难道新民主党要搞科举制度?(附NDP7点政治改革方案)

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CLEANING UP POLITICS

DEMANDING CHANGES IN ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Ed Broadbent & the NDP’s 7 Point Plan
“When they fi nd themselves in the midst of wrongdoing those with a vivid sense of right and wrong have feelings
of remorse. On the other hand the defi ning characteristic of corruption is that feelings of remorse have been lost,
replaced by the impulse to deny, perpetuate and cover-up. Th e Liberal party is losing its sense of remorse.”

Ed Broadbent, MP Ottawa Centre

DEMANDING CHANGES IN ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Canadians are demanding changes in ethics and in accountability. They want a strong
Canada resting on ethically based democratic institutions. They want honesty, fairness and
transparency to be the rule, not the exception in political life.
The New Democratic Party is proposing the following set of democratic and ethical
reforms.

1. Democratic Accountability for MPs
议员的民主可靠性
Democratic accountability should mean no MP can ignore his/her voters and wheel and
deal for personal gain: MPs should not be permitted to ignore their voters’ wishes, change
parties, cross the fl oor, and become a member of another party without fi rst resigning their
seats and running in a by-election.
Wherever we can, we must put an end to backroom opportunism in politics. In particular,
we must ensure that MP’s who are voted in as members of one political party no longer
have the right to ignore those parties and those voters who put them there in the fi rst place.
MPs should not be permitted to ignore their voters’ wishes by changing parties, crossing the
fl oor, and becoming a member of the cabinet without fi rst resigning their seat and running
in a by-election. We must combat cynicism by making better rules. Public trust cannot be
written off for personal gain.
NDP MP Peter Stoffer has a Private Members’ Bill on the order paper which would amend
the Parliament of Canada Act to deal with members who cross the fl oor. This measure
provides that a member’s seat in the House of Commons must be vacated and a by-election
called for that seat if the member, having been elected to the House as a member of a
political party or as an independent, changes parties in the House or becomes a member
of a party in the House, as the case may be, at any time during the term for which he or she
was elected. A member’s seat will not be vacated if the member, having been elected as a
member of a political party, chooses to sit as an independent at any time during the term
for which he or she was elected.

2. Fixed Election Dates
固定选举日期
Election dates should be fi xed: Prime Ministers in governing parties should lose their
control over when we vote. The date should be every four years, unless the government
falls as a result of a confi dence vote. This would add fairness and transparency about dates
for voters and for other political parties.
Election dates should be fi xed. The large majority of the world’s democracies do not give
to the party in power the right to call an election whenever it’s thought to best benefi t
themselves. We should rid Canada of this anti-democratic anachronism.
At present, and subject to the confi dence convention, the timing of an election is almost
always the prerogative of the prime minister. This power has several negative effects on the
governing process. Much of the business of government stays on hold when the possibility of
an election looms. The longer the period of uncertainty, the fewer the things accomplished.
Like any well-run organization, having a fi xed deadline to achieve a task ? a fi xed election
date ? would better focus the mind of any government.
The date should be every four years. By doing this, more rigorous enforcement of election
and pre-election spending laws would also be possible. There would be transparency about
the dates for voters and for other political parties. Governing parties should lose their
control over when we vote. Should a government lose a confi dence vote during the fouryear
period, an election would of course take place. However, the date for the subsequent
election could be set for precisely four years later.
Fixed elections would also remove an unfair advantage held by the governing party.
Opposition parties are forced to spend scarce resources planning for every contingency
while the governing party can focus its efforts on the only date that matters.
Provincial practice demonstrates that there is no fundamental inconsistency between fi xed
elections and parliamentary democracy. British Columbia has recently implemented a fi xed
election date mechanism. The Ontario government has introduced similar legislation.

3. Transparent Leadership Contests
政党领导人竞选透明化
Set spending limits and transparency conditions on leadership contests within political
parties: Parties are largely fi nanced by the taxpayer and the same principles pertinent
to the public good should apply to the internal affairs of parties as they do to electoral
competition between parties.
Canada has laws and regulations regulating the fi nancing of general elections. There are
limits and there is transparency. However, while parties, candidates, electoral district
associations and even nomination race contestants all face strict expense limits, those
running to be the leaders of their parties do not. There is, therefore, a major democratic
defi cit when it comers to the internal operations of political parties. Parties are not private
clubs. In a democracy, they are the means by which citizens select their governors. In
Canada, they are largely fi nanced by the taxpayers. The same principles pertinent to the
public good should apply to the internal affairs of parties as they do to electoral competition
between parties.
The centralized nature of Canadian politics means that party leaders enjoy tremendous clout
within the party, and not only in the governing party. Leaders have authority to accept or
reject candidates nominated at the electoral district level, and exercise additional infl uence
over MPs through party discipline.
There needs to be strong accountability rules for political parties, including regulations
ensuring sources, transparency, and spending limits. In the recent leadership contests,
in the Liberal and Conservative parties, respectively, Mr. Martin spent $12 million and Mr.
Harper spent $2.7 million. In a democratic Canada, no one with access to virtually unlimited
amounts of money should be able to effectively discourage or stop a more poorly funded
opponent. Ideas and values, not cash, should trump.
The absence of spending rules in leadership contests seems incongruous given the power
that party leaders have. Even the prime minister is sometimes “elected” fi rst by the party
in a leadership race. As a result, someone running to be a regular MP may face a more
stringent limit on his or her public electoral campaign than will someone running in a party
contest to inherit the party leadership from a resigning incumbent prime minister, the most
powerful offi ce in the country.

4. Electoral Reform
选举改革
Electoral reform: A major source of needed democratic reform is our outmoded fi rstpast-
the-post electoral system. There is a serious imbalance in the House of Commons in
gender, ethnic, ideological and regional voting preferences. Our present system does not
refl ect Canadian voters’ intentions. Fairness means we need a mixed electoral system that
combines individual constituency-based MPs with proportional representation. Most other
commonwealth countries have already moved in this direction.
A major source of needed democratic reform is our outmoded fi rst-past-the-post electoral
system. In Canada every vote should matter. Ninety percent of the world’s democracies,
including Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland and Wales have abandoned or
signifi cantly modifi ed the pre-democratic British system that still prevails in Ottawa. As
the Canadian Law Commission recommended and fi ve provinces seem to agree, fairness
means we need a mixed electoral system that combines individual constituency-based
MPs with proportional representation. The global evidence is clear: only such a system
would positively redress the existing imbalance in the House of Commons in gender, ethnic,
ideological and regional voting preferences.
The Pepin-Robarts Commission pointed out a quarter of a century ago, our present system
does a great disservice to Canadian unity because regional representation in the House
of Commons ? in the caucuses and in the cabinet ? does not refl ect Canadian voters’
intentions
Recently a Standing Committee of the House of Commons voted unanimously on a motion
presented by Ed Broadbent that called for a concurrent, two-track process to begin by
October 1, 2005, with a joint session mid-way through the process in November. According
to the Committee’s proposal, the citizen consultation process would have concluded its
work, and publicly released its report by January 30, 2006. This report would then have
been taken into account by the Special Committee in the development of its fi nal report
and recommendations on Canada’s democratic and electoral systems. It would table its
recommendations in the House on or by February 28, 2006.
Regrettably on September 20th the Minister responsible, Hon. Mauril Bélanger, announced
that the consultation process on electoral reform would not begin as promised this year.
This cynicism effectively means there will be no decision on electoral reform before the
next election. The New Democratic Party will continue to work to ensure that our present
electoral system is improved.

5. Ending Unregulated Lobbying
结束没有管理的说客
Unregulated lobbying and political cronyism must end: We need tougher laws requiring
disclosure of fees and expenditures of lobbyists. We also need to make illegal the acceptance
of contingency or profi t-based fees. The government must initiate reforms with tough
sanctions applicable to wrongdoing in the public sector.
In spite of the Lobbyist Registration Act which came into force in June, major reform is
still required. In this we have much to learn from the United States where the national and
most state governments have much tougher laws, including requiring disclosure of fees and
expenditures by lobbyists. Our Act has no such provision. Disclosure of this information by
consultant lobbyists and the corporations and organizations employing in-house lobbyists
would allow Canadians to assess just how great a stake a client has in a piece of legislation
or contract.
We also have no laws prohibiting lobbyists from accepting contingency or success-based fees.
This is morally and ethically wrong. Canadians have higher standards. Some government
programs make it impermissible (technically) for contingency fees to be paid by a company
where government contracts (as opposed to grants or other benefi ts) are awarded. There
is some evidence that this policy is violated. All “profi t-related” or “success based” fees
should be illegal to pay and those making them should be brought to court. Equally, it
should be made illegal for a lobbyist to accept such payments. Any violation should entail
a breach of the Criminal Code and be accompanied by a fi ne of up to $25,000, as well as a
prison sentence of up to two years.
As the former co-chair of a commission on corporate accountability, Ed Broadbent
recommended the government initiate reforms with tough sanctions applicable to wrongdoing
in the private sector. The same principles of personal liability should be duplicated in the
public sector. It is time we made corrupt behaviour not only politically embarrassing but
also a matter for the courts.
Also, recently former cabinet ministers have been exempted by the Ethics Commissioner
from the rule prohibiting lobbying activity for a certain period, and no reasons were given.
When the commissioner provides such an exemption he should be required by law to publish
his reasons.
Canada’s lobbyist law falls short in regulating the activities of lobbyists. The Lobbyist
Registration Act now includes a basic code of ethics for lobbyists. Noncompliance with
this code may be investigated by the lobbyist registrar (part of Industry Canada). However,
the actual consequences of the registrar fi nding noncompliance with the code are unclear.
Further, the Act states that “section 126 of the Criminal Code, which provides punishment of
up to two years imprisonment “does not apply in respect of a contravention of” the provision
obliging lobbyist adherence to the code. Hence, sanctions for a violation of the code generally
come only in the form of negative media attention in response to the registrar’s report. This
is obviously not a robust system of enforcement.
Finally, fi rms that act both as lobbyists and as government consultants create diffi cult
confl icts of interest scenarios. Current rules require lobby fi rms to set up “Chinese walls”
partitioning businesses to separate their lobbying operations from other functions, such
as conducting government communications work. However, communications consultants
should be obliged to decide whether they wish to be private lobbyists or public service
confi dantes. They should not be allowed to be both. “Chinese walls” simply do not work.

6. Ethical Appointments
5规范化的任命:
政府任命:在上千的联邦政府机构,委员会,等的官员任命中不公平和照顾行为必须被停止。NDP建议政府给所有的政府职位制定技能和竞争标准,该标准将被公之于众进行严格考试和执行。
(一个独立的管理委员会)

Government appointments: Unfair and unethical patronage practice must stop in the
appointment of thousands of offi cials to federal agencies, boards, commissions and Crown
Corporations. The New Democratic Party proposes that the government develop skills and
competence-related criteria for all government appointments, that these criteria be publicly
released and that committees scrutinize appointments.
The cabinet appoints thousands of full-time and part-time non-judicial offi cials to
approximately 170 federal agencies, boards, commissions and Crown Corporations. A large
proportion of these are made entirely on a partisan basis that effectively excludes large
numbers of qualifi ed Canadians simply because they are independent or have not supported
the party in power. For example, 14 of 15 members of the current board of the National
Capital Commission have fi nancial or other connections with the Liberal Party.
This process has been condemned by the Auditor General (2001) and criticized by the
President of the Public Service Commission (2004). Not only are qualifi ed people excluded
from consideration for partisan reasons, but as well, some incompetent and unqualifi ed
persons got their positions simply because of their political connections.
This unfair and unethical patronage practice must stop. The New Democratic Party would
put an end to it. All Canadians who qualify for these positions must have access. Membership
or support for any political party should neither be a barrier nor a requirement for such
positions. Cynicism about appointments must stop. Merit and merit alone must count.

New Democrats propose the following:
• That the government of Canada develop skills and competence-related criteria for all
government appointments, [including Board Members and senior Offi cers of Crown
Corporations and other government agencies], for which a Standing Committee has
reviewing responsibility; and that these criteria specifi cally address the non-partisan
nature of these appointments;
• That the government submit these criteria to the appropriate Standing Committee for
consideration and approval, with amendment if necessary;
• That the Government of Canada then publicly release the committee-approved criteria
for each appointment;
• That the names and background of each subsequent nominee for appointment be
referred to the appropriate Standing Committee 60 days prior to the date of their
appointment, with an explanation of how each nominee has met the established criteria;
and, that the Committee, unless it unanimously decides otherwise, shall have at least
one full meeting every two months (while the House of Commons is in session) to review
the nominees.
NOTE: The report containing this motion was concurred in by the House on May 31; therefore, the
House of Commons ALREADY supports this portion of the ethics package. We will continue to monitor
this to make sure that Treasury Board implements the proposals. In the present Parliament the
government has already ignored proposals that have been adopted by the House.

7. Access to Information

信息透明

Access to information: The government is backtracking on reforms leading to greater public
access to information. A recent discussion paper introduced by Justice Minister Irwin Cotler
contains proposals that would actually reduce Canadians access to information, virtually
killing reform until after the next election. Canadians want more access to information
about their government.
Canada badly needs an improved Access to Information Act. Justice Minister Cotler promised
last fall to bring forth as a government bill, Bill C-201, MP Pat Martin’s private members
bill. Instead of doing so in March Minister Cotler presented the Standing Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics merely with a discussion paper many of the whose
proposals would actually reduce access to information.
What we need are the changes proposed in Mr. Martin’s bill which enjoyed the support of all
Members on the Committee:
• Extends the Act to Crown corporations and agencies previously excluded and to all
incorporated not-for-profi t organizations that receive at least two-thirds of their funding
through federal government appropriations;
• Makes ministers of the Crown, their exempt staffs and offi cers of parliament subject to
the Act;
• Brings Cabinet confi dences under the Act;
• Improves public access to government records pertaining to third-party contracts and
public opinion polling.
• Requires government records that are more than 30 years old to be automatically
opened except where specifi cally exempted for reasons of national security, public safety
or international obligations;
• Establishes the principles that records be provided without unreasonable barriers as to
time and cost and provides a government institution with the discretion to provide them
free of charge to users who request them in the public interest;
• Provides protection of information related to endangered species and threatened
ecological or archeological sites;
• Allows the disclosure of retained records pertaining to public health and safety,
the environment and governance of corporations if the public interest in disclosure
outweighs in importance the possible injury to the institutions and persons subject to the
Act.
www.ndp.ca/ethics
 
1,防止被选举的国会议员,在国会内倒向另一个政党,使其对选举他和帮助他选举的政党负责。
2,固定选举日期防止有利于执政党。
3,政党领导人掌握着庞大的资源,并且多数党领袖会成为首相,党领袖的竞选和花销必须改革公开和透明,因为这也是花费纳税人的钱。
4,选举改革。地区国会议员和比例代表制相结合。抛弃单纯的地区国会议员制度。改变由性别,种族,思想,地区偏好造成的的国会不平衡现象。该选举系统已经被90%以上的民主国家采用。(估计也是用来对付魁独的)
5,结束没有管理的说客,估计和腐败有关。
6规范化的任命:
政府任命:在上千的联邦政府机构,委员会,等的官员任命中不公平和照顾行为必须被停止。NDP建议政府给所有的政府职位制定技能和竞争标准,该标准将被公之于众进行严格考试和执行。
(这标准意味着更多同胞可以去竞争政府公务员职位。或者这个委员会会发展成为行政官吏资格制度)
7,信息透明,和防止腐败有关的改革措施.
 
此文说明了比例代表制和选区代表制的问题,供参考。

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  德国选举制度对政党政治的影响分析
  
  时间: 06-16 15:54 作者:马敏 新闻来源:中国法学网
  
  摘要:本文在阐述选区代表制的一般含义和类型的基础上,分析了魏玛时期和战后德国不同的选举制度对其政党制度和议会政治所产生的不同影响。
  
  关键词:德国;选举;政党政治
  
  普选制、政党制和议会制是西方民主政治的三大支柱。通过定期安排的竞选来选择政府被普遍视为民主的最低标准①,这样,选举制度获得了西方民主大厦的基础性地位。二十世纪初,西方各主要工业国家在最后冲破性别和财产限制后,都达到了争取普选权的预定目标,人们对选举制度的关注焦点也从普选权问题转向选举程序安排所引起的诸多具体问题。选区代表制的不同选择产生出两种相互区别的类型--单一选区制和比例代表制,它们在试图解释政党制度分化的不同类型或程度以及对议会政治和政府稳定与否的学术研究上占据了显着的位置②。德国从魏玛共和国到战后联邦民主的政治历史为这一领域的研究提供了有意义的分析素材。本文的意图在于从理解选区代表制的一般性意义中结合德国的历史经验来说明不同的选举安排是如何影响德国的民主政治结构和进程。进而说明政治存在选择,不同的制度选择会对政治过程和目标产生迥然相异的结果。
  
  一、选区代表制的一般涵义和类型
  选区代表制是指选区与代表之间的关系问题。当一个国家作为一个选区时,两者的关系就很简单,以色列和波兰就是这样的例子。但这种国家-选区模式只在小国中可行。在大一些的国家中,普遍的是采用地区-选区模式,即把国家按一定标准划分为更多也更小的地区作为选区。这时,选区与代表之间的关系问题才真正产生。从选区的角度看,是指在一个选区中产生一名代表或是多名代表;从代表的角度看,是指代表平均分配于各选区或是按有关规则作比例分配,两方面表达的是同一涵义。主流分类法是以前者作为分类标准,这引出两种基本类型:单名选区制和比例代表制。
  
  (一)单名选区制
  单名选区制(single-member district)是指:一个选区只有一名代表;竞选者只需获得相对多数票而不一定过半数就能将其它竞争者的得票全部揽为己有并当选为本选区的代表。这种制度也被称为"多数代表制(plurality system)"或"胜者全得"。英美实行这种典型的单名选区制。
  单名选区制的精髓就在于,只有在选区内获得排名第一的候选人才能全权代表这个选区,即使拿到与第一名很接近的第二名的票数,一点用处也没有。这种制度被认为促使了多个利益集团和政治团体结合为两个大的政党,极易形成两党体制。①因为在多党竞争而只有一个胜出的规则中,至少有两个失败的政党会认识到彼此联合对于下一次的选举有利,另外的政党也会因为同样原因而被迫合并。第三党虽然能够在这种制度下存在,但没有多少获胜的机会,他们只是作为大政党的反对群体和压力团体而存在。而"废票心理学(wasted votepsy cholgy)"更进一步侵蚀了第三党及其它弱小政党的支持,就是说那些可能会支持一个小政党的人认为,他们的政党不可能赢得胜利,但至少为了能使其选票发挥作用,他们就转而决定在两个大的政党中选择一个不太反对的政党。这个因素推动了英国自由党的衰落。单名选区制具有一些优点。它所造就的主要大党会坚持在政治谱系的中心活动,从而遏制极端主义的成长。在多数民主国家里,公众的观点是一条钟型曲线②,即持中间路线的人居多,极左和极右都是少数,任何偏离主流观点的政党在这种选举制下都会因得不到多数支持而被扫地出门。由于政党数量的减少,一个大党一般会在议会里占据多数,很少有政党联盟出现的必要,稳定的议会多数通常能形成一个稳定的政府,这使得统治变得更容易。
  不过,胜者全得的单名选区制也有明显的缺陷,它在议会中制造了一个多少有些人为色彩的多数,失败的政党即使获得49%的选票也得不到任何代表权,选举的胜利和失败都被扩大,这对于第三党尤为不公平。可以看出这种制度在真实、准确地反映公众观点上有多大程度的歪曲。此外,单名选区制创造了政党恪守中间路线的原则。为了赢得大量的中间选票,两个大的政党总是宣传着相似的政策,选民因难于区分而难于选择,这样的政治虽然安全但却乏味③。
  
  (二)比例代表制
  比例代表制(portionalrep resentation,)所包含的想法是,一个政党在全国大选中的得票比例,应最终与其在议会所获议席的比例相等,从而达到议席的分配情况真实、准确地反映选民中的舆论和忠诚分布状况的目标。这种制度建立在多名选区的基础上,即在一个选区中有多个议席,各个政党按在该区获得的选票比例获得相应席位。例如一个政党在一个有10个议席的选区中获得60%的选票,它就获得六个议席,由本党居前六位的候选人占据。获得10%选票的政党就只有一席,由本党第一候选人占据。但实际情况要复杂得多,为精确起见,有两种主要的方法来进行技术处理。一种是黑尔计算法或"最大均数法",另一种是德洪特(D'Hondt)制或"最大残数法",但两种方法都对弱小政党在议席分配上有利而对大党没有明显的好处④。
  比例代表制的优点是议席更为准确地反映了公众意见和政党实际力量。他们可以明确表达自已的党派理想和原则而不必走中间路线,公众也能做出明确的辩认和选择。一个小政党可以从议会中获得一两个席位而存在,却不必被迫与大党联合并淡化自己的观点。
  但比例代表制更有利于小党生存从而鼓励了政党分裂。通常在这种制度下,党派林立,各党的政策分歧很大,很少有单一政党能在议会中占据稳定多数,要组织政府一般需有几个政党结成联盟。但这种联盟经常不稳定而且不能在重大问题上形成决策,从而出现频繁的倒阁现象,不过这种现象也正在减少。
  
  (三)衍生类型
  单名选区制在法国发生了变化。法国实行两轮投票,在第一轮中,候选人必须获得绝对多数(超过50%)才能当选。如果这一轮没有选出,只有已获得12.5%选票的候选人才能进入第二轮竞选,这一次只以简单多数便可赢得选举。这种安排被称为"决胜负的单名选区制"⑤。其特点是第一轮允许许多政党参加竞选,体现了多党制的内涵,但第二轮就限制了选择范围并迫使政党合并。如果取消第一轮而直接进行第二轮的话,就会促使两大政党的形成,变得和英美一样。
  战后联邦德国发展出一种将单名选区制和比例代表制相结合的混合选举制来选举其议会下院。这种制度的直接影响是产生了两个半党的体制和极稳定的政府,它是对软弱和不稳定的魏玛体制---国家-选区的比例代表制的重大修正。
  
  二、魏玛共和国的比例代表制对政党政治的影响
  
  (一)比例代表制的宪法性规定
  一战后建立的德意志共和国因其宪法是在魏玛制订而又称为魏玛共和国。魏玛宪法将议会分为联邦国会和联邦参政院,联邦参政院的议员由各邦政府任命,在联邦国会的选举中,规定全国作为一个大选区,各政党在全国范围内按比例代表制竞争议席,如前面谈到的,这种规定助长了弱小政党的力量,使得众多的小党能够进入议会。
  魏玛宪法采用比例代表制基本上可说是对当时德国政治现实的一种回应。德国有着长期的分裂历史,国家统一的历史相当短暂,地方分离主义倾向一直对统一权威产生影响。在第二帝国期间,德国就是一个多党并存、意见分歧的政党体制。德国在一战失败后,社会矛盾重重,各种势力和集团纷纷组成政党,比例代表制一方面反映了德国政党力量结构和公众舆论分布,但另一方面也强化了多党纷争的局面。
  
  (二)比例代表制对政党体制和政府稳定的影响
  魏玛时期(1919-1933),德国大小政党有一百多个,能经常进入议会的政党有二十多个。主要大党有社会民主党、共产党、德意志人民党、天主教中央党、德意志民族人民党和民族社会主义德国工人党(纳粹党)等。各个政党纲领的政治倾向极不一致,从极右、右翼、右中、中间派到中左、左派和极左派都有。有些小党并无明确的政治倾向,但却代表着一个小地方或小团体的利益,它只要有最低限度的支持就可以取得一个席位。当时的德国也没有形成公众舆论的主流方向,地方主义势力强大。而比例代表制强化了这种情势,各个政党都不会像在胜者全得制度中那样为了进入议会而被迫联合成强大的政党并淡化本党的观点,因为他们并不想取悦于所有人。这样,魏玛时期德国的政党结构就是一个多党并立、互不妥协的"分裂的政党体制"。①
  一些学者指出,比例代表制由于助长了弱小政党的力量,它直接造成了政党制度的分裂,并最终导致内阁不稳定。②对此的研究揭示出一个潜在的因果模式:分裂的政党制度-意识形态上的极端主义-内阁的不稳定-民主的崩溃。因此,有学者提出,一些在二战前数年里存在的欧洲议会民主制的失败,本可以通过实行一个简单的战略而被转移掉,就是将复杂的比例代表制改为单名选区制。比例代表制使得一些小的政治运动团体在取得政治权力的过程中,不是依靠赢得多少重要的选举上的支持,而是靠通过宣传造势争取更多的信仰者。政党本身也变为"信徒型"政党,③一旦进入议会,它们甚至可以成为政府中的均势力量。这些小政党可能会在它们极端的外表下,坚持自己的准则或程序并认为没有什幺妥协的必要。
  魏玛时期,议会内通常有两三个大党和一批小党,没有一个大党能获得绝对多数,全部席位被十几个政党瓜分。社会民主党和共产党是最强的两个大党,但后者因受到莫斯科政策的影响而拒绝与前者合作,长期沦为反对党,社会民主党只能同其它小党联合组阁。这样小党就可以在政府中担任要职,而比它强得多的反对派大党却没有机会进入政府,小党的政治作用被不成比例地扩大了。另一方面,各政党都坚持本党的立场,政府在重大政策上往往难于达成一致,联合内阁经常因政治伙伴的改弦更张而破裂,政府更替如同走马灯似频繁。议会因各党意见分歧和相互争吵削弱了其立法功能,成为政客角力的场所,政府却因不能获得议会的稳定多数而频频换马,这就是魏玛共和国的议会政治的图景。从1918年到1928年,魏玛共和国更换十届政府。1930年,最后一届民选政府垮台后,共和国就一直依赖于紧急状态法残喘,直到1933年纳粹上台。
  纳粹党作为极右政党,在1919年成立后的最初几年中只不过是一个默默无闻的、政治上无足轻重的小党,但却受益于比例代表制鼓励小党生存和政党分裂的"制度恩惠"而存活并逐渐壮大。1928年,其党员为10万人,1931年则超过80万。1930年国会选举中,纳粹党的议席由原来的12席剧增至108席,1932年增至230席,成为国会中第一大党。1933年3月的选举,纳粹党的选票增至17,277,000张,议席增至288席,占全部议席的43.9%,加上它的伙伴党民族人民党所获得的8%的选票,已接近52%。这样就使希特勒在国会中有了多数的支持。纳粹党的上台证明了比例代表制所包含的"制度性缺陷"。
  
  三、战后德国的混合选举制及对政党政治的影响
  
  (一)基本法对混合选举制的宪法性规定
  《德意志联邦共和国基本法》即德国宪法规定国家的立法机构为联邦议院和联邦参议院,议会选举只在联邦议院中进行。两德统一后,总议席确定为656席,在328个选区内普选产生。
  西德在战后的政党重建过程中,出现了500多个组织要求建立政党,最终有150多个获得了政党身份。德国人既不愿放弃通过不同政党表达各自愿望的目标,又想避免出现魏玛时期议会制所容易导致的软弱无能的弱点,他们只能通过调整法律和宪法内容的方式来防止民主制的再次失败。他们将选举制度作了重大修正,引进了两党制国家的单名选区制并与比例代表制混合,形成了一种新型的选举制---混合制。
  混合制的主要之点在于,656个议席被平等分为两部份,第一部分的328个席位由选民直接投票给候选人,每一个选区有一个议席,由得票最多的一人获得(不一定过半数),这是典型的单名多数制,称为第一票;另外的328个席位是选民投给参加竞选的政党的,各政党按得票的比例多少来分配这一部分席位并由政党自己决定进入议会的人员名单,这称为第二票。但在分配时,应首先减去该党在第一票中已经当选的席位。例如,某党在第二票中获得50%的选票,按656席计,它应得328席,但如该党的候选人在第一票中已有200人当选,则该党在第二票中只能分得128席。如果该党在第一票中揽括了全部的328席,即使在第二票中得到50%的选票,它也不能再分到席位。如多于50%,比方说有60%的第二票,它才可以按比例参与这一部分议席的分配,它可得66席,该党总共在议会中的席位是394席。这样,联邦议会中的全部力量分配是由第二票,也就是投给政党的那一票决定,所以席位总是和选票成比例的。
  为了尽量减少极端主义者政党和许多小党进入联邦议院的问题,《基本法》和1967年制定的《政党法》都对政党问题作了新的规定。在保障结社自由的一般原则基础上,要求政党组织必须符合民主原则,禁止企图危害和废除民主自由秩序的政党活动。在选举方面,规定了政党必须获得5%的选票才可在第二票中获得席位的"门槛条款"。
  
  (二)混合选举制对德国政党政治的影响
  德国人对多党体制的偏爱深深植根于德国长久的历史、文化和传统,它构成了德国政治文化的重要内容,试图让德国人放弃这一点可能是徒劳的。但他们也必须小心防范再次出现魏玛共和国的局势。德国人的预防措施有三条:第一,规定政党的性质即便不是赞同民主自由的,但至少也不得是反民主自由的,这使任何极端主义的政党没有容身之地;第二,采用英美式的单名多数制来选出联邦议院中的一半代表,部分抵销比例代表制偏袒小党的倾向并朝着聚合型政党制度发展,从而有利于一个稳定政府的形成;第三,5%的门槛条款,进一步限制小党进入议会的可能性。前两条的规定趋向柔性,因为政党的意识形态倾向从来就是一个容易引起激烈争论的问题,单名多数制的具体情况又总是包含了许多差异。只有最后一条的规定是刚性的,即没达到5%的选票就别想在议会中获得第二票的席位。在1949年第一次大选中,这一限制是指在"一个州"得票的5%,结果,仍有11个政党进入了议会,几年之后的选举法改为在"全德的总票数"中达不到5%的不能参与第二票席位的分配,1953年便减少到6个,1957年进一步减少到4个,1961年则为3个。此后,能够常驻联邦议院的政党就一直只有3个,直到1983年绿党突破5%。
  在1966-1969年的大联盟时期(Grand Coalition),议会依靠这些办法成功地阻遏了对极端的民族主义政党%D%D国家民主党(National Democratic Party, NDP)的竞选支持。这个党的许多领导者和支持者是前纳粹,它的支持者主要是一部分小农场主和具有农民作风的中低阶层的商人以及手工业工人,人们对其政党性质也产生了激烈的辩论。最后的结果是对NDP的支持率从未超过8%而且迅速下滑,当大联盟时期结束后,NDP也就再也无法构成一种竞选力量了。
  尽管有这些限制,但小党从未在实际上消失,它们只是不能像在比例代表制中那样很容易地进入议会,占据一、两个议席而显示其存在。小党在现存体制下想要获得政治权力,就必须付出加倍的努力。西德绿党(DieGrunen),一个代表后物质主义的"新左派"政党,以其一贯明确的意识形态倾向所具有的吸引力成为上升中的政治力量。在它成立三年后(1983)的大选中,该党突破了5%的限制,进入议会,成为德国的第四大党。1990年,绿党受到重挫而被挤出议会,但在1994年它又卷土重来,以7.3%的得票率和49个议席的竞选结果重返联邦议会。另一小党即民主社会主义党(the Partyof Democratic Socialism, PDS)或被称为"红短袜"(RedSocks),也顽强地在议会中占据了一些席位,它因在1994年柏林4个选区中获胜而赢得30个席位。然而这些小党派的存在并未导致议会中没有了多数党、各党势均力敌、互不妥协而造成议会软弱的现象,相反,选举制的重大变化已为德国政党体制朝准两党制模式方向发展提供了原动力。
  混合选举制对德国政党政治产生明显的影响之一是政党制从分裂型向聚合型政党体制的演进,也就是学者们称呼的准两党制或两个半党体制。从60年代初到80年代末,两大政党控制了联邦议院的大约90%的选票和席位,它们分别是中右翼的基督教民主联盟(the Christian Democratic Union)与基督教社会联盟(the Christian Social Union)所组成的"联盟党(CDU/CSU)"和左翼的社会民主党(Social Democrats, SPD),第三党%D%D自由民主党(Free Democratic Party, FDP)拥有10%的选票和席位。两个半党体制维持了二十几年,自由民主党作为一个关键性小党,一直在西德议会政治中发挥着平衡作用。80年代,由于绿党的崛起,这种状况才有所变化,在议会中形成两个大党、两个小党的四党格局。
  产生影响的第二个方面是稳定的政党体制造就了一个稳定的政府。两个半党体制表明政党结构简单且稳定,大党CDU/CSU和SPD各自的选票和议席都难以超过50%(只有1959年出现过一次例外),而FDP由于太"自由",缺乏一贯的原则和纲领,它也从未获得超过13%的支持率,它的所有席位都来自比例代表部分---在单名多数制中,它将会被踢出议会。大党面临的选择是,或者接受FDP形成政治联盟掌握组阁权,或者使自己成为反对党。从1949年至1966年,联盟党与自由民主党结盟,一直把持德国政府。1966年-1969年,社会民主党与联盟党组成大联合政府才结束了战后17年的在野党历史。1969年,依靠与自由民主党的联合击败了联盟党,但到1982年又因自由民主党倒戈,社会党政府垮台,联盟党与自由民主党再次携手掌权直到1998年,社会民主党又在该年大选中重新上台。总之,两个大党轮流执政,但都离不开自由民主党这个"相关政党"①的支持。在联邦德国的前16届政府中就有13届政府有自由民主党的加盟。当然,这个党没有意识形态的包袱是它既能与SPD也能与CDU/CSU结成联盟的先决条件。
  战后50年中,德国政府保持了相当高的稳定性。只在1982年,发生过一例联盟党联合自由民主党对施密特政府提出"建设性不信任投票"②而导致社会民主党政府垮台的事件。宪法对议会提出不信任投票作出的相当严格的规定和一个简化、稳固的政党体制共同促成了政府的坚强态势:政府与议会发生矛盾时,情况往往不是政府被改组,而是议会被解散。
  第三个方面的影响是主要政党都从原来的"纲领性政党"向"全方位政党(catchallparty)③"的转化。德国政治学家奥托•基希海默用这个词来描述中右翼联盟(CDU/CSU),这个党意识形态的色彩是如此淡泊,以致于在延续其早期拥护资本主义立场的同时,其政纲中也包括了重要的社会福利部分,以吸引信教的工人阶层中的拥护者。加上其长期执政所带来的战后经济繁荣,于是它在选举中得到社会中不同利益和集团的广泛支持。而社会民主党在早期因为背着正统的马克思主义意识形态的包袱,它的支持率一直在40%以下徘徊,直到1959年,它的巴特戈德斯贝格纲领才使其与"正统的"马克思主义传统分道扬镳。社会民主党在两德统一后的胜利(1998年)看起来仍然是依靠其中间主义立场和"包罗万象"的形象。自由民主党却依赖于灵活而模糊的政策选择继续在两大党竞争中增添自已的筹码,但其选票已被绿党蚕食。绿党的前景也会因其明显的意识形态倾向而不容乐观,"新左派"的形象难于获得厌倦了意识形态争论的东德人的支持。
  两德统一后,政党进一步向趋同方向发展。两德社会民主党在1990年9月合二为一,随之两德基督教民主联盟在10月合并。政党规模的扩大和日益明确的中间路线所导致的结果是更加稳定的准两党制和更加稳定的政府。
  
  
  
  
  ①参见Maurice Duverger, Political Parties,Edition3( London: Methuen,1964), pp.55-206.劳伦斯•迈耶:《比较政治学》,华夏出版社,2001年,第36页。
  ②莫里斯•迪韦尔热对选举制度与政党制度的关系作了经典性研究。
  
  
  ①迈克尔•罗斯金:《政治科学》,华夏出版社,2001年,第275页。
  ②同上,第158页。
  ③同上,第276页。
  ④劳伦斯•迈耶《比较政治学》华夏出版社,2001,第63页。
  ⑤迈克尔•罗斯金《政治科学》华夏出版社,2001,第276页。
  
  
  ①萨托利把政党制度划分为分裂的和聚合的两种类型。
  ②Andrew Milnor, Elections and Political Stability (Boston: Little Brown, 1969). Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, Vol.1 (NewYork: Canbridge University Press,1976) p p. 85-131.
  ③参见Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Eition3( London: Methuen, 1964).迪韦尔热把政党分为群众型、干部型和信徒型三个描述性的类别。
  
  
  ①参见Giovanni Sartori, Partiesand Party Systems, Vol.1( New York: Canbridge University Press,1976)
  ②关于"建设性不信任投票"参见马啸原《西方政治制度史》高等教育出版社,2000,第321页。相关政党是指那些让主要政党在竞选或组建联盟时不得不考虑到的政党。
  ③Otto Kirchheimer,"Germany: The Vanishing Opposition,"载 RobertA. Dahl编 Political Oppositions in Western Democracies( New Haven, CT:Yale Unversity Press,1966).
 
NDP倡导选举改革,改变选举单名制,看起来是为了避免形成两党制那种比较乏味的局面。采用类似德国的两个半党制。小党和第三党才有机会,而且不会像魏玛共和国那样。

政党政治在西方发达国家,不论是两党制,还是两个半党制,都有一种政策趋同的趋势。那么人才的选拔也许才是最重要的吧。

刚刚尝试政党政治的国家,政治恶斗是不可避免的,然后逐渐发展到稳定的两党和两个半党制,但也可以直接跨越到宪政下的人才选拔系统。

(对不起大家,我拿CFC当自己的想法日记本,您觉得碍眼就不要进来了。赔个不是先。)
 
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