，而中国还击美国的招数在自己看来很厉害，实际上对美国不痛不痒，加上习在政治上的倒行逆施和对香港的愚蠢作派，不但招来美国打压，还招来英国的其他国家的群殴，所以中国处境是比当年日本德国要差得多。

你这又走向了另一个极端。

X大犯了很多错误， 但把所有目前中国经济和社会的问题和困境归结于他也不是真相。现在很多人不喜欢X大， 即使换成西方认可的邓黑猫，森破，胡锦涛，美国打压老二就会停止么？？ 图样图僧破。

连美国各类智库都坦白承认，美国历史上成功打压各类老二，你还想把美国当成一个大善人？ LOL

 

[爱米]

这个是4个月前的，认为中国不会突然经济衰退，但是长久来看增速会放缓

 

[ert0000]

X大和老G目前国内和国外事务的精力是2，8开， 国内2 国外8

但我看X大和老G重点放错了，实际国内和国外的问题，实际是82开， 国内是8，国外是2

把这占8成左右的国内问题解决好，国外的负面因素就会化解

经济和国内事务要拨乱反正，恢复到森破时期的政策，这些70-80%的问题就会很快解决