毛实践的,是真正意义上的中国特色的社会主义―把中国传统文化中的积极因素和马克思主义的创造性结合.在全世界范围内的68年革命中, 毛泽东成为旗帜之一,不是偶然的.
由于他对中国文化的深刻理解,对传统文化中的负面因素,他是不抱幻想的,打击起来也是不手软的.所以遗老遗少们伤痕文学了几十年,至今还在唧唧歪歪.
今日中国有600万-1000万妓女.爱慕虚荣,想挣快钱的是少数, 为了换口饭吃不得不出卖肉体的是多数.这里有些遗老遗少们面对这些不幸的姐妹同胞,振振有词的说妓女是招商引资的必需, 仁义礼智信都读到狗肚子里去了.
今天刚看到一个很有意思的数据:一直被改革派们所攻击的毛时代的粮食统购统销,其实除了供应城市人口, 有1/3强的粮食是以平价甚至无价返还给农村的―以国家调控的方式,供应非产粮区(牧区,林区,等),灾区,或因为人多地少长期缺粮的地方. 所以那个时候的中国农民,哪怕在灾年,也不需要靠卖血或女儿做妓女来谋生.
俺下面这篇文章,比较了毛时代和今日中国的社会公平,教育,卫生状况.算是忆苦思甜吧―或更确切的说,是忆甜思苦.
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China’s Economic Miracle: Facts and Illusions
China has experienced huge social and economic changes since it started
the reform process in late seventies. It has enjoyed more than 9% annual
GDP growth in the last twenty-five years, unparalleled in modern history.
There is no doubt that China has witnessed an explosion of material wealth
during the period. In 1978, most items including grain, cooking oil, sugar,
eggs, meat, clothes etc. were being rationed through an extensive coupon
system. Item by item, the rationing system has disappeared. Modern luxuries
like TV, washing machines and refrigerators have entered millions of urban
households and many rural households as well. In the capital city Beijing,
personal car ownership has skyrocketed in the last several years to 11
cars per 100 permanent residents while private car ownership was virtually
unheard of 20 years ago.
The World Bank and most economists today say that globalization and the
market economy have brought great success to China in reducing poverty.
Indeed, the number of people living under extreme poverty (1$ per day)
in China has been reduced dramatically from 250 million in 1978 to 30
million in 2000, making China one of the few countries well ahead of its
poverty reduction targets in Millennium Development Goals. In 1999, the
World Bank raised China’s classification from a “low-income country”
to a “lower middle-income country”, when income per capita surpassed
the US $755 cut-off point for low-income countries.
However, in 2004, China’s State Statistics Bureau publicly acknowledged
that the number of people living in extreme poverty actually increased
from 28.2 million in 2002 to 29 million in 2003 despite the rapid GDP
growth. World Bank has generally defined poverty as less than two dollars
per day and extreme poverty as less than one dollar per day. China’s
statistics bureau sets the line of extreme poverty at an annual income
of 636 Yuan for 2003. (The number is adjusted annually and it is supposed
to be more or less comparable with $1 per day in terms of purchasing power
parity.) Virtually all the extreme poor lived in rural areas. The government
blamed the increase on hazardous weather conditions during the year, thus
dismissing it as an abnormal blip in the otherwise optimistic long-term
trend. Is this true? China officially joined WTO in December 2001, marking
a further commitment towards integration in the world economy. Increased
concessions in the agriculture sector certainly do not offer relief to
the already ailing rural areas. From 2000 to 2002, 42% of rural households
experienced decreased income in absolute terms.
In this briefing document, we will comment on some counter trends to the
general optimism―what actually happened to Chinese people in the reform
era in terms of quality of life indicators such as equality, health care
and education.
TRENDS TOWARDS DISEQUALITY
In less than thirty years, China transformed from one of most egalitarian
countries to one of most unequal in the world. In early 1980s, the income
percentage of the top decile group was less than 20%. In 1995, the top
decile group appropriated 33.7% of income, while the bottom decile only
1.87% (from Khan & Riskin, ”Inequality and poverty in China in the age
of globalization”). This disequalizing trend continues. In 2005, State
Statistics Bureau announced that the top decile group now takes 45% of
the wealth, while the bottom decile only 1.4%. The change of Gini ratio
over the years also signifies the disturbing trend. Gini ratio is a measure
of inequality often used by sociologists: a value of 0.2 or less is associated
with an egalitarian society; 0.2-0.4 is considered acceptable; values
over 0.4 signifies serious polarization and increasing social unrest (i.e.,
typical symptoms of Latin Americanization); values over 0.5 or 0.6 often
predicts that violent revolution is inevitable. China’s Gini ratio increased
steadily from less than 0.2 in 1980 to 0.45 of current level. Not surprisingly,
the incidence of mass incidents (protests, demonstrations and even clashes
with the government) increased from 58,000 in 2003 to 74,000 in 2004,
more than 10 times compared to a decade ago.
One common critique of the pre-reform era was that the household registration
system treated the rural population as second-rate citizens and limited
their freedom of movement. Nowadays, the huge army of migrant workers
is the living proof of high mobility. However, the ever-enlarging rural-urban
gap demonstrates that it is mostly a freedom to experience inequality
and exploitation. According to estimates by State Statistics Bureau, the
ratio of urban vs. rural per capita income was 1.8 in early 1980s, 2.19
in 1988, 2.72 in 1995, and 3.23 in 2003, while the world average in between
1.5 to 2. Rural residents shoulder disproportionate tax burden while
having less access to public services including education and health care.
In several interviews, deputy minister Qiu Xiaohua pointed out that if
the non-cash subsidies enjoyed by urban residents were taken into account,
the real income gap could be as high as 6:1, the highest rural urban gap
in the world.
The rising tide is certainly lifting the yachts much more than other boats,
if other boats were lifted at all.
***The Plight of Migrant Workers***
It is estimated that there are 100-200 million migrant workers from rural
areas currently working in Chinese cities. It is probably the biggest
migration in human history. These people work as construction workers,
domestic helpers, sex workers, guards, assembly line workers, miners etc.
They are one major driving force of the economic boom, the labor force
behind the “Made in China” labels currently sweeping through the world,
the builders of expanding highways and skyscrapers. It is estimated that
they contribute to more than 20% of GDP generation. Are these people making
huge strides towards industrialization and urbanization as some people
claim? Are they benefiting from the current economic order? Despite a
small percentage of success stories, the answers are probably a big “
NO” for the majority of migrant workers.
Most of the migrant workers work in sweatshop conditions. As a socialist
country, China used to have one of the world best labor laws to protect
its workers. Though these laws still exist on paper, their implementation
has been steadily eroded over the years. Migrant workers bear the brunt
of deteriorating labor conditions as they have little bargaining power
in the labor market and do not have access to fair legal protection. It
is estimated that migrant workers as a group, has 150-300 billion Yuan
(about 20-40 billion dollar) worth of overdue salary to be collected.
The payment is often overdue for months or even years. China’s State
Administration of Work Safety reported about 136,000 fatalities from workplace
accidents in 2004, up from 100,000 in 2000. In three high-risk professions
(mining, construction and works involving dangerous chemicals), migrant
workers account for over 80% of the casualties. One health survey of state
owned mines found that 4.74% of the migrant workers suffer from occupational
diseases, and the average onset of the diseases is only 6.69 years on
the job post; in comparison, only 0.89% of official workers get occupational
diseases and the onset is 25 years on the job post. Coal mining accidents
claim 5,000 lives per year, about 80% of the world total. In one industrial
area alone―Shenzhen and the surrounding Pearl River delta, industrial
accidents cut off 40,000 fingers per year. The average pay out is only
60 dollars per finger―though the injured normally could get much higher
compensation if they went through the formal litigation process, the case
average of litigation time is 1,070 days, making it prohibitively long
and expensive for most workers.
In 2003, some professors and NGO workers carried out a joint survey of
industrial injuries in the Pearl River delta. The survey covered 582 injured
workers and its statistics shed light to the prevailing labor conditions
in the region:
・ 70.2%, 15.4% and 10% of the injured were from rural villages, rural
towns and rural counties respectively, while urban workers only made up
4.3% of the injured. ・ The average age of the workers was 26 years old,
4.5% of them were below 17 years old. ・ Private enterprises (most of
them are contractors for foreign corporations) accounted for 53.9% of
the accidents while foreign enterprises accounted for 26%. State owned
enterprises and collective enterprises were responsible for 3.5% and 1.9%
of the accidents respectively.・ 61.7% of the injured workers had no labor
contracts with the enterprises. Only 11% of involved enterprises had labor
unions.・ 66.3% of the surveyed worked over 8 hours per day. The average
working day was 10.18 hours. More than 50% of the workers had to work
overtime, with the overtime ranged from 1 hour to 8 hours. More than 70%
of the workers had no weekend off at ll. ・ Though the labor laws stipulated
that they were entitled to regular salary during treatment period, most
of the injured workers did not received it: only 20.3% received regular
pay and 16.4% received reduced pay.
Even if they are lucky enough to escape sweatshop conditions and injuries,
the dream of middle-class life is beyond the reach of most migrant workers
despite their hard work. For example, for a typical security guard who
is working for some newly developed residence community in Beijing, his
annual salary is barely enough to purchase one square meter of the middle-class
real estate he is guarding. Most migrant workers and their families live
in shantytowns or urban slums, forgotten corners of the cities where little
public service is available. According to 2004 government report, the
mortality rate of pregnant migrant women and their children is estimated
to be between 1.4 and 3.6 times national average. The children of migrant
workers grow up in two ways: some are left in the countryside, being raised
up by the grandparents while separated from the parents for prolonged
period of time; the others are living with their parents, facing all the
uncertainties and insecurities of the “floating” life. Needless to say,
neither is an attractive option. Among the 3 million migrant children,
about 15% do not attend school. Those who do attend often enroll in improvised,
substandard private schools. Only in recent years, the government starts
to mandate some public schools to accept migrant children. But often times,
the schools are still using higher fees and other discriminatory measures
to discourage enrollment.
What is even more depressing is that despite China’s economic growth,
the conditions of migrant workers are deteriorating instead of improving.
A decade ago, a migrant worker working in manufacture jobs in Southern
China could look forward to earning about 5,000 Yuan per year. But oven
the past 12 years, factory workers’ annual salary has risen by a tiny
68 Yuan, according to a study released in 2004. In the meantime, prices
of many basic food items have more than doubled, thus the real salary
has decreased significantly if inflation is factored in. ***End: The Plight
of Migrant Workers**
DETERIOATION IN HEALTH CARE
Before 1980, China’s health care system had been developed under the
socialist planned economy. By 1980, more than 90% of the population was
covered by state or collective health care system. From 1949 to 1980,
average life expectancy increased from 35 years to 67 years; infant mortality
rate dropped from more than 200 per thousand to 39 per thousand. It was
one of the fastest improvements witnessed in the world during the same
period. By the late 1970s, China’s health indicators were not only much
better than the average of low income countries, but also better than
the world average or average of middle income countries. In WHO’s 1978
Alma Ata Conference “Health for all by the Year 2000”, China’s primary
health care system was featured as model for the world.
Unfortunately, despite spectacular GDP growth in more than two decades,
such brilliant performance has not continued or even being maintained
in many aspects. Since 1980, the health care system went through several
rounds of market-oriented reform. From 1980 to 2003, health care expenditure
skyrocketed 15 times even after inflation was taken into account (from
14.32 billion Yuan to 662.33 billion Yuan). Meanwhile, the percentage
of government contributions and collective contributions (from state owned
enterprises, collective owned enterprises and rural cooperatives) decreased
from 36.2% and 42.6% to 17.2% and 27.3% respectively. Thus the share of
individual contribution increased from 21.2% to 55.5%. Even the dwindling
government funds are distributed very unequally. In 1998, per capital
government spending on health care were 130 and 10.7 Yuan respectively
for urban and rural sector. As a consequence, rural public health infrastructure
has deteriorated considerably: it is estimated that of the public health
organizations below the county level, 1/3 are still functioning normally,
1/3 are at the brink of bankruptcy, 1/3 are in total disarray. Health
care insurance now covers about half of the urban population and only
10% of the rural population. In the 2003 SARS epidemic, the society came
to the shocking realization of total lack of health care in the rural
area. The government had to resort to mass mobilization and blockades
to prevent SARS from spreading to the countryside. As all clinics and
hospitals are increasingly pressured by the profit motive, more and more
cost effective preventive measures are being replaced by expensive and
not always necessary treatments. It is estimated that due to price concern,
about half of urban patients self medicate, while half of rural patients
forgo any kind of treatment at all. A 2001 study showed that 21.6% of
poverty stricken rural households fell below the poverty line due to medical
expenses: the average cost of hospitalization is over 1500Yuan, about
half of the average annual rural income, or more than twice of the government
poverty line.
Diseases that were once controlled, like tuberculosis and schistosomiasis,
are having a strong coming-back. The occurrence rate of tuberculosis has
quadrupled in recent years. New diseases like AIDS are spreading rapidly
through activities like illegal blood selling and needle sharing. It is
estimated that HIV infected around 1 to 6 million poor farmers who sold
blood. The government has become quite forth coming about the crisis in
the last few years and the wide range of estimation is not due to any
cover-up. It is due to the simple fact that health monitor in rural areas
has collapsed together with health care, thus no one is having accurate
information of the problem. As cited by Khan and Riskin in “Inequality
and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization” (P95), “World Bank
analyses indicate that the national under-five mortality rate, regarded
by UNICEF as the single best indicator of social development because it
encompasses so many other indicators, stopped declining in the early 1980s
and stagnated until 1991, and that the percentage of rural children with
very low height for age (a key indication of malnutrition) increased from
1987 to 1992.” In a 2000 World Health Report, China ranked 188th out
of 191 countries in terms of fairness in financial contribution to health
and 144th out of 191 countries in overall performance of the health care
sector.
Instead of continuing as a leader of health care performance, China has
become a leader in the worldwide trend toward health care financing privatization.
The consequence is nothing but gloom. In July 2005, Development Research
Center of the State Council released an official document admitting the
market-oriented health care reform was not a success. Some authors of
the document commented that China’s health care system is suffering from
an “American disease” with the following symptoms: skyrocketing cost,
unfair access, low efficiency and stagnant health indicators.
DETIORATION IN EDUCATION
Public education especially primary and secondary education enjoyed significant
growth in the pre-reform era. Adult illiteracy rate dropped from more
than 80% in 1949 to 33% in 1980. In 1978, the enrollment rate for elementary
school was above 95% and the advancement rate from elementary school to
junior high was 87.5%. Government or collective funds supported virtually
all levels of education, while only token fees were charged from the parents.
The same as health care, education costs have skyrocketed in the last
20 years while the share of private financing has increased significantly.
It is estimated that four year of college would have cost a family 40,000
Yuan, more than 13 times of average per capita rural income. Even for
primary and secondary education, non-government sources are forced to
pay 44% of the cost (1999 data), much higher than that of all OECD countries
and most developing countries. Many rural children, especially girls,
are being kept out of school as their families find it impossible to pay
the increasingly steep fees. Though the official data about enrollment
rate or literacy rate has more or less maintained previous high levels,
many people working on the ground say the situation is probably otherwise―
as enrollment rate is an important criteria for official evaluation, it
is not uncommon for some local officials to round up all children into
schools at the beginning of school year to guarantee a good number, but
many kids would drop out soon after the government check-up.
In 1999, public spending on education was only 2.79% of GDP, in comparison
to 4.38% of the world average. The government funding is also distributed
quite unevenly as well. 77% of the educational investment is allocated
for urban areas. Higher education gets a bigger share of the funding at
the cost of basic education. Take the years 1999 and 2000 as examples,
government allocation in primary education dropped from 36.1% to 32.6%,
while the share of tertiary education increased from 15.6% to 24.0%. From
1978 to 1990, the advancement rate from primary school to junior high
decreased from 87.5% to 74.6%. In some areas, the advancement rate from
junior high school to senior high school is as low as 25% though college
education has exploded in the last several years.
The elitist approach also affects the content of education profoundly.
Education is increasingly geared towards book knowledge and college entrance
exams while detached from community conditions and needs. Education has
degenerated into a means to climb up the social ladder only, while its
function to improve people’s daily life withers away. Especially for
many poor families, education has become a risky gamble because chances
of upward social mobility are limited. The whole education system is
ridden by fierce competition, confirming a lucky few as winners while
condemning the rest majority as losers. There are more and more incidents
where young kids commit suicides when their families cannot come up with
tuition fees, or when they fail some important exams.
Besides equality, health care and education, the mounting environmental
crisis also raises serious questions about who is benefiting and whether
the growth is sustainable; but environmental issues will be addressed
in more details in other part of the report. The above picture already
provides another angle to explain why China has been a darling for investors
in recent years: as more and more cost is externalized, higher return
is being achieved for the capital. Besides the top 10% -20% of the population
who are joining the global consuming elites, average Chinese people are
no winners in this process. In 1978, China was a country with low wages
but high benefits: education, health care and housing were provided to
urban residents at little or no cost; majority of rural residents enjoyed
public education and health care as well. Today’s China is a country
with low wages and low benefits, a leader in the global race to the bottom.
While people have to pay more and more for public goods, even their share
of the pie is getting smaller: in late 1970s and most of 1980s, the total
salary vs. GDP was around 16%, since then it has steadily decreased to
12% in 2003.
When the author grew up in China in early 1970s, the family lived under
one dollar per person per day. Even if all subsidies were taken into account,
the total could hardly be two or three dollars per day. It was a life
with little luxury and some inconveniences. But instead of a life of poverty,
it was a life of frugality, sufficiency, dignity and rich community experience―
if we have to put a price tag on things, just the free baby-sitting offered
by the neighbors alone could easily translate into a few hundred dollars
per month in western standards. Those were by-gone years. Today’s China
is increasingly dominated by money, fierce competition and social Darwinism.
Living with less than one or two dollars per day is indeed difficult to
get by. Reflecting the rapidly deteriorating social environment, suicide
rate has increased to unprecedented level and suicide has become of the
leading cause of death for age group 20-35.
Given above examinations of quality of life indicators (education, health,
equality etc.), the entire legitimacy of the whole poverty reduction claims
is called into question. With more and more aspects of life being commodified
and monetized, of course we see growing GDP and per capita income; with
the top 10-20% getting an ever-enlarging share, of course their success
stories dominate the media space. But that is hardly a measure of general
improvement for the mass. What kind of poverty reduction is it when more
and more people find it difficult to afford basic health care and education?
