时事焦点 :
发布者 HXWZ 在 04-05-15 08:05
傅立民
【译者说明】
在一次聚会上，一位美国朋友知道我在以私人身份从事中美关系研究，便对我说：“我的父亲和我的哥哥都是美国军人，而且都在朝鲜半岛服役。半个世纪，两代人了，我们可以为了联合国的和平使命而把亲人送到前线。可我们不了解中国。你是研究中美关系的，请你告诉我，为什么我们要为中国大陆和台湾的关系而要把中国看作敌人和跟中国打仗？你是从中国大陆来的，请你告诉我，中国人是不是因为台湾问题而把美国看作敌人和想跟美国打仗？都说中国是我们美国的朋友。既然彼此是朋友，为什么不能避免战争？”
我感到难以给出简明的回答，但我知道，有他那样问题的美国人，成千上万。
前些时候，由于台湾当局的“公投”和“台独”尝试，由于北京方面的回应，这位美国朋友的问题就不但是美国民众的问题，而且成为美国政府必须面对和必须作出明确回答的问题。就在这个时候，4月22日，傅立民先生（Chas W. Freeman）应邀出席了美中友协会议，发表了题为《中美关系和台湾问题》的讲演，清晰简明和深入广泛地回答了美国民众关注和美国政府面对的一个战争与和平的战略选择的重大问题。
1971年中美关系正常化开始，傅立民先生担任尼克松总统的首席翻译；正常化实现，他担任美国驻华大使馆公使。从那个时候到现在，傅立民先生多次参与了官方高层往来和各种民间往来，是中美关系建设的参与者和见证人，也是美国朝野都非常尊重的知名人士。在1991年的“海湾战争”中，他是美国驻沙特大使和负责前线外交，在现代战争和现代外交方面具有高层管理的第一手经验。因而，傅立民先生的见解不但有很高程度的决策实践价值，而且也有很高程度的政策研究价值。
傅立民先生在美中友协的讲演是以个人名义发表的。然而，据我的经验看，他的见解代表了美国的主流看法；也根据我的了解，他的讲演得到中美两国政府高层人士和专家的特别关注和重视。傅立民先生的讲演是为美国听众而做的，却也非常值得所有关心中美关系和台湾问题的中国读者参考。为此，我尽力而为把他的讲演翻译成中文，方便各位。我的翻译水平有限。因此，如果有什么问题，请以人民网英文版发表的英文原文为准。（译者米阿仑）
中美关系和台湾问题（讲演全文）
就台湾海峡问题，我应邀做个讲演。我认为，要说明这个问题，就不能脱离本世纪美国的敌友问题。请让我就中美关系的全球背景开始。我将尽力而为直接和简洁地做些阐明。
本世纪开始的时候，我们美国人仍然为失去了敌人而痛苦，有一种因为失去了强大的敌人而迷失方向、不清楚如何确定持续的和庞大的国防开支的病态感觉。曾经有段时间，中国似乎可以替代无人感到惋惜的前苏联而对此有所弥补。然而，2001年9月11日，美国蒙受到真正的和残暴的、而并非想象中的敌人的攻击。现在，只有那些神经错乱和连皮毛知识都没有的人、或是紧绷神经机构里的某些匆匆过客，才会试图把中国看成美国的头号敌人。中美两国发现，他们共同努力的课题范围在不断增加，两国关系的气氛得到了稳定的改善。
然而，有些东西在影响美国公众舆论，即中国的崛起给美国目前超群财富和力量提出了重要的长期挑战。就此而论，美中关系如何，可能是影响本世纪前景的决定性因素。我同意这种见解。
中国已经成为亚太地区的经济重心。为了从这个现实中获益，中国的远东邻国，包括日本，正在重新为他们的经济政策定向。越来越多的全球经济供应链跟中国连接起来。据世界贸易组织统计，中国的外贸进口增长率是40%、出口增长率是35%，是去年全球贸易增长幅度最大的国家，世界贸易增长很大程度上是由于中国贸易的增长。然而，中国的经济贸易增长主要还是由于国内市场的规模和推动，事实证明，相对而言它不受全球经济周期的影响。中国正在发生令全球感到惊异的变化。仅举几个例子：
去年，美国生产了大约9000万吨钢，日本大约1亿吨。同年，中国生产了2.20亿吨钢、进口了3750万吨，追上了美国，成为世界最大的钢铁进口国。到2010年，一些迹象说明，中国可能生产5亿吨钢材，超过2000年的全球钢材产量。实际上，由于中国对能源和原材料需求而推动价格上升，我们也许正在进入一个商品成本的上升时期，正在扭转过去一百年的趋向。
中国正在像日本那样的发展科技力量，可能成为全球技术革新的一个主要中心。每一年，美国大约有60,000名工程技术毕业生，日本有70,000名；而中国每年大约有325,000位工程技术毕业生。正在出现的中国创造能力和科学技术结合，将使中国再次成为世界文化的一个主要贡献者。中国和世界之间、包括中美之间的技术流动，将成为双向的技术流动。
中国重新富强起来，将在许多方面对美国和全球发生影响。中国旅客已经成为东南亚旅游业的关键客户；同样的情景将在欧洲发生。如果我们的签证政策宽松，那么，中国旅客也会到美国来（当然，我们没有那样的签证政策）。将来，上万上亿的中国人将有资金和护照到海外冒险。
跟日本商人和日本旅客打交道，我们美国人向他们学习烹调寿司，然后，我们学会了自己怎么吃寿司。我们跟中国的互动交往，将给我们带来什么文化转变？我相信，那不是粤语歌曲，也不是中国的海参或狗肉包子，但很难说，――谁能预言美国人不会为中国的“小精灵”游戏、功夫动画片、或为中国方便面而迷恋得发疯？
我援引这些事情，是要说明，中国正在成为一个世界力量，它在按照自己的方式取代日本在东亚的经济地位。在一代人或一代半的时间里，在十五、二十、或二十五年的时间里（选您的经济学家来估计吧），中国的经济将大于我们美国的经济。如同历史记录的那样，东亚将再次成为全球经济的重心地区。从商业活动角度说，你可以作出这些趋势的图表；用经济学的术语说，中国正在成为世界强国。现在，如果没有中国的参与或默许，能获得解决的世界经济问题很少，不久，所有的世界经济问题都要有中国的参与或默许才能获得解决。
中国与G-7（七国首脑会议，有时称为G-8八国首脑会议）所讨论的问题的关联越来越紧密，疏忽对这些问题的讨论，是不包括中国在内的G-7会议何以减少了它的相关性的原因。亚洲的繁荣与中国有不可分割的联系。不消多说，中国和美国的经济也变得越来越互相依赖。我们依靠日本和中国为我们的国债提供财政支持，说明我们的繁荣越来越依靠其他国家，就这一点来说，中国在扮演一个从来没有过的重要角色。
美国人已经关注人民币的价值与美元的关系。就所谓的“大中华”的大陆、香港和台湾三个部分的互相关联的程度来说，以某种货币联盟的形式连接他们的货币，符合经济学原理。随着时间推移，政治状况或许会允许这个连接。然而，不管这是否发生，中国经济的规模和它在外贸中的角色，意味着成为“硬通货”的人民币将可能跟欧元和日元一样，成为针对美元的一种储备选择。就此，我们比以往更密切地关注中国的财政政策和货币政策。
诚然，正如上半个世纪的日本实例所证明的，经济实力不一定等同于政治影响。没有政治改革，中国就难以赶上包括美国那样典型国家在内的西方的国际影响。没有人试图仿效中国的政治管理，也没有人试图学习中国的政治艺术。没有像经济现代化那样的政治改革，就是在它自己所在的地区，中国的吸引力将继续和长期地受到严重限制。中国的政治改革如何，也跟台湾问题如何紧密相关，但这还是不确定的。当前的情况是，中国的政治影响小于许多其它比它小得多的国家。
中国对它的邻国的军事威慑力和强制力则是另一回事。随着经济增长，在没有更大国防预算支持的情况下，中国也能保持它的军事能力。在本世纪的前三分之一的时间里，中国可能成为亚洲最强大的军事强国。随着本世纪的时间推移，或者由于中国自己的选择，或者由于其它国家的刺激激化，中国的军事可能会发展为与美国军事对抗的力量。为了与中国的军事力量增长取得平衡，就可能使美国和中国进入一系列的军备竞赛，这是一个很实际的风险。
然而，中国的那种选择并非是必然的，正如与崛起的中国发生敌对冲突并非不可避免一样。不能用俄国、德国、日本和美国的崛起来类推中国的崛起。中国没有帝国主义、殖民主义、重商主义、军国主义的思想体系，没有天意授命民族扩张和领土扩张的命运论，也没有文明传播的使命。相反，使许多人惊异的是，中国强调国家平等、国家主权不可侵犯和联合国宪章的权威。
中国没有给亚洲订立“门罗主义教条”。中国没有寻求替代美国或填补美国力量撤出后留下的真空。尽管中国可以用武力收回香港或澳门，但他们没有那样做。他们恢复了这些领土，并尊重现状，没有寻求把自己的系统强加给那些地方，虽然他们本来可以对殖民主义统治后的民主改革给予更多支持。同样，中国与俄国、新独立的中亚国家和越南解决了他们的边界问题，在谈判中，中国给多得少。中国说，它准备以同样方式解决沿海边界问题。
迄今为止的所有证据说明，中国不是一个以地区或国际秩序为代价而为它自己寻求惯例以外势态的新强国。在亚洲，中国是在回归到历史上的超群绝伦的角色。中国人民梦寐以求的，是在一个半世纪后成为全球文明中引以为自豪的领导国家。这样，中国终将摆脱它早期的软弱和贫穷，摆脱西方列强给他们带来的创伤。
由此，中国正在恢复自信。北京对前几年亚洲金融危机的回应，最近在朝鲜半岛问题上的纯熟外交，它关于东北亚安全对话的建议，它跟我们一道赞赏不扩散政策，它在联合国越来越活跃的维和角色，这些都在说明，中国的回归是一个更成熟和更负责的国际成员。像日本一样，中国正在成为一个更加规范的国家，它也期望如此被国际社会接受。
如果所有情况都是如此，那么，中国就更是一个全球和地区稳定的力量，而不是当前世界秩序的挑战者。借助双方点点滴滴的努力，中美关系的合作应该比对抗更多，中国应该是我们的朋友、而不是我们的敌人。如果真是如此，那么，本世纪就会有一个和平扩展、繁荣和民主的良好远景。
然而，不幸，并非所有情况都是如此。在这十年结束前，美国也许会看到，我们也许因为台湾而与中国交战的真实可能。
在过去的一个世纪，中国有两次革命，1911年的革命和1949年的革命，旨在铲除外国帝国主义在中国肉体和灵魂上刻下的痕迹、铲除在中国领土上的外国势力范围、结束外国列强对中国内部事务的干涉、恢复中国的全国团结与它的财富和力量。随着其它思想体系消逝，留下的是很容易点燃引爆的中国民族主义。台湾与中国其它地方的分离，是国民党和共产党的革命都感到耻辱和都想克服的。统一是中国的国家最高原则。
值得注意的是，鉴于台湾问题在中国民族主义中的中心地位，上个世纪70和80年代，美国以纯熟的外交说服了北京，台湾问题能够像香港和澳门那样通过和平手段、即谈判手段，获得解决。然而，我们的台湾朋友总是说，殖民地（香港）和台湾的情况有根本的不同，台湾的状况是没有外国统治的自治，外国力量不能就台湾问题跟北京做交易，台湾如何，只能由台湾当局决定。
在很长一段时间里，台湾当局的民族主义者和他们的共产主义敌手都致力于中国的统一。跨海峡的一个中国的公众舆论，使双方施展主权那样的敏感问题、同时寻求彼此适应的务实手段。这样的公众舆论使北京接受了一个国家有两种制度并存的概念，导致了统一后确保而不是改变台湾的政治、经济、文化和军事的自治的对话。无疑，这些提案回答了日本和美国的战略利益问题，即人民解放军不在台湾驻防，这就保持了东亚的军事平衡。到目前，中国的这一立场没有改变。
但在过去几年，台湾方面的立场有所改变。台湾当局否定了一个中国的想法。陈水扁先生断言，台湾海峡两岸是分开的国家。他说，在他看来，既然台湾已经独立，那么独立就是现状、没有必要宣布独立。他提出了全岛范围的宪法公民投票，在法律上巩固那个独立。
台湾的现用宪法是1947年全国投票通过的，而2006年可能由台湾地区人民制定、并可能于2008年生效的宪法却没有包括其他中国人的意见。从法律角度看，这是一个自决行动。陈先生表示了跟北京对话，但要以明确或含蓄地重申他关于台湾是独立国家的见解为条件。
布什当局对陈先生警告说，美国反对任何改变台湾海峡的“一个中国”现状的单方面行动。陈先生拒绝了这个忠告，他否认现状是一中国，并重申说，作为民主国家，美国有责任支持台湾人民表达的让台湾独立的民主意愿，而不顾及湾海峡另一边的中国人的见解。
然而，没有得到它所要分离出去的国家的同意，就不能实现国家独立。跟我们美国和其它许多国家的情况一样，往往是经过多年血战之后才能获得独立，例如美国南方人的例子，例如巴斯克人、比夫拉人、库尔德人、巴勒斯坦人、斯里兰卡的泰米尔人、车臣人、南苏丹人和其他人的例子，都证实，不管屠杀和人类苦难有多么大，分裂企图总是失败，而像捷克和斯洛伐克那样通过各方协议而实现和平分裂的情况，则是非常少见的。
但是，就台湾问题，目前，海峡两岸的立场没有谈判的余地。陈先生坚持独立，明确宣布了单方面的最终时间表。目前，北京则准备容忍事实上分裂，条件是，这种分裂状态能导致就某种形式统一的协议的谈判。双方都不准备就对方提出的问题表态，更不要说接受它们了。
回应台湾当局的声明和行动，中国增加了国防开支，为防止台湾脱离中国而做了很大的军事准备。中国当局说，陈先生的行动，使他们没有选择的余地，而只有使用武力应对台湾。很巧，他们的准备完成时间差不多跟陈先生提出的公投自称独立的日程表一样。
陈先生说，北京是只纸老虎。似乎是在强调这种评断，他减少而不是增加了台湾的国防开支，同时，延迟了回应美国关于台湾自卫能力升级的建议。当问到他，台湾外部担心，一旦北京对他的单方面行动采取武力、台湾将如何自卫的时候，陈先生自信地表示，美国军事力量将会因为台湾关系法而感到自己的责任，美国国会的亲台情绪也将站到保卫台湾这一边。他和他的追随者似乎很确定，一场美国与中国的战争的结局就是一个独立的台湾。
就算这是可能的吧，然而，美国、中国，还有台湾，他们各自的代价是什么？而且，为台湾摆脱它自己的行为所造成的后果而去跟中国打仗，我们为什么要觉得那是我们美国人的责任？鉴于台湾当局领导人明显地要与中国民族主义做血腥的冒险，现在，是清楚地考虑和说明中美战争意味着什么的时候了。
上个世纪50年代，由于跟台湾防御有关的危机，美国曾数次威胁要动用核武器攻击中国。然而，如果不能冒险面临中国的核反击，我们就不能再做同样的威胁。好消息是，中美双方都不愿意为了台湾而冒核战争的风险。
一场为台湾而发生的中美战争，不会在第三国进行或由代理国进行，例如朝鲜战争和越南战争。在那些战争中，美国非常审慎地避免攻击中国国土。但是，台湾防御则要求还击那些攻击台湾的中国大陆的基地和设施。长期以来，中国表明，如果它的国土受到美国的攻击，它将以以美国的攻击方式做出反击、包括对美国国土和海外军事基地的攻击。这样的冲突可能迅速地升级为全球水平的危险，是真实存在的，――中美双方都没有任何控制战争升级的战略，我们的国防部的鲁莽决定会导致更糟糕的结果，而当战争可能存在的时候，我们跟中国人民解放军的通讯往来，远不如我们曾跟苏联军事力量的通讯往来。实际上，我们现在与中国人民解放军的通讯往来，与不存在中美战争的可能性时相比要少得多。
中国把台湾看作中国的一部分，全世界、包括美国在内，都承认这个立场。在一场为台湾而跟中国进行的战争中，我们的盟友会很少，尽管我们在日本有军事基地，但日本很可能会发现它很不情愿、却不得不支持我们。
这样战争将会分裂亚洲，将会使本世纪陷入中美两国之间的全球性的角逐和敌对。这将比冷战更危险、将迫使美国比在冷战时期做出更大的牺牲。跟苏联不同，中国没有机能不正常的思想体系和经济体制的牵制，它不太可能崩溃。中美之间的问题，不是中国在世界场合的行为如何、或它如何对待我们的盟国，而是中国将如何结束自己的内战。
当然，跟美国发生战争，中国将蒙受巨大损失。我相信，我们的武力能迅速地摧毁大多数中国的海军、空军和导弹基地。在经济发达的沿海地区，中国也许将蒙受非常严重的战争破坏。（我不会推测美国的哪一部分将蒙受中国报复攻击的损失。）战争结束后，中国将需要巨大的努力来重建工业基础设施和军事力量。
如果中国夺取台湾不成功，那么，中国的民族主义将迫使它一再尝试，战争将会断断续续地不停，直到某一方放弃。中国现代化的各个方面都将可能发生倒退，国家对外开放政策将蒙受严重挫折，近些年来的政治松动将被严厉的戒严令所替代。海外的中国少数民族，特别是在美国的华人，将可能变得非常难受。
不过，不管战争如何进行，台湾将成为主要战场。即便战争只有一个回合，如果没有暂停，那么，整个海岛的基础设施将被摧毁，它的繁荣将被破坏，它的民主将受到损伤。如果战争结果是台湾与中国一体化，那么，人民解放军将发现自己面对的是带有敌对感的平民。国内外的投资者不会支持中国以这种方式收取台湾，中国也不会以武力收取台湾而赢得这样的经济奖励。
如果战争的结果是台湾持续从中国分裂出去，那么，台湾当局就会面临中国大陆不断更新的攻击威胁。几乎不会有投资者乐意冒险把他们的钱扔在中国枪口下的一个海岛。由于中国大陆为每次制服台湾而重组它的武装力量，台湾的跛脚经济也许无法买得起武器装备来保护自己。结果，就可能像上世纪50年代一样，台湾不得不再次依靠美国的补贴生存，同时，美国和中国的军队将会继续在海岛对峙。
事实上，没有任何一方能成为台湾战争的“赢者”，所有各方都是失败者。所以，我们必须确保避免这样的一场战争。当然，中国民族主义者可能回应说，避免战争的明显方式就是台湾放弃它的独立梦想，而台湾的分裂主义者们会争辩说，海峡对岸的中国人应该尊重台湾的自决权。两方面的每个方面，都将在美国发现许多支持者，却很少在台湾海峡的对岸发现支持者。
就短期看，那些矛盾是不可调和的，然而，在很长时间里，海峡两岸若没有彼此挑战，就可以避免战争。再说，随着时间推移和彼此更多理解和更多良好愿望，也许会出现双方都能彼此接受的妥协。就海峡两岸的互动作用和台湾政治经济模式带来的中国变化的速度看，这个可能是存在的，导致双方各种问题的不同会随着时间推移而消逝。为这样一个汇合而拖延时间，是客观而且值得的。
长久以来，使台湾问题和平解决，经过双方协商谈判、而不是单方面行动或通过战争来解决问题，符合美国的利益、也符合世界各国的利益。北京知道，我们对此是非常严肃认真的，因而北京为此非常小心谨慎。然而，在台北方面，现在，需要清楚地对它说明，如果它一意孤行，它将自食其果。长话短说，北京需要继续避免轻率行动，而台北则需要停止它的轻率行动。至于美国人，我们应该明确地保留不为台湾违背美国利益和不听从美国忠告的后果而与中国发生战争的权利。我们不应该把与中国发生战争或和平的决定委托于台湾当局。这样决定本来就应该是我们单独做的。
目前，在国内巨大压力下，北京对台湾是“叫”（威慑）、还是“咬”（实行打击）呢？陈先生无视他的冒险后果、也不考虑他向中国大陆发动挑战对美国造成的后果，他的做法惊动了布什当局。中国和美国都不想被迫再次卷入冲突，更不想为台湾而发生战争冲突。十分明显的答案，就是美国和中国都坐下来，设法阻止台北的挑战，同时，要设法避免我们自己去创造那种挑战。然而，我们之间关于台湾问题的对话，大体上还只是个又聋又哑的对话，而没有讨论如何操作实施的问题。
疏远它唯一的保护者美国无异于玩火和制造危险，就此说服台北是符合我们的利益的。北京针对台湾增加军事威胁或伤害台湾岛，不符合我们的利益。最近，例如昨天，布什当局更加直截了当地公开说明，要努力使台湾正视现实，要阻止台北的那些使北京采取单方面行动的做法。陈先生不但对美国的劝阻置之不理，而且，甚至设法让他的党的报社媒体忽视或歪曲美国政府的说明，结果，他的追随者从来就没有听说或看到美国政府的说明。很明显，仅仅是文字声明不足以说服台湾当局不要损害台湾岛的未来和我们的未来，惩罚性的行动是必要的。
劝阻北京采取单方面行动，非常符合我们的利益。这里，我们面对一个微妙的问题。中国领导人非常清楚而且非常了解跟美国发生战争的后果。他们绝对不想要那样的战争。但他们也认为，华盛顿反对台湾和大陆的任何形式的重新联合、甚至是谈判的联合。如同许多人在台湾一样，他们判断，美国政策的秘密目的是帮助台湾变得独立，而且，如果必要，我们会为此跟中国打仗。中国的国家荣誉要求用某种形式结束中国的国家分裂，即使只是个象征性的结束。如果完成这个目标不可避免地要与美国发生战争，即便中国使用和平手段，那么，摆在中国领导面前的唯一选择，就是在什么时候冒战争风险、而不是是否冒战争的风险，而且，中国很少激励负责任的行动。
因为所有这些理由，现在是我们清楚地作出以下声明的时候了：
我们承认台湾海峡的法律现状是“一个中国”，不接受现状是独立的论说；
我们支持和赞同在“一个中国”条件下的双方谈判；
我们将接受台海双方都接受的现状改变，不接受未经双方都同意的现状改变；
我们不会承认未经北京认可的“台湾独立”,我们也不认可未经台湾民众认可的任何形式的统一；
我们会按照上述的原则履行台湾台湾关系法和中美三个联合公报的原则。
这跟布什当局昨天在国会听政所做的声明没有太大的不同。在我看，如果台湾当局不听从这些忠告，或者不让这些忠告传达到台湾普通老百姓，那么，美国政府就没有选择余地、而不得不考虑选择某些方面与台湾的关系降格，其中包括我们的防御关系和武器销售关系，以此来告诉台北和北京两个方面，为了避免战争，我们必须对这个问题作出非常严肃的处理。
或许，由于在美国的亲台力量和反华力量、由于台湾在国会的游说力量，回归到一个着重于台湾海峡和平、而不是其它政治日程的平衡政策，在政治上似乎不可能。如果那就是实际情形，那么，我们就必须接受一个结论：处理台湾问题和避免与中国发生战争，政治上也许也是不可能的。我个人不能接受那个结论，那种结论的后果，对我们和对全世界，都是非常严重的。
相反地说，成功地处理台湾问题，是打开健全的美中关系的大门的钥匙。用那把钥匙打开那扇大门，将使所有的各个方面、包括台湾方面，都有一个更美好的世纪。我们应该寻找那把钥匙，我们应该努力打开那扇大门。
比如说，中华人民共和国能够找到和平途径与台湾的民主社会重新联合起来的中国，将完全符合我们的价值观和国家利益。那样的中国，是我们可以与之合作的中国，由此而来推动美国人民和中国人民都期望的本世纪的共同繁荣与和平的国际环境。那样的中国将是美国的朋友，而不是美国的敌人。
（中文翻译：米阿仑）
□ 一读者推荐
Mr. Freeman on Sino-US Relations and Taiwan Issue
I have been asked to speak about cross-Strait relations. I do not think this subject can be addressed apart from the prospects for American friendship or enmity with it over the course of this century. Allow me to begin, then, with a few remarks about Sino-American relations in their global context. I will be as direct and brief as I can be.
As the century began, we Americans were still suffering from enemy deprivation syndrome -- the sick feeling of disorientation one feels when one has lost a powerful enemy and isn't quite sure how to justify continued high levels of defense spending. For a time, China seemed to be in line to fill in behind the late, unlamented USSR. But on September 11, 2001 America was cruelly assaulted by real, not imaginary enemies. Only the lunatic fringe and a few of its fellow travelers inside the Beltway now seek to appoint China as enemy-in-chief of the United States. The two countries have found an increasing range of issues to work together on, and the atmosphere of our relations has steadily improved.
Nevertheless there is something approaching an American consensus that the rise of China presents the most important long-term challenge to America's currently preeminent wealth and power. In this view, the kind of relationship the United States and China work out is likely to be the decisive factor affecting prospects for the century. I agree.
China is already emerging as the center of economic gravity in the Asia-Pacific region. China's East Asian neighbors, including Japan, are reorienting their economic policies to take advantage of this new reality. Increasingly, all supply chains tie the global economy to China. According to the WTO, the growth in China's foreign trade -- imports up 40 percent, exports up 35 percent -- accounted for most of the growth in world trade last year. Nevertheless, China's growth is mainly driven by the size and dynamism of its domestic market. It has proven relatively immune to global economic cycles. Astonishing changes are occurring in China's place in the world. A few examples:
Last year, the United States produced about 90 million tons of steel; Japan about 100 million. In that same year, China produced 220 million tons of steel and imported another 37.5 million, overtaking the United States as the world's largest importer. By 2010, some projections suggest that China may be producing 500 million tons of steel, more than the entire world did in the year 2000. We may, in fact, now be entering an age of rising commodity costs, reversing the trends of the past hundred years, as Chinese demand for energy and raw materials pulls prices up.
China is also likely to become a major center of global technological innovation, as it joins Japan as a scientific and technological power. The United States graduates about 60,000 engineers each year; Japan 70,000. China is now graduating about 325,000 engineers annually. The marriage of Chinese genius to science and technology that is now occurring will enable China once again to become a major net contributor to global culture. The flow of technology between China and the world, including the United States, will increasingly be in both directions.
There will be many other ways in which China's return to wealth affects the world and the United States. Already Chinese tourists are a key clientele for Southeast Asia's tourist industry. Increasingly, one sees them in Europe. They would be here as well if we had sensible visa policies (but, of course, we don't). In the future, hundreds of millions of Chinese will have the money and the passports to venture abroad.
To deal with Japanese businessmen and tourists, Americans learned to prepare sushi and sashimi. Then we learned to eat seaweed-wrapped sticky rice and raw fish ourselves. What cultural transformations will our future interactions with Chinese bring about! Not, I trust, a passion for CantoPop, sea slugs or dog meat baozi. But you never know. Who would have predicted an American infatuation with pokemon, manga, or instant ramen?
I cite these things simply to suggest the extent to which China is becoming a force in the world. It is on its way to overtaking Japan as the preeminent economy in East Asia. Within a generation or a generation and a half, in fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years (pick your economist), China's economy will be larger than ours. East Asia will then again be, as it was for most of recorded history, the dominant region in the global economy. Business activity by business activity, one can chart these trends. In economic terms, China is becoming a world power. There are now very few, if any, global economic problems that can be solved without the participation or acquiescence of China. Before long, there will essentially be none.
This is why the failure to include China in the G-7 (or G-8, as it is sometimes called) reduces the relevance of that gathering without addressing the problem of China's increasing connectedness to the issues it is discussing. Asia's prosperity is now inextricably linked to that of China. Without many remarking it, China's and America's economies are also becoming more interdependent. As our reliance on Japan and China to finance our mounting national debt illustrates, our prosperity increasingly depends on that of others. And China is playing an ever-larger role in this regard.
Americans are already concerned about the value of the Renminbi yuan in relation to the dollar. Given the extent to which the economies of the three parts of so-called "greater China - the China mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan - are now interconnected, linking their currencies in some form of monetary union would even now make economic sense. In time, political circumstances may permit this. But whether or not this happens, the size of the Chinese economy and its role in foreign trade means that, as the yuan becomes a hard currency, it is likely to join the euro and the yen as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar. We are destined to become far more interested in Chinese fiscal and monetary policies than we have been.
Of course, as the example of Japan in the last half of the past century reminds us, economic power does not necessarily equate to political influence. Without political reform, China cannot hope to match the international influence of the West, including its most prominent exemplar: the United States. No one now seeks to emulate the Chinese way of governance or to learn the political arts from China. Without political as well as economic modernization, China will continue to have severely limited attractive power, even in its own region, for a very long time to come. The prospects for such political reform are closely linked to the Taiwan issue and thus, at best, uncertain. The odds at present are that China's political influence will thus remain distinctly inferior to that of many other countries much smaller than it is.
China's capacity to overawe and coerce its neighbors militarily could, of course, be a different matter. As China's economy grows, Beijing will be able without strain to support an ever larger defense budget. In the first third of this century, China could emerge as the preeminent military power in Asia. As the century proceeds, if it chooses or is stimulated by others to do so, it could develop military capabilities that begin to rival those of the United States. There is a real risk that the United States and China could be drawn into a series of arms races as military balances shift to reflect China's growing military prowess.
But there is nothing inevitable about the choices China will make, just as there is nothing inevitable about conflict or rivalry with China as a rising power. The analogies that are sometimes drawn to the rise of Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States do not ring true. China has articulated no ideologies of imperialism, colonialism, mercantilism, militarism, manifest destiny, territorial aggrandizement, or mission civilisatrice. It has instead, to the surprise of many, stressed the equality of nations, the inviolability of national sovereignty, and the supremacy of the United Nations Charter.
There has been no hint of a Chinese "Munroe Doctrine" for Asia; China has not sought to displace the United States or our forces from the region or to fill the vacuums our inattention has sometimes created. The Chinese did not take Hong Kong or Macao by force, though they could have. When they recovered these territories they were respectful of the status quo in them; they did not seek to impose their own system there, though they have been less hospitable to post-colonial democratic reforms than they should have been. Similarly, China has now settled all of its land borders with Russia, the newly independent Central Asian states, and Vietnam through negotiations in which it gave as much or more than it got. It says it is prepared to do the same for its maritime boundaries.
All the evidence to date suggests that China is not a new power seeking to stake out an unprecedented status for itself at the expense of the existing regional or international order. The Chinese are a nation returning to an historically preeminent role in Asia. They aspire to resume their traditional status as proud leaders of global civilization after a century and a half of eclipse. As Chinese do this, they are finally putting the trauma of their earlier weakness, impoverishment, and victimization by foreign powers behind them.
China is thus regaining a welcome measure of poise and self-confidence. Beijing's response to the Asian financial crisis of a few years ago, its recent skillful diplomacy in Korea, its proposals for a northeast Asian security dialogue, its embrace of non-proliferation policies paralleling our own, and its increasingly active role in UN peacekeeping operations all illustrate the return of China as an increasingly mature and responsible international actor. China is, like Japan, becoming a more normal country. It wants to be accepted as such.
All things being equal, China looks to be a force for global and regional stability, not a challenger of the current world order. With a bit of work by both sides, Sino-American relations should therefore be marked by much more cooperation than contention and China should be our friend, not our enemy. If that is so, the prospects for a century of expanded peace, prosperity, and democracy are good.
Unfortunately, all things do not now seem likely to be equal. There is a real possibility that, before the end of the decade, the United States may find ourselves at war with China over Taiwan.
Two Chinese revolutions in the last century, one in 1911 and one in 1949, were fired by the nation's will to erase the imprint of foreign imperialism on China's body and soul, eliminate foreign spheres of influence on Chinese territory, end the capacity of foreign powers to intervene in China's internal affairs, and restore China's national unity along with its wealth and power. As other ideologies have fallen away, the explosive underpinning of Chinese nationalism is all that is left. Taiwan's separation from the rest of China is a monument to all the humiliations both the Kuomintang and Communist revolutions were conceived to overcome. Reunification is a central imperative of the Chinese state.
Remarkably, given the centrality of the Taiwan issue to Chinese nationalism, skillful American diplomacy in the 1970s and '80s persuaded Beijing that Taiwan's status could, like the Hong Kong and Macao issues, be resolved by peaceful means, that is, by negotiation. But, as our friends in Taiwan never tire of pointing out, there are fundamental differences between the circumstances of those colonies and that of Taiwan, which is self-administering and under no foreign sovereignty. No foreign power can cut a deal with Beijing about Taiwan; that can only be done by the Taiwan authorities.
Those authorities were for long Chinese nationalists as committed as their communist rivals to the unity of China. The cross-Strait consensus that there was only one China enabled both sides to finesse sensitive issues like sovereignty while seeking practical means of mutual accommodation. This consensus enabled Beijing to accept the notion of two systems coexisting within one country. It led to proposals for talks about reunification that would guarantee rather than change Taiwan's political, economic, cultural, and military autonomy. These proposals implicitly addressed Japanese and American strategic interests by affirming that there would be no People's Liberation Army forces stationed in Taiwan, thus leaving the military balance in northeast Asia unaltered. China's position has not changed.
But, over the past few years, Taiwan's position has. The Taiwan authorities have repudiated the idea of one China. The current president, Mr. Chen Shui-bian asserts that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separate countries. He says that, since - in his view - Taiwan is already independent, independence is the status quo and there is no need to declare it. He has proposed an island-wide referendum on a new constitution that would, among other things, legally consolidate such independence.
The constitution now in force in Taiwan vests sovereignty in the people of China, who approved it in a nationwide vote in 1947. The new constitution would be created in 2006 by a sovereign act of the people of Taiwan without regard to the views of other Chinese. It would go into effect in 2008. By any legal standard, this would constitute an act of self-determination. Mr. Chen has offered to talk with Beijing in the meantime but only on terms that explicitly or implicitly reaffirm his view of Taiwan as an independent state.
The Bush Administration has cautioned Mr. Chen against any effort to change the one-China status quo in the Taiwan Strait by such unilateral acts. Mr. Chen has rejected this advice. Instead he denies that the status quo is one China and affirms that the United States, as a democracy, is bound to support the democratically expressed will of the people of Taiwan to enjoy their own separate state, regardless of the views of Chinese across the Strait.
But no nation achieves independence without the agreement of the country from which it is separating. Very often, as in our own case and many others, the grant of independence is gained only after years of bloodshed. More often still, as the examples of American Southerners, Basques, Biafrans, Kurds, Palestinians, Sri Lankan Tamils, Chechens, southern Sudanese, and others attest, despite great carnage and human suffering, attempts at separation fail. Rarely, as in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, separation is peacefully agreed between the parties.
But the positions of both sides on the Taiwan question are now non-negotiable. Mr. Chen insists on independence and has declared a firm, unilateral timetable for making it final. Beijing is prepared to tolerate the current situation of de facto separation only if it will lead to negotiations that can produce cross-Strait agreement on some form of reunification. Neither is prepared to address the aspirations of the other, still less to accept them.
In response to the Taiwan authorities' statements and actions China has raised defense spending and greatly stepped up military preparations to prevent secession by Taiwan. The Chinese say that Mr. Chen's actions are leaving them no choice but to use force against the island. Coincidentally, their preparations to do so will be complete on more or less the same schedule that Mr. Chen has proposed for his referenda consolidating the island's self-proclaimed independence.
Mr. Chen says that Beijing is a paper tiger. As if to underscore this judgment, he has reduced rather than increased Taiwan's defense spending while delaying decisions on American recommendations for upgrading Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. Asked how he would defend Taiwan if, as many outside Taiwan fear, Beijing attacks the island in response to his unilateral actions, Mr. Chen expresses confidence that US forces would feel obliged by the Taiwan Relations Act and pro-Taiwan sentiment in Congress to come to Taiwan's defense. He and his followers seem certain that the result of a war between the United States and China would be an independent Taiwan.
Maybe so. But at what cost to the United States, China, and Taiwan itself? And why should Americans feel obliged to go to war with China to save Taiwan from the consequences of actions it is taking over our objections? With Taiwan's leaders apparently determined to risk a bloody rendezvous with Chinese nationalism, it is time to think and speak clearly about what a Sino-American war over Taiwan would mean.
In the 1950s, the United States several times threatened nuclear attack on China over crises related to the defense of Taiwan. We can no longer do so without risking nuclear counterattack by China. The good news, therefore, is that neither side is likely to risk a nuclear exchange over Taiwan.
But a US-China war over Taiwan would not be fought in a third country or by proxy, as was the case in Korea and Vietnam. In those wars, the United States scrupulously avoided attacking the Chinese homeland. But the defense of Taiwan would require counterattacking the bases and facilities on the Chinese mainland from which Taiwan was being attacked. China has long indicated that it would reply to attacks on its homeland with counterattacks in kind on the United States, including our homeland and our bases overseas. The danger that the conflict could rapidly escalate to the global level is real - all the more so because neither side has done anything to develop a strategy for escalation control and - as a result of reckless decisions in our Defense Department - there is now far less communication with the People's Liberation Army than there was with Soviet forces during the Cold War. There is, in fact, far less communication with the PLA that there was when war with China was not a possibility.
China regards Taiwan as part of China and the world, including the United States, acknowledges this Chinese position. In a fight with China over Taiwan, we would have few, if any, allies, though -- given our bases on its territory -- Japan would probably find it impossible not to support us.
Such a war would divide Asia and usher in a century dominated by global contention and mutual hostility between China and the United States. This could be even more dangerous and require vastly larger sacrifices of Americans than the Cold War did. China, unlike the Soviet Union, is unhampered by a dysfunctional ideology and economic system. It is unlikely to oblige us by collapsing. The issue between us is not Chinese behavior on the world scene or toward US allies. It is how the Chinese civil war should end.
China would, of course, be severely damaged by war with the United States. I believe that our armed forces could and would rapidly destroy most of China's navy and air force as well as its missile bases. Areas along the coast, where economic development is most advanced, might suffer especially heavy war damage. (I will not speculate about which parts of the United States are most likely to suffer Chinese retaliatory strikes.) An enormous effort would be required to rebuild China's industrial infrastructure and armed forces after the fighting ended.
If China had not succeeded in taking Taiwan, Chinese nationalism would compel it to prepare to try again. The war would thus continue on an intermittent basis until one side or the other gave up. Every aspect of China's modernization would be seriously set back. The country's opening to the outside world would be blighted and the political loosening of recent years replaced with the stringencies of martial law. The position of Chinese minorities abroad, especially in the United States, could become very uncomfortable.
But Taiwan would be the main battleground in any such war. Even if there were only one round of warfare, the island would, in all likelihood, emerge with its infrastructure devastated, its prosperity destroyed, and its democracy traumatized, if not suspended. If the result of the fighting were to incorporate Taiwan into China, the PLA would find itself pacifying a sullenly hostile populace. Neither domestic nor foreign investors would want to help the Chinese occupation. China would not gain much of an economic prize if it took Taiwan by force.
If the result were Taiwan's continued de facto separation from China, the Taiwan authorities would face the constant threat of renewed Chinese attack. Few investors would wish to risk their money on an island under the Chinese gun. As China reconstituted its armed forces for another try at subduing the island, Taiwan's lamed economy might be unable to afford the weaponry necessary to defend itself. Taiwan might once again, as it did in the 1950s, have to rely on US subsidies to survive. Meanwhile, US and Chinese forces would continue to face off over the island.
The fact is that no one can "win" a war over Taiwan. All will lose. Therefore we must make sure that we avoid such a war. Chinese nationalists will, of course, respond that the obvious way to avoid war is for Taiwan to abandon its dreams of independence. Taiwanese separatists will argue that Chinese across the Strait simply need to respect Taiwan's right of self-determination. Each will find many supporters for its view in the United States but few on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
In the short term such contradictions are irreconcilable. But so long as neither side actually does anything to challenge the other, there need be no war. And, with the passage of time and the growth of mutual understanding and goodwill, mutually acceptable compromises may emerge. That is especially the case, given the speed of change in China, much of it catalyzed by cross-Strait interaction and the attractiveness of Taiwan's politico-economic model. Given time, differences between the two sides that are problems now may well blur and fade away. Gaining time for such convergence is a worthy objective in itself.
It has long been in the American interest - as well as that of the parties and the world - for this issue to be resolved peacefully, by mutual agreement, through negotiations, not unilaterally and not through war. Beijing knows that we are serious about this and has so far acted with appropriate caution. Taipei, however, now clearly needs to be convinced that if it acts on its own, it may well end up on its own. In short, Beijing needs to continue to avoid acting rashly but Taipei needs to stop doing so. As for Americans, we should explicitly reserve the right not to go to war with China to save Taiwanese from the consequences of their acting against US interests and advice. We should not entrust decisions about war and peace with China to the Taiwan authorities. Such decisions are rightly for us alone to make.
Beijing is currently under mounting domestic pressure to show Taipei that it can bite as well as growl. Mr. Chen's dismissal of the risks he has been taking and his disregard of the consequences for Americans of his provocative behavior vis-¨¤-vis China have alarmed the Bush Administration. Neither China nor the United States wants to be forced into another confrontation, still less a war over Taiwan. The obvious answer is for the United States and China to sit down together and figure out how to deter Taipei from provoking such confrontation and how to avoid creating it on our own. But our dialogue about Taiwan is basically a dialogue of the deaf that never reaches the operative issues.
It is in our interest to convince Taipei that it is both playing with fire and becoming dangerously distant from its sole protector, the United States. It is not in our interest for Beijing to accomplish this for us by upping the military threat to Taiwan or taking a bite out of the island. The Bush Administration, as recently as yesterday, has spoken out ever more bluntly in an effort to instill realism into Taipei and to deter it from taking steps that will provoke such unilateral action by Beijing. Mr. Chen has not only brushed these warnings aside, he has ensured that his partisan press ignores and distorts the Administration's message so that it is never heard or read by his followers. It is becoming clear that words alone may not be enough to convince the Taiwan authorities not to jeopardize the island's future and our own; punitive actions may be required.
Deterring Beijing from its own unilateral actions is also very much in our interest. Here we confront a subtle problem. China's leaders understand very clearly what the consequences of war with the United States would be. They absolutely do not want such a war. But they have come to believe that Washington is opposed to any form of reassociation of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, even a negotiated one. Like many people in Taiwan, they judge that the secret purpose of U.S. policy is to help Taiwan become independent and that we will, if necessary, fight China to accomplish this. But China's national honor requires some form of end to the division of the Chinese nation, even if only symbolically. If accomplishing this will inevitably entail war with the United States, even if China uses peaceful means, then the only choice before China's leaders is when, not whether, to risk such war and China has little, if any, incentive to act responsibly.
For all these reasons, it is time for us to state clearly that:
we regard the juridical status quo in the Taiwan Strait as "one China" and do not accept that that status quo is independence; that:
we favor negotiations between the two sides within the context of "one China;" that:
we will accept any change in the status quo that both sides accept but, conversely, will not accept any change that is not agreed by both sides; that:
we will not recognize an independent Taiwan that has not been recognized by Beijing, nor we will recognize any form of reunification that has not been endorsed by the people of Taiwan; and that:
we will implement our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act and the three US-China joint communiques and carry out our relations with both sides of the Strait in a manner consistent with these principles.
This is not that far from what the Administration stated yesterday in testimony before Congress. If the Taiwan authorities do not get the message or allow it to get through to ordinary people on the island, the Administration will - in my opinion - be left with no alternative but to consider appropriate downgrading of selected aspects of American relationships with Taiwan, including our defense and arms sales relationships, as a way of convincing both Taipei and Beijing of our seriousness about managing this issue to avoid war.
Perhaps, given the strength of pro-Taiwan and anti-China sentiment in the United States and the power of the Taiwan lobby in the US Congress, such a return to a balanced policy focused on the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait rather than other agendas is politically impossible. If that is the case, then we must accept that the management of the Taiwan problem to avoid war with China may also be impossible. I, for one, cannot accept that conclusion. The consequences for us and for the world are much too great.
Conversely, successful management of the Taiwan problem is the key to a sound US-China relationship. And the door that key can open is one that leads to a better century than the last one for all concerned, including Taiwan. That is the key we should be looking for and the door we should strive to open.
Among other things, a People's Republic of China that has found a way to reassociate itself peacefully with the democratic Chinese society on Taiwan is a China that is likely to be much more congenial to both our values and our interests. That kind of China is one we can work with to promote the common prosperity and peaceful international environment both Americans and Chinese long for in the century to come. That kind of China is one that will certainly be a friend, not an enemy of the United States.
By People's Daily Online
发布者 HXWZ 在 04-05-15 08:05
傅立民
【译者说明】
在一次聚会上，一位美国朋友知道我在以私人身份从事中美关系研究，便对我说：“我的父亲和我的哥哥都是美国军人，而且都在朝鲜半岛服役。半个世纪，两代人了，我们可以为了联合国的和平使命而把亲人送到前线。可我们不了解中国。你是研究中美关系的，请你告诉我，为什么我们要为中国大陆和台湾的关系而要把中国看作敌人和跟中国打仗？你是从中国大陆来的，请你告诉我，中国人是不是因为台湾问题而把美国看作敌人和想跟美国打仗？都说中国是我们美国的朋友。既然彼此是朋友，为什么不能避免战争？”
我感到难以给出简明的回答，但我知道，有他那样问题的美国人，成千上万。
前些时候，由于台湾当局的“公投”和“台独”尝试，由于北京方面的回应，这位美国朋友的问题就不但是美国民众的问题，而且成为美国政府必须面对和必须作出明确回答的问题。就在这个时候，4月22日，傅立民先生（Chas W. Freeman）应邀出席了美中友协会议，发表了题为《中美关系和台湾问题》的讲演，清晰简明和深入广泛地回答了美国民众关注和美国政府面对的一个战争与和平的战略选择的重大问题。
1971年中美关系正常化开始，傅立民先生担任尼克松总统的首席翻译；正常化实现，他担任美国驻华大使馆公使。从那个时候到现在，傅立民先生多次参与了官方高层往来和各种民间往来，是中美关系建设的参与者和见证人，也是美国朝野都非常尊重的知名人士。在1991年的“海湾战争”中，他是美国驻沙特大使和负责前线外交，在现代战争和现代外交方面具有高层管理的第一手经验。因而，傅立民先生的见解不但有很高程度的决策实践价值，而且也有很高程度的政策研究价值。
傅立民先生在美中友协的讲演是以个人名义发表的。然而，据我的经验看，他的见解代表了美国的主流看法；也根据我的了解，他的讲演得到中美两国政府高层人士和专家的特别关注和重视。傅立民先生的讲演是为美国听众而做的，却也非常值得所有关心中美关系和台湾问题的中国读者参考。为此，我尽力而为把他的讲演翻译成中文，方便各位。我的翻译水平有限。因此，如果有什么问题，请以人民网英文版发表的英文原文为准。（译者米阿仑）
中美关系和台湾问题（讲演全文）
就台湾海峡问题，我应邀做个讲演。我认为，要说明这个问题，就不能脱离本世纪美国的敌友问题。请让我就中美关系的全球背景开始。我将尽力而为直接和简洁地做些阐明。
本世纪开始的时候，我们美国人仍然为失去了敌人而痛苦，有一种因为失去了强大的敌人而迷失方向、不清楚如何确定持续的和庞大的国防开支的病态感觉。曾经有段时间，中国似乎可以替代无人感到惋惜的前苏联而对此有所弥补。然而，2001年9月11日，美国蒙受到真正的和残暴的、而并非想象中的敌人的攻击。现在，只有那些神经错乱和连皮毛知识都没有的人、或是紧绷神经机构里的某些匆匆过客，才会试图把中国看成美国的头号敌人。中美两国发现，他们共同努力的课题范围在不断增加，两国关系的气氛得到了稳定的改善。
然而，有些东西在影响美国公众舆论，即中国的崛起给美国目前超群财富和力量提出了重要的长期挑战。就此而论，美中关系如何，可能是影响本世纪前景的决定性因素。我同意这种见解。
中国已经成为亚太地区的经济重心。为了从这个现实中获益，中国的远东邻国，包括日本，正在重新为他们的经济政策定向。越来越多的全球经济供应链跟中国连接起来。据世界贸易组织统计，中国的外贸进口增长率是40%、出口增长率是35%，是去年全球贸易增长幅度最大的国家，世界贸易增长很大程度上是由于中国贸易的增长。然而，中国的经济贸易增长主要还是由于国内市场的规模和推动，事实证明，相对而言它不受全球经济周期的影响。中国正在发生令全球感到惊异的变化。仅举几个例子：
去年，美国生产了大约9000万吨钢，日本大约1亿吨。同年，中国生产了2.20亿吨钢、进口了3750万吨，追上了美国，成为世界最大的钢铁进口国。到2010年，一些迹象说明，中国可能生产5亿吨钢材，超过2000年的全球钢材产量。实际上，由于中国对能源和原材料需求而推动价格上升，我们也许正在进入一个商品成本的上升时期，正在扭转过去一百年的趋向。
中国正在像日本那样的发展科技力量，可能成为全球技术革新的一个主要中心。每一年，美国大约有60,000名工程技术毕业生，日本有70,000名；而中国每年大约有325,000位工程技术毕业生。正在出现的中国创造能力和科学技术结合，将使中国再次成为世界文化的一个主要贡献者。中国和世界之间、包括中美之间的技术流动，将成为双向的技术流动。
中国重新富强起来，将在许多方面对美国和全球发生影响。中国旅客已经成为东南亚旅游业的关键客户；同样的情景将在欧洲发生。如果我们的签证政策宽松，那么，中国旅客也会到美国来（当然，我们没有那样的签证政策）。将来，上万上亿的中国人将有资金和护照到海外冒险。
跟日本商人和日本旅客打交道，我们美国人向他们学习烹调寿司，然后，我们学会了自己怎么吃寿司。我们跟中国的互动交往，将给我们带来什么文化转变？我相信，那不是粤语歌曲，也不是中国的海参或狗肉包子，但很难说，――谁能预言美国人不会为中国的“小精灵”游戏、功夫动画片、或为中国方便面而迷恋得发疯？
我援引这些事情，是要说明，中国正在成为一个世界力量，它在按照自己的方式取代日本在东亚的经济地位。在一代人或一代半的时间里，在十五、二十、或二十五年的时间里（选您的经济学家来估计吧），中国的经济将大于我们美国的经济。如同历史记录的那样，东亚将再次成为全球经济的重心地区。从商业活动角度说，你可以作出这些趋势的图表；用经济学的术语说，中国正在成为世界强国。现在，如果没有中国的参与或默许，能获得解决的世界经济问题很少，不久，所有的世界经济问题都要有中国的参与或默许才能获得解决。
中国与G-7（七国首脑会议，有时称为G-8八国首脑会议）所讨论的问题的关联越来越紧密，疏忽对这些问题的讨论，是不包括中国在内的G-7会议何以减少了它的相关性的原因。亚洲的繁荣与中国有不可分割的联系。不消多说，中国和美国的经济也变得越来越互相依赖。我们依靠日本和中国为我们的国债提供财政支持，说明我们的繁荣越来越依靠其他国家，就这一点来说，中国在扮演一个从来没有过的重要角色。
美国人已经关注人民币的价值与美元的关系。就所谓的“大中华”的大陆、香港和台湾三个部分的互相关联的程度来说，以某种货币联盟的形式连接他们的货币，符合经济学原理。随着时间推移，政治状况或许会允许这个连接。然而，不管这是否发生，中国经济的规模和它在外贸中的角色，意味着成为“硬通货”的人民币将可能跟欧元和日元一样，成为针对美元的一种储备选择。就此，我们比以往更密切地关注中国的财政政策和货币政策。
诚然，正如上半个世纪的日本实例所证明的，经济实力不一定等同于政治影响。没有政治改革，中国就难以赶上包括美国那样典型国家在内的西方的国际影响。没有人试图仿效中国的政治管理，也没有人试图学习中国的政治艺术。没有像经济现代化那样的政治改革，就是在它自己所在的地区，中国的吸引力将继续和长期地受到严重限制。中国的政治改革如何，也跟台湾问题如何紧密相关，但这还是不确定的。当前的情况是，中国的政治影响小于许多其它比它小得多的国家。
中国对它的邻国的军事威慑力和强制力则是另一回事。随着经济增长，在没有更大国防预算支持的情况下，中国也能保持它的军事能力。在本世纪的前三分之一的时间里，中国可能成为亚洲最强大的军事强国。随着本世纪的时间推移，或者由于中国自己的选择，或者由于其它国家的刺激激化，中国的军事可能会发展为与美国军事对抗的力量。为了与中国的军事力量增长取得平衡，就可能使美国和中国进入一系列的军备竞赛，这是一个很实际的风险。
然而，中国的那种选择并非是必然的，正如与崛起的中国发生敌对冲突并非不可避免一样。不能用俄国、德国、日本和美国的崛起来类推中国的崛起。中国没有帝国主义、殖民主义、重商主义、军国主义的思想体系，没有天意授命民族扩张和领土扩张的命运论，也没有文明传播的使命。相反，使许多人惊异的是，中国强调国家平等、国家主权不可侵犯和联合国宪章的权威。
中国没有给亚洲订立“门罗主义教条”。中国没有寻求替代美国或填补美国力量撤出后留下的真空。尽管中国可以用武力收回香港或澳门，但他们没有那样做。他们恢复了这些领土，并尊重现状，没有寻求把自己的系统强加给那些地方，虽然他们本来可以对殖民主义统治后的民主改革给予更多支持。同样，中国与俄国、新独立的中亚国家和越南解决了他们的边界问题，在谈判中，中国给多得少。中国说，它准备以同样方式解决沿海边界问题。
迄今为止的所有证据说明，中国不是一个以地区或国际秩序为代价而为它自己寻求惯例以外势态的新强国。在亚洲，中国是在回归到历史上的超群绝伦的角色。中国人民梦寐以求的，是在一个半世纪后成为全球文明中引以为自豪的领导国家。这样，中国终将摆脱它早期的软弱和贫穷，摆脱西方列强给他们带来的创伤。
由此，中国正在恢复自信。北京对前几年亚洲金融危机的回应，最近在朝鲜半岛问题上的纯熟外交，它关于东北亚安全对话的建议，它跟我们一道赞赏不扩散政策，它在联合国越来越活跃的维和角色，这些都在说明，中国的回归是一个更成熟和更负责的国际成员。像日本一样，中国正在成为一个更加规范的国家，它也期望如此被国际社会接受。
如果所有情况都是如此，那么，中国就更是一个全球和地区稳定的力量，而不是当前世界秩序的挑战者。借助双方点点滴滴的努力，中美关系的合作应该比对抗更多，中国应该是我们的朋友、而不是我们的敌人。如果真是如此，那么，本世纪就会有一个和平扩展、繁荣和民主的良好远景。
然而，不幸，并非所有情况都是如此。在这十年结束前，美国也许会看到，我们也许因为台湾而与中国交战的真实可能。
在过去的一个世纪，中国有两次革命，1911年的革命和1949年的革命，旨在铲除外国帝国主义在中国肉体和灵魂上刻下的痕迹、铲除在中国领土上的外国势力范围、结束外国列强对中国内部事务的干涉、恢复中国的全国团结与它的财富和力量。随着其它思想体系消逝，留下的是很容易点燃引爆的中国民族主义。台湾与中国其它地方的分离，是国民党和共产党的革命都感到耻辱和都想克服的。统一是中国的国家最高原则。
值得注意的是，鉴于台湾问题在中国民族主义中的中心地位，上个世纪70和80年代，美国以纯熟的外交说服了北京，台湾问题能够像香港和澳门那样通过和平手段、即谈判手段，获得解决。然而，我们的台湾朋友总是说，殖民地（香港）和台湾的情况有根本的不同，台湾的状况是没有外国统治的自治，外国力量不能就台湾问题跟北京做交易，台湾如何，只能由台湾当局决定。
在很长一段时间里，台湾当局的民族主义者和他们的共产主义敌手都致力于中国的统一。跨海峡的一个中国的公众舆论，使双方施展主权那样的敏感问题、同时寻求彼此适应的务实手段。这样的公众舆论使北京接受了一个国家有两种制度并存的概念，导致了统一后确保而不是改变台湾的政治、经济、文化和军事的自治的对话。无疑，这些提案回答了日本和美国的战略利益问题，即人民解放军不在台湾驻防，这就保持了东亚的军事平衡。到目前，中国的这一立场没有改变。
但在过去几年，台湾方面的立场有所改变。台湾当局否定了一个中国的想法。陈水扁先生断言，台湾海峡两岸是分开的国家。他说，在他看来，既然台湾已经独立，那么独立就是现状、没有必要宣布独立。他提出了全岛范围的宪法公民投票，在法律上巩固那个独立。
台湾的现用宪法是1947年全国投票通过的，而2006年可能由台湾地区人民制定、并可能于2008年生效的宪法却没有包括其他中国人的意见。从法律角度看，这是一个自决行动。陈先生表示了跟北京对话，但要以明确或含蓄地重申他关于台湾是独立国家的见解为条件。
布什当局对陈先生警告说，美国反对任何改变台湾海峡的“一个中国”现状的单方面行动。陈先生拒绝了这个忠告，他否认现状是一中国，并重申说，作为民主国家，美国有责任支持台湾人民表达的让台湾独立的民主意愿，而不顾及湾海峡另一边的中国人的见解。
然而，没有得到它所要分离出去的国家的同意，就不能实现国家独立。跟我们美国和其它许多国家的情况一样，往往是经过多年血战之后才能获得独立，例如美国南方人的例子，例如巴斯克人、比夫拉人、库尔德人、巴勒斯坦人、斯里兰卡的泰米尔人、车臣人、南苏丹人和其他人的例子，都证实，不管屠杀和人类苦难有多么大，分裂企图总是失败，而像捷克和斯洛伐克那样通过各方协议而实现和平分裂的情况，则是非常少见的。
但是，就台湾问题，目前，海峡两岸的立场没有谈判的余地。陈先生坚持独立，明确宣布了单方面的最终时间表。目前，北京则准备容忍事实上分裂，条件是，这种分裂状态能导致就某种形式统一的协议的谈判。双方都不准备就对方提出的问题表态，更不要说接受它们了。
回应台湾当局的声明和行动，中国增加了国防开支，为防止台湾脱离中国而做了很大的军事准备。中国当局说，陈先生的行动，使他们没有选择的余地，而只有使用武力应对台湾。很巧，他们的准备完成时间差不多跟陈先生提出的公投自称独立的日程表一样。
陈先生说，北京是只纸老虎。似乎是在强调这种评断，他减少而不是增加了台湾的国防开支，同时，延迟了回应美国关于台湾自卫能力升级的建议。当问到他，台湾外部担心，一旦北京对他的单方面行动采取武力、台湾将如何自卫的时候，陈先生自信地表示，美国军事力量将会因为台湾关系法而感到自己的责任，美国国会的亲台情绪也将站到保卫台湾这一边。他和他的追随者似乎很确定，一场美国与中国的战争的结局就是一个独立的台湾。
就算这是可能的吧，然而，美国、中国，还有台湾，他们各自的代价是什么？而且，为台湾摆脱它自己的行为所造成的后果而去跟中国打仗，我们为什么要觉得那是我们美国人的责任？鉴于台湾当局领导人明显地要与中国民族主义做血腥的冒险，现在，是清楚地考虑和说明中美战争意味着什么的时候了。
上个世纪50年代，由于跟台湾防御有关的危机，美国曾数次威胁要动用核武器攻击中国。然而，如果不能冒险面临中国的核反击，我们就不能再做同样的威胁。好消息是，中美双方都不愿意为了台湾而冒核战争的风险。
一场为台湾而发生的中美战争，不会在第三国进行或由代理国进行，例如朝鲜战争和越南战争。在那些战争中，美国非常审慎地避免攻击中国国土。但是，台湾防御则要求还击那些攻击台湾的中国大陆的基地和设施。长期以来，中国表明，如果它的国土受到美国的攻击，它将以以美国的攻击方式做出反击、包括对美国国土和海外军事基地的攻击。这样的冲突可能迅速地升级为全球水平的危险，是真实存在的，――中美双方都没有任何控制战争升级的战略，我们的国防部的鲁莽决定会导致更糟糕的结果，而当战争可能存在的时候，我们跟中国人民解放军的通讯往来，远不如我们曾跟苏联军事力量的通讯往来。实际上，我们现在与中国人民解放军的通讯往来，与不存在中美战争的可能性时相比要少得多。
中国把台湾看作中国的一部分，全世界、包括美国在内，都承认这个立场。在一场为台湾而跟中国进行的战争中，我们的盟友会很少，尽管我们在日本有军事基地，但日本很可能会发现它很不情愿、却不得不支持我们。
这样战争将会分裂亚洲，将会使本世纪陷入中美两国之间的全球性的角逐和敌对。这将比冷战更危险、将迫使美国比在冷战时期做出更大的牺牲。跟苏联不同，中国没有机能不正常的思想体系和经济体制的牵制，它不太可能崩溃。中美之间的问题，不是中国在世界场合的行为如何、或它如何对待我们的盟国，而是中国将如何结束自己的内战。
当然，跟美国发生战争，中国将蒙受巨大损失。我相信，我们的武力能迅速地摧毁大多数中国的海军、空军和导弹基地。在经济发达的沿海地区，中国也许将蒙受非常严重的战争破坏。（我不会推测美国的哪一部分将蒙受中国报复攻击的损失。）战争结束后，中国将需要巨大的努力来重建工业基础设施和军事力量。
如果中国夺取台湾不成功，那么，中国的民族主义将迫使它一再尝试，战争将会断断续续地不停，直到某一方放弃。中国现代化的各个方面都将可能发生倒退，国家对外开放政策将蒙受严重挫折，近些年来的政治松动将被严厉的戒严令所替代。海外的中国少数民族，特别是在美国的华人，将可能变得非常难受。
不过，不管战争如何进行，台湾将成为主要战场。即便战争只有一个回合，如果没有暂停，那么，整个海岛的基础设施将被摧毁，它的繁荣将被破坏，它的民主将受到损伤。如果战争结果是台湾与中国一体化，那么，人民解放军将发现自己面对的是带有敌对感的平民。国内外的投资者不会支持中国以这种方式收取台湾，中国也不会以武力收取台湾而赢得这样的经济奖励。
如果战争的结果是台湾持续从中国分裂出去，那么，台湾当局就会面临中国大陆不断更新的攻击威胁。几乎不会有投资者乐意冒险把他们的钱扔在中国枪口下的一个海岛。由于中国大陆为每次制服台湾而重组它的武装力量，台湾的跛脚经济也许无法买得起武器装备来保护自己。结果，就可能像上世纪50年代一样，台湾不得不再次依靠美国的补贴生存，同时，美国和中国的军队将会继续在海岛对峙。
事实上，没有任何一方能成为台湾战争的“赢者”，所有各方都是失败者。所以，我们必须确保避免这样的一场战争。当然，中国民族主义者可能回应说，避免战争的明显方式就是台湾放弃它的独立梦想，而台湾的分裂主义者们会争辩说，海峡对岸的中国人应该尊重台湾的自决权。两方面的每个方面，都将在美国发现许多支持者，却很少在台湾海峡的对岸发现支持者。
就短期看，那些矛盾是不可调和的，然而，在很长时间里，海峡两岸若没有彼此挑战，就可以避免战争。再说，随着时间推移和彼此更多理解和更多良好愿望，也许会出现双方都能彼此接受的妥协。就海峡两岸的互动作用和台湾政治经济模式带来的中国变化的速度看，这个可能是存在的，导致双方各种问题的不同会随着时间推移而消逝。为这样一个汇合而拖延时间，是客观而且值得的。
长久以来，使台湾问题和平解决，经过双方协商谈判、而不是单方面行动或通过战争来解决问题，符合美国的利益、也符合世界各国的利益。北京知道，我们对此是非常严肃认真的，因而北京为此非常小心谨慎。然而，在台北方面，现在，需要清楚地对它说明，如果它一意孤行，它将自食其果。长话短说，北京需要继续避免轻率行动，而台北则需要停止它的轻率行动。至于美国人，我们应该明确地保留不为台湾违背美国利益和不听从美国忠告的后果而与中国发生战争的权利。我们不应该把与中国发生战争或和平的决定委托于台湾当局。这样决定本来就应该是我们单独做的。
目前，在国内巨大压力下，北京对台湾是“叫”（威慑）、还是“咬”（实行打击）呢？陈先生无视他的冒险后果、也不考虑他向中国大陆发动挑战对美国造成的后果，他的做法惊动了布什当局。中国和美国都不想被迫再次卷入冲突，更不想为台湾而发生战争冲突。十分明显的答案，就是美国和中国都坐下来，设法阻止台北的挑战，同时，要设法避免我们自己去创造那种挑战。然而，我们之间关于台湾问题的对话，大体上还只是个又聋又哑的对话，而没有讨论如何操作实施的问题。
疏远它唯一的保护者美国无异于玩火和制造危险，就此说服台北是符合我们的利益的。北京针对台湾增加军事威胁或伤害台湾岛，不符合我们的利益。最近，例如昨天，布什当局更加直截了当地公开说明，要努力使台湾正视现实，要阻止台北的那些使北京采取单方面行动的做法。陈先生不但对美国的劝阻置之不理，而且，甚至设法让他的党的报社媒体忽视或歪曲美国政府的说明，结果，他的追随者从来就没有听说或看到美国政府的说明。很明显，仅仅是文字声明不足以说服台湾当局不要损害台湾岛的未来和我们的未来，惩罚性的行动是必要的。
劝阻北京采取单方面行动，非常符合我们的利益。这里，我们面对一个微妙的问题。中国领导人非常清楚而且非常了解跟美国发生战争的后果。他们绝对不想要那样的战争。但他们也认为，华盛顿反对台湾和大陆的任何形式的重新联合、甚至是谈判的联合。如同许多人在台湾一样，他们判断，美国政策的秘密目的是帮助台湾变得独立，而且，如果必要，我们会为此跟中国打仗。中国的国家荣誉要求用某种形式结束中国的国家分裂，即使只是个象征性的结束。如果完成这个目标不可避免地要与美国发生战争，即便中国使用和平手段，那么，摆在中国领导面前的唯一选择，就是在什么时候冒战争风险、而不是是否冒战争的风险，而且，中国很少激励负责任的行动。
因为所有这些理由，现在是我们清楚地作出以下声明的时候了：
我们承认台湾海峡的法律现状是“一个中国”，不接受现状是独立的论说；
我们支持和赞同在“一个中国”条件下的双方谈判；
我们将接受台海双方都接受的现状改变，不接受未经双方都同意的现状改变；
我们不会承认未经北京认可的“台湾独立”,我们也不认可未经台湾民众认可的任何形式的统一；
我们会按照上述的原则履行台湾台湾关系法和中美三个联合公报的原则。
这跟布什当局昨天在国会听政所做的声明没有太大的不同。在我看，如果台湾当局不听从这些忠告，或者不让这些忠告传达到台湾普通老百姓，那么，美国政府就没有选择余地、而不得不考虑选择某些方面与台湾的关系降格，其中包括我们的防御关系和武器销售关系，以此来告诉台北和北京两个方面，为了避免战争，我们必须对这个问题作出非常严肃的处理。
或许，由于在美国的亲台力量和反华力量、由于台湾在国会的游说力量，回归到一个着重于台湾海峡和平、而不是其它政治日程的平衡政策，在政治上似乎不可能。如果那就是实际情形，那么，我们就必须接受一个结论：处理台湾问题和避免与中国发生战争，政治上也许也是不可能的。我个人不能接受那个结论，那种结论的后果，对我们和对全世界，都是非常严重的。
相反地说，成功地处理台湾问题，是打开健全的美中关系的大门的钥匙。用那把钥匙打开那扇大门，将使所有的各个方面、包括台湾方面，都有一个更美好的世纪。我们应该寻找那把钥匙，我们应该努力打开那扇大门。
比如说，中华人民共和国能够找到和平途径与台湾的民主社会重新联合起来的中国，将完全符合我们的价值观和国家利益。那样的中国，是我们可以与之合作的中国，由此而来推动美国人民和中国人民都期望的本世纪的共同繁荣与和平的国际环境。那样的中国将是美国的朋友，而不是美国的敌人。
（中文翻译：米阿仑）
□ 一读者推荐
Mr. Freeman on Sino-US Relations and Taiwan Issue
I have been asked to speak about cross-Strait relations. I do not think this subject can be addressed apart from the prospects for American friendship or enmity with it over the course of this century. Allow me to begin, then, with a few remarks about Sino-American relations in their global context. I will be as direct and brief as I can be.
As the century began, we Americans were still suffering from enemy deprivation syndrome -- the sick feeling of disorientation one feels when one has lost a powerful enemy and isn't quite sure how to justify continued high levels of defense spending. For a time, China seemed to be in line to fill in behind the late, unlamented USSR. But on September 11, 2001 America was cruelly assaulted by real, not imaginary enemies. Only the lunatic fringe and a few of its fellow travelers inside the Beltway now seek to appoint China as enemy-in-chief of the United States. The two countries have found an increasing range of issues to work together on, and the atmosphere of our relations has steadily improved.
Nevertheless there is something approaching an American consensus that the rise of China presents the most important long-term challenge to America's currently preeminent wealth and power. In this view, the kind of relationship the United States and China work out is likely to be the decisive factor affecting prospects for the century. I agree.
China is already emerging as the center of economic gravity in the Asia-Pacific region. China's East Asian neighbors, including Japan, are reorienting their economic policies to take advantage of this new reality. Increasingly, all supply chains tie the global economy to China. According to the WTO, the growth in China's foreign trade -- imports up 40 percent, exports up 35 percent -- accounted for most of the growth in world trade last year. Nevertheless, China's growth is mainly driven by the size and dynamism of its domestic market. It has proven relatively immune to global economic cycles. Astonishing changes are occurring in China's place in the world. A few examples:
Last year, the United States produced about 90 million tons of steel; Japan about 100 million. In that same year, China produced 220 million tons of steel and imported another 37.5 million, overtaking the United States as the world's largest importer. By 2010, some projections suggest that China may be producing 500 million tons of steel, more than the entire world did in the year 2000. We may, in fact, now be entering an age of rising commodity costs, reversing the trends of the past hundred years, as Chinese demand for energy and raw materials pulls prices up.
China is also likely to become a major center of global technological innovation, as it joins Japan as a scientific and technological power. The United States graduates about 60,000 engineers each year; Japan 70,000. China is now graduating about 325,000 engineers annually. The marriage of Chinese genius to science and technology that is now occurring will enable China once again to become a major net contributor to global culture. The flow of technology between China and the world, including the United States, will increasingly be in both directions.
There will be many other ways in which China's return to wealth affects the world and the United States. Already Chinese tourists are a key clientele for Southeast Asia's tourist industry. Increasingly, one sees them in Europe. They would be here as well if we had sensible visa policies (but, of course, we don't). In the future, hundreds of millions of Chinese will have the money and the passports to venture abroad.
To deal with Japanese businessmen and tourists, Americans learned to prepare sushi and sashimi. Then we learned to eat seaweed-wrapped sticky rice and raw fish ourselves. What cultural transformations will our future interactions with Chinese bring about! Not, I trust, a passion for CantoPop, sea slugs or dog meat baozi. But you never know. Who would have predicted an American infatuation with pokemon, manga, or instant ramen?
I cite these things simply to suggest the extent to which China is becoming a force in the world. It is on its way to overtaking Japan as the preeminent economy in East Asia. Within a generation or a generation and a half, in fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years (pick your economist), China's economy will be larger than ours. East Asia will then again be, as it was for most of recorded history, the dominant region in the global economy. Business activity by business activity, one can chart these trends. In economic terms, China is becoming a world power. There are now very few, if any, global economic problems that can be solved without the participation or acquiescence of China. Before long, there will essentially be none.
This is why the failure to include China in the G-7 (or G-8, as it is sometimes called) reduces the relevance of that gathering without addressing the problem of China's increasing connectedness to the issues it is discussing. Asia's prosperity is now inextricably linked to that of China. Without many remarking it, China's and America's economies are also becoming more interdependent. As our reliance on Japan and China to finance our mounting national debt illustrates, our prosperity increasingly depends on that of others. And China is playing an ever-larger role in this regard.
Americans are already concerned about the value of the Renminbi yuan in relation to the dollar. Given the extent to which the economies of the three parts of so-called "greater China - the China mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan - are now interconnected, linking their currencies in some form of monetary union would even now make economic sense. In time, political circumstances may permit this. But whether or not this happens, the size of the Chinese economy and its role in foreign trade means that, as the yuan becomes a hard currency, it is likely to join the euro and the yen as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar. We are destined to become far more interested in Chinese fiscal and monetary policies than we have been.
Of course, as the example of Japan in the last half of the past century reminds us, economic power does not necessarily equate to political influence. Without political reform, China cannot hope to match the international influence of the West, including its most prominent exemplar: the United States. No one now seeks to emulate the Chinese way of governance or to learn the political arts from China. Without political as well as economic modernization, China will continue to have severely limited attractive power, even in its own region, for a very long time to come. The prospects for such political reform are closely linked to the Taiwan issue and thus, at best, uncertain. The odds at present are that China's political influence will thus remain distinctly inferior to that of many other countries much smaller than it is.
China's capacity to overawe and coerce its neighbors militarily could, of course, be a different matter. As China's economy grows, Beijing will be able without strain to support an ever larger defense budget. In the first third of this century, China could emerge as the preeminent military power in Asia. As the century proceeds, if it chooses or is stimulated by others to do so, it could develop military capabilities that begin to rival those of the United States. There is a real risk that the United States and China could be drawn into a series of arms races as military balances shift to reflect China's growing military prowess.
But there is nothing inevitable about the choices China will make, just as there is nothing inevitable about conflict or rivalry with China as a rising power. The analogies that are sometimes drawn to the rise of Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States do not ring true. China has articulated no ideologies of imperialism, colonialism, mercantilism, militarism, manifest destiny, territorial aggrandizement, or mission civilisatrice. It has instead, to the surprise of many, stressed the equality of nations, the inviolability of national sovereignty, and the supremacy of the United Nations Charter.
There has been no hint of a Chinese "Munroe Doctrine" for Asia; China has not sought to displace the United States or our forces from the region or to fill the vacuums our inattention has sometimes created. The Chinese did not take Hong Kong or Macao by force, though they could have. When they recovered these territories they were respectful of the status quo in them; they did not seek to impose their own system there, though they have been less hospitable to post-colonial democratic reforms than they should have been. Similarly, China has now settled all of its land borders with Russia, the newly independent Central Asian states, and Vietnam through negotiations in which it gave as much or more than it got. It says it is prepared to do the same for its maritime boundaries.
All the evidence to date suggests that China is not a new power seeking to stake out an unprecedented status for itself at the expense of the existing regional or international order. The Chinese are a nation returning to an historically preeminent role in Asia. They aspire to resume their traditional status as proud leaders of global civilization after a century and a half of eclipse. As Chinese do this, they are finally putting the trauma of their earlier weakness, impoverishment, and victimization by foreign powers behind them.
China is thus regaining a welcome measure of poise and self-confidence. Beijing's response to the Asian financial crisis of a few years ago, its recent skillful diplomacy in Korea, its proposals for a northeast Asian security dialogue, its embrace of non-proliferation policies paralleling our own, and its increasingly active role in UN peacekeeping operations all illustrate the return of China as an increasingly mature and responsible international actor. China is, like Japan, becoming a more normal country. It wants to be accepted as such.
All things being equal, China looks to be a force for global and regional stability, not a challenger of the current world order. With a bit of work by both sides, Sino-American relations should therefore be marked by much more cooperation than contention and China should be our friend, not our enemy. If that is so, the prospects for a century of expanded peace, prosperity, and democracy are good.
Unfortunately, all things do not now seem likely to be equal. There is a real possibility that, before the end of the decade, the United States may find ourselves at war with China over Taiwan.
Two Chinese revolutions in the last century, one in 1911 and one in 1949, were fired by the nation's will to erase the imprint of foreign imperialism on China's body and soul, eliminate foreign spheres of influence on Chinese territory, end the capacity of foreign powers to intervene in China's internal affairs, and restore China's national unity along with its wealth and power. As other ideologies have fallen away, the explosive underpinning of Chinese nationalism is all that is left. Taiwan's separation from the rest of China is a monument to all the humiliations both the Kuomintang and Communist revolutions were conceived to overcome. Reunification is a central imperative of the Chinese state.
Remarkably, given the centrality of the Taiwan issue to Chinese nationalism, skillful American diplomacy in the 1970s and '80s persuaded Beijing that Taiwan's status could, like the Hong Kong and Macao issues, be resolved by peaceful means, that is, by negotiation. But, as our friends in Taiwan never tire of pointing out, there are fundamental differences between the circumstances of those colonies and that of Taiwan, which is self-administering and under no foreign sovereignty. No foreign power can cut a deal with Beijing about Taiwan; that can only be done by the Taiwan authorities.
Those authorities were for long Chinese nationalists as committed as their communist rivals to the unity of China. The cross-Strait consensus that there was only one China enabled both sides to finesse sensitive issues like sovereignty while seeking practical means of mutual accommodation. This consensus enabled Beijing to accept the notion of two systems coexisting within one country. It led to proposals for talks about reunification that would guarantee rather than change Taiwan's political, economic, cultural, and military autonomy. These proposals implicitly addressed Japanese and American strategic interests by affirming that there would be no People's Liberation Army forces stationed in Taiwan, thus leaving the military balance in northeast Asia unaltered. China's position has not changed.
But, over the past few years, Taiwan's position has. The Taiwan authorities have repudiated the idea of one China. The current president, Mr. Chen Shui-bian asserts that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separate countries. He says that, since - in his view - Taiwan is already independent, independence is the status quo and there is no need to declare it. He has proposed an island-wide referendum on a new constitution that would, among other things, legally consolidate such independence.
The constitution now in force in Taiwan vests sovereignty in the people of China, who approved it in a nationwide vote in 1947. The new constitution would be created in 2006 by a sovereign act of the people of Taiwan without regard to the views of other Chinese. It would go into effect in 2008. By any legal standard, this would constitute an act of self-determination. Mr. Chen has offered to talk with Beijing in the meantime but only on terms that explicitly or implicitly reaffirm his view of Taiwan as an independent state.
The Bush Administration has cautioned Mr. Chen against any effort to change the one-China status quo in the Taiwan Strait by such unilateral acts. Mr. Chen has rejected this advice. Instead he denies that the status quo is one China and affirms that the United States, as a democracy, is bound to support the democratically expressed will of the people of Taiwan to enjoy their own separate state, regardless of the views of Chinese across the Strait.
But no nation achieves independence without the agreement of the country from which it is separating. Very often, as in our own case and many others, the grant of independence is gained only after years of bloodshed. More often still, as the examples of American Southerners, Basques, Biafrans, Kurds, Palestinians, Sri Lankan Tamils, Chechens, southern Sudanese, and others attest, despite great carnage and human suffering, attempts at separation fail. Rarely, as in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, separation is peacefully agreed between the parties.
But the positions of both sides on the Taiwan question are now non-negotiable. Mr. Chen insists on independence and has declared a firm, unilateral timetable for making it final. Beijing is prepared to tolerate the current situation of de facto separation only if it will lead to negotiations that can produce cross-Strait agreement on some form of reunification. Neither is prepared to address the aspirations of the other, still less to accept them.
In response to the Taiwan authorities' statements and actions China has raised defense spending and greatly stepped up military preparations to prevent secession by Taiwan. The Chinese say that Mr. Chen's actions are leaving them no choice but to use force against the island. Coincidentally, their preparations to do so will be complete on more or less the same schedule that Mr. Chen has proposed for his referenda consolidating the island's self-proclaimed independence.
Mr. Chen says that Beijing is a paper tiger. As if to underscore this judgment, he has reduced rather than increased Taiwan's defense spending while delaying decisions on American recommendations for upgrading Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. Asked how he would defend Taiwan if, as many outside Taiwan fear, Beijing attacks the island in response to his unilateral actions, Mr. Chen expresses confidence that US forces would feel obliged by the Taiwan Relations Act and pro-Taiwan sentiment in Congress to come to Taiwan's defense. He and his followers seem certain that the result of a war between the United States and China would be an independent Taiwan.
Maybe so. But at what cost to the United States, China, and Taiwan itself? And why should Americans feel obliged to go to war with China to save Taiwan from the consequences of actions it is taking over our objections? With Taiwan's leaders apparently determined to risk a bloody rendezvous with Chinese nationalism, it is time to think and speak clearly about what a Sino-American war over Taiwan would mean.
In the 1950s, the United States several times threatened nuclear attack on China over crises related to the defense of Taiwan. We can no longer do so without risking nuclear counterattack by China. The good news, therefore, is that neither side is likely to risk a nuclear exchange over Taiwan.
But a US-China war over Taiwan would not be fought in a third country or by proxy, as was the case in Korea and Vietnam. In those wars, the United States scrupulously avoided attacking the Chinese homeland. But the defense of Taiwan would require counterattacking the bases and facilities on the Chinese mainland from which Taiwan was being attacked. China has long indicated that it would reply to attacks on its homeland with counterattacks in kind on the United States, including our homeland and our bases overseas. The danger that the conflict could rapidly escalate to the global level is real - all the more so because neither side has done anything to develop a strategy for escalation control and - as a result of reckless decisions in our Defense Department - there is now far less communication with the People's Liberation Army than there was with Soviet forces during the Cold War. There is, in fact, far less communication with the PLA that there was when war with China was not a possibility.
China regards Taiwan as part of China and the world, including the United States, acknowledges this Chinese position. In a fight with China over Taiwan, we would have few, if any, allies, though -- given our bases on its territory -- Japan would probably find it impossible not to support us.
Such a war would divide Asia and usher in a century dominated by global contention and mutual hostility between China and the United States. This could be even more dangerous and require vastly larger sacrifices of Americans than the Cold War did. China, unlike the Soviet Union, is unhampered by a dysfunctional ideology and economic system. It is unlikely to oblige us by collapsing. The issue between us is not Chinese behavior on the world scene or toward US allies. It is how the Chinese civil war should end.
China would, of course, be severely damaged by war with the United States. I believe that our armed forces could and would rapidly destroy most of China's navy and air force as well as its missile bases. Areas along the coast, where economic development is most advanced, might suffer especially heavy war damage. (I will not speculate about which parts of the United States are most likely to suffer Chinese retaliatory strikes.) An enormous effort would be required to rebuild China's industrial infrastructure and armed forces after the fighting ended.
If China had not succeeded in taking Taiwan, Chinese nationalism would compel it to prepare to try again. The war would thus continue on an intermittent basis until one side or the other gave up. Every aspect of China's modernization would be seriously set back. The country's opening to the outside world would be blighted and the political loosening of recent years replaced with the stringencies of martial law. The position of Chinese minorities abroad, especially in the United States, could become very uncomfortable.
But Taiwan would be the main battleground in any such war. Even if there were only one round of warfare, the island would, in all likelihood, emerge with its infrastructure devastated, its prosperity destroyed, and its democracy traumatized, if not suspended. If the result of the fighting were to incorporate Taiwan into China, the PLA would find itself pacifying a sullenly hostile populace. Neither domestic nor foreign investors would want to help the Chinese occupation. China would not gain much of an economic prize if it took Taiwan by force.
If the result were Taiwan's continued de facto separation from China, the Taiwan authorities would face the constant threat of renewed Chinese attack. Few investors would wish to risk their money on an island under the Chinese gun. As China reconstituted its armed forces for another try at subduing the island, Taiwan's lamed economy might be unable to afford the weaponry necessary to defend itself. Taiwan might once again, as it did in the 1950s, have to rely on US subsidies to survive. Meanwhile, US and Chinese forces would continue to face off over the island.
The fact is that no one can "win" a war over Taiwan. All will lose. Therefore we must make sure that we avoid such a war. Chinese nationalists will, of course, respond that the obvious way to avoid war is for Taiwan to abandon its dreams of independence. Taiwanese separatists will argue that Chinese across the Strait simply need to respect Taiwan's right of self-determination. Each will find many supporters for its view in the United States but few on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
In the short term such contradictions are irreconcilable. But so long as neither side actually does anything to challenge the other, there need be no war. And, with the passage of time and the growth of mutual understanding and goodwill, mutually acceptable compromises may emerge. That is especially the case, given the speed of change in China, much of it catalyzed by cross-Strait interaction and the attractiveness of Taiwan's politico-economic model. Given time, differences between the two sides that are problems now may well blur and fade away. Gaining time for such convergence is a worthy objective in itself.
It has long been in the American interest - as well as that of the parties and the world - for this issue to be resolved peacefully, by mutual agreement, through negotiations, not unilaterally and not through war. Beijing knows that we are serious about this and has so far acted with appropriate caution. Taipei, however, now clearly needs to be convinced that if it acts on its own, it may well end up on its own. In short, Beijing needs to continue to avoid acting rashly but Taipei needs to stop doing so. As for Americans, we should explicitly reserve the right not to go to war with China to save Taiwanese from the consequences of their acting against US interests and advice. We should not entrust decisions about war and peace with China to the Taiwan authorities. Such decisions are rightly for us alone to make.
Beijing is currently under mounting domestic pressure to show Taipei that it can bite as well as growl. Mr. Chen's dismissal of the risks he has been taking and his disregard of the consequences for Americans of his provocative behavior vis-¨¤-vis China have alarmed the Bush Administration. Neither China nor the United States wants to be forced into another confrontation, still less a war over Taiwan. The obvious answer is for the United States and China to sit down together and figure out how to deter Taipei from provoking such confrontation and how to avoid creating it on our own. But our dialogue about Taiwan is basically a dialogue of the deaf that never reaches the operative issues.
It is in our interest to convince Taipei that it is both playing with fire and becoming dangerously distant from its sole protector, the United States. It is not in our interest for Beijing to accomplish this for us by upping the military threat to Taiwan or taking a bite out of the island. The Bush Administration, as recently as yesterday, has spoken out ever more bluntly in an effort to instill realism into Taipei and to deter it from taking steps that will provoke such unilateral action by Beijing. Mr. Chen has not only brushed these warnings aside, he has ensured that his partisan press ignores and distorts the Administration's message so that it is never heard or read by his followers. It is becoming clear that words alone may not be enough to convince the Taiwan authorities not to jeopardize the island's future and our own; punitive actions may be required.
Deterring Beijing from its own unilateral actions is also very much in our interest. Here we confront a subtle problem. China's leaders understand very clearly what the consequences of war with the United States would be. They absolutely do not want such a war. But they have come to believe that Washington is opposed to any form of reassociation of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, even a negotiated one. Like many people in Taiwan, they judge that the secret purpose of U.S. policy is to help Taiwan become independent and that we will, if necessary, fight China to accomplish this. But China's national honor requires some form of end to the division of the Chinese nation, even if only symbolically. If accomplishing this will inevitably entail war with the United States, even if China uses peaceful means, then the only choice before China's leaders is when, not whether, to risk such war and China has little, if any, incentive to act responsibly.
For all these reasons, it is time for us to state clearly that:
we regard the juridical status quo in the Taiwan Strait as "one China" and do not accept that that status quo is independence; that:
we favor negotiations between the two sides within the context of "one China;" that:
we will accept any change in the status quo that both sides accept but, conversely, will not accept any change that is not agreed by both sides; that:
we will not recognize an independent Taiwan that has not been recognized by Beijing, nor we will recognize any form of reunification that has not been endorsed by the people of Taiwan; and that:
we will implement our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act and the three US-China joint communiques and carry out our relations with both sides of the Strait in a manner consistent with these principles.
This is not that far from what the Administration stated yesterday in testimony before Congress. If the Taiwan authorities do not get the message or allow it to get through to ordinary people on the island, the Administration will - in my opinion - be left with no alternative but to consider appropriate downgrading of selected aspects of American relationships with Taiwan, including our defense and arms sales relationships, as a way of convincing both Taipei and Beijing of our seriousness about managing this issue to avoid war.
Perhaps, given the strength of pro-Taiwan and anti-China sentiment in the United States and the power of the Taiwan lobby in the US Congress, such a return to a balanced policy focused on the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait rather than other agendas is politically impossible. If that is the case, then we must accept that the management of the Taiwan problem to avoid war with China may also be impossible. I, for one, cannot accept that conclusion. The consequences for us and for the world are much too great.
Conversely, successful management of the Taiwan problem is the key to a sound US-China relationship. And the door that key can open is one that leads to a better century than the last one for all concerned, including Taiwan. That is the key we should be looking for and the door we should strive to open.
Among other things, a People's Republic of China that has found a way to reassociate itself peacefully with the democratic Chinese society on Taiwan is a China that is likely to be much more congenial to both our values and our interests. That kind of China is one we can work with to promote the common prosperity and peaceful international environment both Americans and Chinese long for in the century to come. That kind of China is one that will certainly be a friend, not an enemy of the United States.
By People's Daily Online
