全球化是美国主导的。1985年开始，挟广场协议战胜日本的余威，2000到达顶峰。美国踌躇满志，让中国加入WTO。它的设计是，美国做制造业的上游，搞尖端技术，加上华尔街的金融业。 中国有人力成本低的优势，做下中游制造业。 这个设计对美国来说挺好的，但是它经受不了时间的考验。 它的中低端制造业必然空洞化，而且必然产生贸易逆差，因为大量的中低端产品必须从中国进口，高端产品如iPhone也是从中国输入。 其实美国并不怕贸易逆差，它仗着美元强势，可以无限印刷。真正的问题是1.虽然大资本家大赚，但是中下产业空洞化导致劳动人民大量失业。2.中国不甘心永远呆在中下游，用市场换技术，高端制造快速赶上来了。 问题来了：谁的错？怎么改？
美国输 美国急了，所以选出了川普 这个问题不解决，美国人还得选川普，这个70多老川普干不动了，还会有川普第二。。。这是这个制度自我防卫的机制。美国的事，是有理由的，瞎起哄嘲笑他们老总改变不了美国。 中国怎么办不饥到，习大大下台换一个汉奸可能有，日本广场以后怎么过来的？日本人自己适应，它没有机会干翻美国。
好好读读经济学， 贸易的目的是为了让两国双赢或多国共赢， 当这一目标不能实现的时候， 贸易就失去了存在的基础。更何况是中国故意不遵守世贸规则， 把别人的路全部堵死， 好好说话又不爱听，只能玩硬的。 把北美和欧洲当冤大头几十年还论什么谁之错？ 其实共产党要有希特勒的军事实力早就东南西北地开始搞事情了。
WTO前总干事拉米曾多次在公开场合称，中国履行WTO承诺可以得“A+”的分数。美国彼得森国际经济研究所所长波森也表示，中国“基本上履行了世贸组织的所有的规则和裁决。 中国遵守WTO的承诺比美国做的好太多。看这里：
废那么多话有什么用， 美国要求对等， 贸易条件对等， 怎么就这么难呢 怎么就是欺负你家土共了呢？把你当自己一样成人对待是尊重的表现啊 前两天我不都贴了那个世行前官员退休后怎么帮中国说话的视频了么？ 我自己就是伴着中国开放长大的， 你骗现在小孩子还行， 骗我就太嫩了
加前总理Chretien因为受不了川普的疯癫和废话，写了本新书。观点跟中宣部一样，美帝国在川普手上将消失，这是自然而不可避免的。 https://nationalpost.com/news/polit...akable-trump-marks-end-of-the-american-empire “If you want to be in isolation, that’s fine. But you have less influence.” The rise and eventual fall of superpowers is natural and inevitable, Chretien added. “You know, empires disappear. A lot of people are nostalgic about the British empire. A lot of people in France still dream of Napoleon; he’s dead since a long time. Life is like that.”
中共努力搞产业升级，用市场换技术，这个办法WTO没有禁止，这样让中国人民从高污染高能耗的低端制造走出来。你们普世派正好相反，希望中国人永远为美帝在低端打工。 说中共是为了百姓的利益你们出卖百姓的利益是汉奸冤枉你们没有？
The "Trade War" is Really About the Future of Innovation The escalation of tariffs between China and the United States is haunting the financial markets. “Manageable, orchestrated trade skirmishes” is probably the right description. But “trade war” is so much better a headline. Either way, what is really going on is not about trade; it is about who will lead global innovation in the 21st century. Think less steel, soybeans, and solar panels, and more electric vehicles, self-driving cars, and artificial intelligence. The electoral incentives are clear for the Trump administration to talk up links between wages and jobs and the mushrooming of America’s trade deficit with China over the past 15 years. But the administration’s much bigger concern is China’s very real challenge to American global dominance in the innovation economy. Rising power vs. incumbent power normally refers to the growing military competition between China and the U.S. But it also describes rising Sino-American competition over the future of innovation. Consider some facts. China has laid down more high-speed rail lines than the rest of the world combined (see the breathtaking new Chongqing-Guiyan line below). Mobile payments in China are 50 times as large as in the U.S. Last year, more electric vehicles were sold in China than in the rest of the world, and more than twice as many industrial robots were in use in China than in the U.S. Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft are firmly entrenched in the top 10 companies in the world by market capitalization. They were joined a couple of years ago by two Chinese companies—Alibaba and Tencent—that continued to climb up the standings. Over the period 2012-2016, Goldman Sachs estimates that total AI investment in the U.S. were about $18 billion, compared with only $2 billion in China—big advantage to America. But by 2020 China intends to invest about $150 billion in AI—looming enormous advantage to China. There is no doubt that most of the best new underlying technology continues to come out of the U.S. Realistically, it will take China many years, probably decades, to change this. But the ability of China to adopt and adapt American technology, and to do so at warp speed and massive scale, is extraordinary. If the definition of innovation is turning ideas into outcomes, China is already an innovation economy. This is what the Trump administration is really worried about. Dig just below the surface of “trade war” tweets, and the administration’s focus on China and the future of innovation is apparent. The U.S. Trade Representative report on which the new tariffs are based is entitled, “China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.” Nothing about steel or manufacturing jobs. This report then justifies actions against China based on a powerful but controversial provision of Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, which allows the President to take essentially any actions he sees fit against “acts, policies or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. Commerce.” This raises three big questions: 1. Is China behaving “unreasonably” to restrict U.S. commerce with respect to the innovation economy? There is no doubt that the Chinese government has an active “industrial policy” to transform its economy from a low cost assembler and manufacturer into a global leader in the cutting edge industries of the 21st century. This is the core of Xi Jinping’s ambition for China. In the past, the U.S. government has complained that government investment creates “unfair competition” in global markets—for example, the muscle European governments have used to help Airbus take on Boeing. But that is not the U.S.’s main beef with China. Instead, the U.S. is arguing that China unfairly regulates the conditions under which American firms can operate in China—with good reason. There is no doubt that the Chinese government regulates what American firms do in China, with a view both to protecting domestic firms and to ensuring that Chinese companies get access to leading-edge American intellectual property. My economics training tells me it does not matter “who wins” in innovation, because the whole world will benefit from more innovation no matter where it comes from. Consider, for example, the 15-year-old joint venture between General Motors and Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation that has resulted in GM’s selling more vehicles today in China than it does in America. This has been great for GM’s bottom line. But it has also increased the probability that China will soon have its own global auto company (not necessarily SAIC) that will compete head-to-head with GM inside and outside China. All the more likely given China’s enormous investments in electric and self-driving vehicles. Would American firms like to have unfettered access to the Chinese market? Would they prefer not to have to enter joint ventures with Chinese firms? Are they worried that “tech transfer” in China sometimes takes the form of intellectual property theft? Yes, to all three questions. This is just not the way the free market is supposed to operate. But the Chinese government says it has the right to regulate its own market, and it is improving intellectual property protections all the time. That is why China says what the U.S. is doing is unfair, and why its own retaliation is justified, focusing on industries like farming that might hurt Trump’s Republicans at the ballot box in November. 2. Is the U.S. justified in retaliating with trade sanctions against China? The Chinese government says “no.” So, too, might the World Trade Organization, which has repeatedly questioned the legality of Section 301 because it makes the U.S. judge and jury in its disputes with other countries—when this is exactly the job the WTO was created to do. Even though the U.S. was the prime mover behind the creation of the WTO, it has always wanted to insist that it is above the international law, at least with respect to the powers it gave itself in the 1974 Trade Act, two decades before the creation of the WTO. All the more so in Trump’s America. This rules out at least two pathways to resolving the current dispute between China and the U.S. The U.S. will defend its right to act under Section 301. China will not appeal to the WTO to rule against the U.S. Instead, both countries will take matters into their own hands—that is exactly what has happened this year. 3. Where will it end? In the past, I have argued that it is best to view things like trade spats between China and the U.S. as well-choreographed theater designed to appease domestic political audiences without threatening the underlying big economic win-wins between the two countries. It is easy to fit “steel for soybeans” tit-for-tat tariffs into that frame. But the stakes are much higher where the future of innovation is concerned. My economics training tells me it does not matter “who wins” in innovation, because the whole world will benefit from more innovation no matter where it comes from. Moreover, it is clear that the U.S. and China are complementary where innovation is concerned—the U.S. has a comparative advantage in incubating innovation; China’s comparative advantage is scaling it. This makes cooperation so much better than conflict. The problem with this thinking in the current situation is that the economic competition bleeds quickly over into concerns about military/security competition—and the rising power (China) vs incumbent power (U.S.) dynamic more generally. Cyber security is an obvious example. The same technologies that make industrial espionage possible and increase worries about personal data security are also increasingly the backbone of the 21st century military. In fact, most modern technology falls under the “dual use” rubric—important both to commerce and to security. Put it all together, and China-U.S. competition over innovation is here to stay. I do not expect the current trade tensions to spiral out of control—the potential for major damage to the economies of both countries, and to the global economy, is just too great. But even if Trump and Xi continue to emulate their predecessors in managing down their tensions, the underlying struggle over who will win the battle for global pre-eminence in innovation will only intensify. Calling it a trade war is not only misleading. It is also an understatement of what is really going on between the two most powerful countries in the world. Geoffrey Garrett is Dean, Reliance Professor of Management and Private Enterprise, and Professor of Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Follow Geoff on Twitter.
