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At a high level, it is clear that RTG failed to deliver a reliable system by the initial deadline of May 24, 2018, or indeed within the several new deadlines that RTG chose after that. It is not unreasonable to expect that a company consisting of some of the biggest players in the construction industry should be able to fulfill its obligations to the City, which was the purchaser of a product that RTG undertook to provide. However, a closer examination reveals that the reasons for the project’s problems are multi-faceted, and include the following:
■ The City chose an essentially new vehicle based on unproven technology. Thus, the City had to suffer the inevitable start-up problems with the introduction of new technology. This problem was exacerbated by the City’s technical demands, which strained the limits of an LRT.
■ The model chosen for delivery of the project, which relied on the private sector to build and maintain the OLRT1, resulted in the City avoiding significant financial liability during the construction phase, but it also led to a situation where the parties’ attention was diverted to protecting their legal rights instead of opening a reliable LRT.
■ The delivery model chosen by the City left the City with little control over RTG’s work.
■ RTG and OLRT-C failed to ensure the integration of roles, responsibilities, and deliverables through the construction of the OLRT1. Further, the arrangements for subcontractors on this project were complex and uncoordinated. At times subcontractors, which had overlapping ownership interests, were working at crosspurposes, which contributed to an overall lack of integration.
■ The OLRT1 project was characterized by new relationships, new designs, new facilities and infrastructure, and new undertakings that affected nearly every aspect of the project. The parties failed to appreciate and plan for the resulting delays and reliability issues. Executive Summary 2 Ottawa Light Rail Transit Public Inquiry I Executive Summary and Recommendations _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
■ A series of factors led to the project’s construction delays, including a sinkhole, provincial rules requiring specified amounts of Canadian content, and a failure to integrate engineering systems. While some of these factors were outside the parties’ control, it was unconscionable that RTG and OLRT-C would knowingly provide inaccurate information to the City about when the OLRT1 system would be ready for operation, which resulted in the City communicating unachievable dates to the public.
■ Considerable political pressure to begin operation caused the City to rush the system into public service. It agreed to consider the system as having met the Project Agreement’s definition of Substantial Completion, even though significant operating issues remained. The City also agreed to lower the trial running testing criteria, which were supposed to operate as an objective measurement of the system’s readiness. It did so because the OLRT1 could not pass the testing criteria previously agreed to by the City and RTG. Further, it appears that the City negotiated passes and fails with RTG instead of sticking with an independent and objective measure of the system’s readiness for operation.
■ Generally, City staff properly shared information about the OLRT1 with the public and Ottawa City Council (Council) during the construction phase. However, this changed during the problematic trial running testing period when critical information was withheld and provided only to Mayor Jim Watson and his office, and the Chair of the Transit Commission. Most troubling was the deliberate effort by Steve Kanellakos, the City Manager, to mislead Council on the decision to lower the testing criteria and on the testing results. The Mayor had accurate information about trial running and the decision to change the testing criteria, but failed to provide that information to Council. Thus, the conduct of senior City staff and the Mayor irreparably compromised the statutory oversight function of Council.
■ The City lessened the requirements for accepting the system at the stage called Revenue Service Availability, or RSA.
■ The City failed to follow best practices by not implementing a soft start for the opening of the OLRT1 to the public. Instead, it opened with full service for the public from Day 1. This resulted in a situation where start-up issues were being worked out during the initial operations period.
■ RTG and its subcontractors provided inadequate maintenance resources. Consequently, there were ongoing problems with the system that caused service delays and general system unreliability. The City contributed to this problem by filing hundreds of work orders in the first weeks of operation, many of which were categorized as urgent, to respond to minor issues that would have been largely resolved through regular maintenance. Executive Summary 3 Ottawa Light Rail Transit Public Inquiry I Executive Summary and Recommendations _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
■ The OLRT1 experienced two main-line derailments. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), a federal body that has exclusive legal jurisdiction to investigate and determine the causes of the derailments, determined that the first derailment was caused by the failure of an axle bearing. All parties agree the second derailment was a result of human error in servicing the vehicles. The City and RTG, along with its subcontractors, eventually worked together co-operatively and relatively effectively to respond to the derailments. The City brought in an outside safety expert to provide advice and guidance regarding the reduction of problems and to advise on a safe opening date for the system.
■ Despite this co-operation in responding to the derailments, the Commission concludes that there is an ongoing issue with the wheel and track interface that is continuing to cause problems. Given the problems identified later in this summary regarding the failure of City Manager Kanellakos to properly update Council, it is recommended by this Commission that the City continue to retain outside safety advisors and that they report directly to Council or the Transit Commission.
■ The City chose an essentially new vehicle based on unproven technology. Thus, the City had to suffer the inevitable start-up problems with the introduction of new technology. This problem was exacerbated by the City’s technical demands, which strained the limits of an LRT.
■ The model chosen for delivery of the project, which relied on the private sector to build and maintain the OLRT1, resulted in the City avoiding significant financial liability during the construction phase, but it also led to a situation where the parties’ attention was diverted to protecting their legal rights instead of opening a reliable LRT.
■ The delivery model chosen by the City left the City with little control over RTG’s work.
■ RTG and OLRT-C failed to ensure the integration of roles, responsibilities, and deliverables through the construction of the OLRT1. Further, the arrangements for subcontractors on this project were complex and uncoordinated. At times subcontractors, which had overlapping ownership interests, were working at crosspurposes, which contributed to an overall lack of integration.
■ The OLRT1 project was characterized by new relationships, new designs, new facilities and infrastructure, and new undertakings that affected nearly every aspect of the project. The parties failed to appreciate and plan for the resulting delays and reliability issues. Executive Summary 2 Ottawa Light Rail Transit Public Inquiry I Executive Summary and Recommendations _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
■ A series of factors led to the project’s construction delays, including a sinkhole, provincial rules requiring specified amounts of Canadian content, and a failure to integrate engineering systems. While some of these factors were outside the parties’ control, it was unconscionable that RTG and OLRT-C would knowingly provide inaccurate information to the City about when the OLRT1 system would be ready for operation, which resulted in the City communicating unachievable dates to the public.
■ Considerable political pressure to begin operation caused the City to rush the system into public service. It agreed to consider the system as having met the Project Agreement’s definition of Substantial Completion, even though significant operating issues remained. The City also agreed to lower the trial running testing criteria, which were supposed to operate as an objective measurement of the system’s readiness. It did so because the OLRT1 could not pass the testing criteria previously agreed to by the City and RTG. Further, it appears that the City negotiated passes and fails with RTG instead of sticking with an independent and objective measure of the system’s readiness for operation.
■ Generally, City staff properly shared information about the OLRT1 with the public and Ottawa City Council (Council) during the construction phase. However, this changed during the problematic trial running testing period when critical information was withheld and provided only to Mayor Jim Watson and his office, and the Chair of the Transit Commission. Most troubling was the deliberate effort by Steve Kanellakos, the City Manager, to mislead Council on the decision to lower the testing criteria and on the testing results. The Mayor had accurate information about trial running and the decision to change the testing criteria, but failed to provide that information to Council. Thus, the conduct of senior City staff and the Mayor irreparably compromised the statutory oversight function of Council.
■ The City lessened the requirements for accepting the system at the stage called Revenue Service Availability, or RSA.
■ The City failed to follow best practices by not implementing a soft start for the opening of the OLRT1 to the public. Instead, it opened with full service for the public from Day 1. This resulted in a situation where start-up issues were being worked out during the initial operations period.
■ RTG and its subcontractors provided inadequate maintenance resources. Consequently, there were ongoing problems with the system that caused service delays and general system unreliability. The City contributed to this problem by filing hundreds of work orders in the first weeks of operation, many of which were categorized as urgent, to respond to minor issues that would have been largely resolved through regular maintenance. Executive Summary 3 Ottawa Light Rail Transit Public Inquiry I Executive Summary and Recommendations _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
■ The OLRT1 experienced two main-line derailments. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), a federal body that has exclusive legal jurisdiction to investigate and determine the causes of the derailments, determined that the first derailment was caused by the failure of an axle bearing. All parties agree the second derailment was a result of human error in servicing the vehicles. The City and RTG, along with its subcontractors, eventually worked together co-operatively and relatively effectively to respond to the derailments. The City brought in an outside safety expert to provide advice and guidance regarding the reduction of problems and to advise on a safe opening date for the system.
■ Despite this co-operation in responding to the derailments, the Commission concludes that there is an ongoing issue with the wheel and track interface that is continuing to cause problems. Given the problems identified later in this summary regarding the failure of City Manager Kanellakos to properly update Council, it is recommended by this Commission that the City continue to retain outside safety advisors and that they report directly to Council or the Transit Commission.
