普利策奖得主Hersh爆出猛料：美国潜水员在“北溪”管道下放炸药 挪威人将其引爆

[贵圈]

分儿：赞，米国言论自由。
毛儿：看，米国万恶之首。

圈儿：美国这届太卖国了。
把软实力用差不多了。

 

[metropolis]

为什么要挪威去引爆，美国人不会把这事儿全干了吗？找挪威人因为怕泄露的太慢？

我哪知道为什么让挪威，而不是瑞典，波兰，德国或者美国，人家密谋了九个月决定的，有那么不合理吗？

那地方美国有权飞行吗？（只是个问题非质疑）

 

[rottenmelon]

美国cia这种事情做了被人揭发又不是第一次 不都这么过来了，真没必要帮着舔，美国政府又不在乎cfc这一舔….重要的是美国既不承认也没否认，你们这些国家又能拿他怎么样，即便要待几年甚至几十年发酵，目前甚至未来几十年世界又有哪个大国或者组织能够把美国的担子担下来？中国还是俄罗斯还是欧洲？

 

[ert0000]

几乎所有主流西方媒体都噤声，都不报道，只有2个印度媒体和一个西语小频道在报道。油管上能上第一页的英文就是印度的几个报道。

美国和西方在舆论管控方面紧跟中国的步伐呀。彼此彼此，难兄难弟了。。。。LOL

 

[metropolis]

我记得克林顿访华时回答炸死中国驻南斯拉夫使馆人员的问题时说，就是一个错误，那你还要我说什么？

车祸杀人还可以判断，测量，轨迹，谁知道导弹为什么就飞到中国使馆来了，你能找到那位操作员问问吗？

 

[Noberry]

想看德国政府的反应，还舔不舔白等政府

 

[metropolis]

几乎所有主流西方媒体都噤声，都不报道，只有2个印度媒体和一个西语小频道在报道。油管上能上第一页的英文就是印度的几个报道。

美国和西方在舆论管控方面紧跟中国的步伐呀。彼此彼此，难兄难弟了。。。。LOL

是啊，我也想找像样的大媒体，只找到这个nypost.

 

[Noberry]

别看败登痴呆，干起坏事一点也不含糊

 

[metropolis]

这事发生之后，有人说过，这个无疑是人为的爆炸，具有潜水作业安装炸药的无非是中俄美英，前两国没有可能性，所以嫌犯只有后两国。

 

[Koodo]

注意消息源是NYPOST， 不是NYTIMES，二者可不一样，让子弹再飞一会儿吧。

 

[lzb]

米国撒谎不是第一次了，特别是这种国际事件，查查东京湾事件，当年说越南首先攻击美国，约翰逊总统亲自国会作证的，然后导致越南战争扩大，直到1994年当年国务卿才出来证明，当年越南袭击美国军舰第二次从来没有发生过，而且很多证据也证明越南军队不在那个地区。还有出名的洗衣粉事件，联合国作证。

 

[metropolis]

注意消息源是NYPOST， 不是NYTIMES，二者可不一样，让子弹再飞一会儿吧。

普利策奖得主Hersh已经确认这篇文章是他本人所写，楼上大掐说过各大主媒有意忽视，或许在等政府的批示。

 

[lzb]

还有当年U2 被苏联击落，美国也宣布不是侦察飞机，结果几天后苏联看新闻发布会公布飞机和飞行员，然后柏林墙很快建立。

北部湾事件 - 维基百科，自由的百科全书

zh.wikipedia.org

事件揭露​

最早的揭露​

一直以来北越均不承认8月4日发生过所谓冲突；如1995年武元甲与原美国国防部长罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉会面时便予以否认，只承认8月2日发生过冲突。[3]詹森总统本人事后（1965年）也对8月4日的事件有怀疑，称两舰是“向鲸发炮”。[4]1971年6月丹尼尔·艾尔斯伯格向《纽约时报》发布了他拿到的长达7000页的绝密文件五角大楼文件，首次指出该事件系美方的夸大和虚构。除了北部湾事件之外，该文件还涉及美国对老挝和柬埔寨的举措等，大量真相震动了公众。

揭露的进展​

2005年美国国家安全局发表报告，[5]进一步承认8月2日的事件亦是由于马多克斯号率先开火警告而引起；8月4日则“有很大可能”在附近根本没有北越军舰。报告就8月4日的情况指出：

当夜并“没有攻击”……事实上河内海军当夜除了努力救助2日受创的鱼雷艇之外什么也没做。[6]

 

[metropolis]

How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline​

The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now​

Seymour Hersh

Feb 8
4,973



The administration was floundering, despite getting a reprieve on the crisis in mid-November, when Germany’s energy regulators suspended approval of the second Nord Stream pipeline. Natural gas prices surged 8% within days, amid growing fears in Germany and Europe that the pipeline suspension and the growing possibility of a war between Russia and Ukraine would lead to a very much unwanted cold winter. It was not clear to Washington just where Olaf Scholz, Germany’s newly appointed chancellor, stood. Months earlier, after the fall of Afghanistan, Scholtz had publicly endorsed French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for a more autonomous European foreign policy in a speech in Prague—clearly suggesting less reliance on Washington and its mercurial actions.

Throughout all of this, Russian troops had been steadily and ominously building up on the borders of Ukraine, and by the end of December more than 100,000 soldiers were in position to strike from Belarus and Crimea. Alarm was growing in Washington, including an assessment from Blinken that those troop numbers could be “doubled in short order.”

The administration’s attention once again was focused on Nord Stream. As long as Europe remained dependent on the pipelines for cheap natural gas, Washington was afraid that countries like Germany would be reluctant to supply Ukraine with the money and weapons it needed to defeat Russia.

It was at this unsettled moment that Biden authorized Jake Sullivan to bring together an interagency group to come up with a plan.

All options were to be on the table. But only one would emerge.

PLANNING

In December of 2021, two months before the first Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Jake Sullivan convened a meeting of a newly formed task force—men and women from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and the State and Treasury Departments—and asked for recommendations about how to respond to Putin’s impending invasion.

It would be the first of a series of top-secret meetings, in a secure room on a top floor of the Old Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House, that was also the home of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). There was the usual back and forth chatter that eventually led to a crucial preliminary question: Would the recommendation forwarded by the group to the President be reversible—such as another layer of sanctions and currency restrictions—or irreversible—that is, kinetic actions, which could not be undone?

What became clear to participants, according to the source with direct knowledge of the process, is that Sullivan intended for the group to come up with a plan for the destruction of the two Nord Stream pipelines—and that he was delivering on the desires of the President.

THE PLAYERS Left to right: Victoria Nuland, Anthony Blinken, and Jake Sullivan.

Over the next several meetings, the participants debated options for an attack. The Navy proposed using a newly commissioned submarine to assault the pipeline directly. The Air Force discussed dropping bombs with delayed fuses that could be set off remotely. The CIA argued that whatever was done, it would have to be covert. Everyone involved understood the stakes. “This is not kiddie stuff,” the source said. If the attack were traceable to the United States, “It’s an act of war.”

At the time, the CIA was directed by William Burns, a mild-mannered former ambassador to Russia who had served as deputy secretary of state in the Obama Administration. Burns quickly authorized an Agency working group whose ad hoc members included—by chance—someone who was familiar with the capabilities of the Navy’s deep-sea divers in Panama City. Over the next few weeks, members of the CIA’s working group began to craft a plan for a covert operation that would use deep-sea divers to trigger an explosion along the pipeline.

Something like this had been done before. In 1971, the American intelligence community learned from still undisclosed sources that two important units of the Russian Navy were communicating via an undersea cable buried in the Sea of Okhotsk, on Russia’s Far East Coast. The cable linked a regional Navy command to the mainland headquarters at Vladivostok.

A hand-picked team of Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency operatives was assembled somewhere in the Washington area, under deep cover, and worked out a plan, using Navy divers, modified submarines and a deep-submarine rescue vehicle, that succeeded, after much trial and error, in locating the Russian cable. The divers planted a sophisticated listening device on the cable that successfully intercepted the Russian traffic and recorded it on a taping system.

The NSA learned that senior Russian navy officers, convinced of the security of their communication link, chatted away with their peers without encryption. The recording device and its tape had to be replaced monthly and the project rolled on merrily for a decade until it was compromised by a forty-four-year-old civilian NSA technician named Ronald Pelton who was fluent in Russian. Pelton was betrayed by a Russian defector in 1985 and sentenced to prison. He was paid just $5,000 by the Russians for his revelations about the operation, along with $35,000 for other Russian operational data he provided that was never made public.

That underwater success, codenamed Ivy Bells, was innovative and risky, and produced invaluable intelligence about the Russian Navy's intentions and planning.

Still, the interagency group was initially skeptical of the CIA’s enthusiasm for a covert deep-sea attack. There were too many unanswered questions. The waters of the Baltic Sea were heavily patrolled by the Russian navy, and there were no oil rigs that could be used as cover for a diving operation. Would the divers have to go to Estonia, right across the border from Russia’s natural gas loading docks, to train for the mission? “It would be a goat fuck,” the Agency was told.

Throughout “all of this scheming,” the source said, “some working guys in the CIA and the State Department were saying, ‘Don’t do this. It’s stupid and will be a political nightmare if it comes out.’”

Nevertheless, in early 2022, the CIA working group reported back to Sullivan’s interagency group: “We have a way to blow up the pipelines.”

What came next was stunning. On February 7, less than three weeks before the seemingly inevitable Russian invasion of Ukraine, Biden met in his White House office with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who, after some wobbling, was now firmly on the American team. At the press briefing that followed, Biden defiantly said, “If Russia invades . . . there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it.”

Twenty days earlier, Undersecretary Nuland had delivered essentially the same message at a State Department briefing, with little press coverage. “I want to be very clear to you today,” she said in response to a question. “If Russia invades Ukraine, one way or another Nord Stream 2 will not move forward.”

the science adviser to the Pentagon’s Chief of Naval Operations, said the issue facing the group in Norway because of Biden’s delay was one of chance: “The longer the explosives are in the water the greater risk there would be of a random signal that would launch the bombs.”)

On September 26, 2022, a Norwegian Navy P8 surveillance plane made a seemingly routine flight and dropped a sonar buoy. The signal spread underwater, initially to Nord Stream 2 and then on to Nord Stream 1. A few hours later, the high-powered C4 explosives were triggered and three of the four pipelines were put out of commission. Within a few minutes, pools of methane gas that remained in the shuttered pipelines could be seen spreading on the water’s surface and the world learned that something irreversible had taken place.

FALLOUT

In the immediate aftermath of the pipeline bombing, the American media treated it like an unsolved mystery. Russia was repeatedly cited as a likely culprit, spurred on by calculated leaks from the White House—but without ever establishing a clear motive for such an act of self-sabotage, beyond simple retribution. A few months later, when it emerged that Russian authorities had been quietly getting estimates for the cost to repair the pipelines, the New York Times described the news as “complicating theories about who was behind” the attack. No major American newspaper dug into the earlier threats to the pipelines made by Biden and Undersecretary of State Nuland.

While it was never clear why Russia would seek to destroy its own lucrative pipeline, a more telling rationale for the President’s action came from Secretary of State Blinken.

Asked at a press conference last September about the consequences of the worsening energy crisis in Western Europe, Blinken described the moment as a potentially good one:

“It’s a tremendous opportunity to once and for all remove the dependence on Russian energy and thus to take away from Vladimir Putin the weaponization of energy as a means of advancing his imperial designs. That’s very significant and that offers tremendous strategic opportunity for the years to come, but meanwhile we’re determined to do everything we possibly can to make sure the consequences of all of this are not borne by citizens in our countries or, for that matter, around the world.”

More recently, Victoria Nuland expressed satisfaction at the demise of the newest of the pipelines. Testifying at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in late January she told Senator Ted Cruz, “Like you, I am, and I think the Administration is, very gratified to know that Nord Stream 2 is now, as you like to say, a hunk of metal at the bottom of the sea.”

The source had a much more streetwise view of Biden’s decision to sabotage more than 1500 miles of Gazprom pipeline as winter approached. “Well,” he said, speaking of the President, “I gotta admit the guy has a pair of balls. He said he was going to do it, and he did.”

Asked why he thought the Russians failed to respond, he said cynically, “Maybe they want the capability to do the same things the U.S. did.

“It was a beautiful cover story,” he went on. “Behind it was a covert operation that placed experts in the field and equipment that operated on a covert signal.

“The only flaw was the decision to do it.”

How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline

The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now

seymourhersh.substack.com

 

[光放]

为什么要挪威去引爆，美国人不会把这事儿全干了吗？找挪威人因为怕泄露的太慢？

这么秘密的事还要“美国人放炸药，挪威人来引爆”？生怕知道的人少？

不是挪威人引爆，只是要他们投放一个声纳浮漂而已。事后挪威人即使反应过来那是干什么用的也不敢说什么。