为什么渥太华的阿蹄永远不可能正常运行,多伦多阿蹄出轨,5人轻伤

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Manifesto Multilinko 2

Mostly about Ottawa​

Why Ottawa’s Citadis Spirit trains will never work


Summary​

The City of Ottawa bought the wrong trains for Line 1 (Confederation Line), using the wrong process, and then doubled down by buying more of the wrong trains for Line 1 Stage 2, and now we’re fucked.
The train will never do what it is supposed to do, because what it is supposed to do is an impossible combination of contradictory design elements.
The only future for Ottawa LRT Line 1 is to rip up the whole thing and install new tracks with new trains on a new alignment which will probably never happen or if it does is decades away.

Details​

1. Fundamentally the wrong procurement process​

The city should have specified:
  1. A proven system (non-negotiable)
  2. The number of passengers per hour per direction (pphpd)
  3. The frequency of the trains
And that’s it. Then vendors should have provided proposals based on those three priority items, and the city should have picked a proposal based on staff advice and multiple outside experts.
Why multiple outside experts? Because selecting the train type and then the specific train is the most fundamental decision of the entire line. If you pick the wrong train, you’re fucked.
The city absolutely should not have been in the business of specifying the train type.
But instead, the city relied on councillors (who are not rail experts) and staff (who are not rail experts) and a single flawed, skewed expert report that clearly was all designed to select light rail as the vehicle type even though the vendors and other cities universally advised heavy rail for Ottawa’s required passenger volumes.

2. Fundamentally the wrong procurement design​

Once they chose the wrong type of vehicle there’s basically nothing that would have fixed the procurement other than an expert review step that could take you back to the beginning. But there was no such step.
After that everything just cascades into one bad decision after another.
The city apparently created a procurement where the bidders were bound to specific train vendors. So once they selected a bidder, that bidder only has a small number of train vendors it can work with, all other vendors are excluded.
Then the city ridiculously overspecified the train. In particular, the city wanted a light rail train that worked like a heavy rail train, which is just, well, stupid. A sedan is not a truck. They’re just fundamentally different things. You can’t put a different undercarriage on a sedan and it magically becomes a truck. You can’t do some Wile E. Coyote thing and stick a rocket onto a skateboard and it becomes a reliable transit system.
The city trapped itself in a loop where it was asking for a light rail train that could do heavy rail train things, and it wanted a proven train, but there is no such proven train, because what they were asking for is impossible, so RTG proposes some cobbled-together CAF train, which the city rejects, and then we get a last minute substitution of an Alstom train because that’s apparently the only other vendor that RTG has available anyway.
What’s supposed to happen is the vendors tell you what train type based on your few priority requirements and then you have a procurement where you invite ALL vendors to make proposals, then you pick a specific train based on their proposals and then you design the entire system, rails and all, around the train you’ve picked.

3. We literally bought a train off a PowerPoint​

I feel bad for both RTG and Alstom, who are in an impossible position. The city has specified an imaginary train. No train can meet the city’s ridiculous contradictory specifications. What vendor is going to tell them that and kill the procurement?
So the city rejects the CAF train as unproven (because no such proven train exists) and then in the weirdest twist of the entire catastrophe, they buy an Alstom train, an entirely imaginary Alstom train hurriedly cobbled together with components from trains in cities that have completely different requirements.
It’s literally a PowerPoint that says sure here’s your impossible train and it’s proven in the sense that a brand new car design with a proven sparkplug is proven.
There also should have been an expert review step at this point which should also have taken us back to the very beginning, but there wasn’t.
I’m not going to cut out and paste every single slide, you can see them all in “Ottawa Light Rail Transit Project: Tunney’s Pasture to Blair Station, Vehicle Ad-Hoc CCM, July 18, 2012” (PDF) – or see an Internet Archive copy (PDF). (CCM stands for Commercially Confidential Meeting.) Here are three examples of their slides:
RTG Service Proven Vehicle
Different vehicles, different climates, different passenger volumes and still nowhere close to “at least 5 years in revenue service”. (As a side note, when they say SNCF Nantes Citadis, they mean the Dualis, a vehicle that had been in service for barely a year.)
And the city accepts it.
And now we’re fucked.
Also the rails are wrong for the train, and the track curves are wrong for the train (or probably for any train), and RTG/RTM is terrible at its job, and Alstom is trying to conjure up expert rail staff in a small city in a continent with very few expert rail staff to start with, and we froze the budget at an amount that was too small and constrained the entire system build-out, but that’s all a bonus on top of the fundamentally wrong chain of decisions.
And there were no consequences whatsoever for the Mayor, Councillors, staff, and private sector consultants and contractors so we can be guaranteed that there is no disincentive to just repeat this same disaster all over again, which is what we continue to see in big-bang public and private sector implementations of new services over and over again.

4a. Also we screwed Toronto!​

As a bonus, in an apparent copy-paste of Ottawa’s procurement, Toronto has two lines that will use these fundamentally ill-suited trains. They might escape some of the disaster through lower passenger loads and better rails, but that seems unlikely.

4b. And we screwed Quebec City!​

Quebec City has inexplicably also chosen the Citadis Spirit for its tramway.

5. Why the Citadis Spirit will never work​

Our train is some jumble of components that are trying to take a light rail train (a train designed for light suburban use) and make it do heavy rail things (a train designed for intensive frequent core system use). This is impossible. Even on the best platform in the world it would be impossible, and there are plenty of indications that the Dualis wasn’t the best platform to start with anyway.
We should have just bought a proven metro (subway type) train, or at worst bought Calgary’s high-floor light rail vehicles or basically anything proven that would have been more suited to our actual requirements than a low-floor light rail suburban surface train.
Anyway, in the unlikely event you want to read the actual details, I have written other thousands of words including:
Or you can, you know, read the entire 600 page report on this debacle.
I don’t know if I have much more to say, there are only so many ways you can frame a fundamentally wrong decision that had no consequences for any of the decisionmakers and that has trapped the entire transit-using city in a situation that would take billions of dollars (and widespread admissions of total failure) to fix.

 
google translate

为什么渥太华的 Citadis Spirit 列车永远无法运行

发表于 2023 年 7 月 20 日

概括


渥太华市使用错误的流程为 1 号线(联邦线)购买了错误的列车,然后加倍努力为 1 号线第二阶段购买了更多错误的列车,现在我们完蛋了。

火车永远不会做它应该做的事情,因为它应该做的事情是矛盾的设计元素的不可能组合。

渥太华轻轨 1 号线唯一的未来就是拆除整个轨道,并在新的路线上安装新的轨道和新的列车,这可能永远不会发生,或者即使发生也需要几十年的时间。

细节

1. 采购流程根本上是错误的

城市应该明确:

一个经过验证的系统(不可协商)
每个方向每小时的乘客数量 (pphpd)
列车班次

就是这样。 然后供应商应该根据这三个优先事项提供建议,而城市应该根据工作人员的建议和多名外部专家选择建议。

为什么要聘请多名外部专家? 因为选择列车类型,然后选择具体列车,是整条线路最根本的决定。 如果你选错了火车,那你就完蛋了。

市政府绝对不应该参与指定列车类型的事务。

但相反,该市依赖于议员(他们不是铁路专家)和工作人员(他们不是铁路专家)和一份有缺陷、歪曲的专家报告,该报告显然是为了选择轻轨作为车辆类型,尽管供应商和其他城市普遍建议使用重轨来满足渥太华所需的客运量。

2. 根本上错误的采购设计

一旦他们选择了错误的车辆类型,除了专家评审步骤可以让你回到起点之外,基本上没有什么可以解决采购问题。 但没有这一步。

在那之后,一切都会变成一个又一个错误的决定。

该市显然制定了一项采购计划,投标人必须与特定的火车供应商联系。 因此,一旦他们选择了一个投标人,该投标人就只能与少数几家火车供应商合作,所有其他供应商都被排除在外。

然后,这座城市对火车的规定可笑地过高。 特别是,该市想要一辆像重轨列车一样工作的轻轨列车,这只是,呃,愚蠢的。 轿车不是卡车。 它们只是根本上不同的东西。 你不能在轿车上安装不同的底盘,它就会神奇地变成一辆卡车。 你不能像怀尔狼一样,把火箭粘在滑板上,它就成为可靠的交通系统。

该市陷入了一个循环,它要求一辆可以完成重型铁路列车任务的轻轨列车,并且想要一辆经过验证的列车,但没有这样经过验证的列车,因为他们所要求的东西是不可能的,所以 RTG 提出了一些拼凑在一起的 CAF 列车,但该市拒绝了,然后我们在最后一刻得到了阿尔斯通列车的替代品,因为这显然是 RTG 唯一可用的其他供应商。

应该发生的事情是供应商根据您的几个优先要求告诉您什么火车类型,然后您进行采购,邀请所有供应商提出建议,然后您根据他们的建议选择特定的火车,然后围绕您选择的火车设计整个系统,轨道和所有内容。

3. 我们真的是通过 PowerPoint 购买了火车

我为 RTG 和阿尔斯通感到难过,他们处于一个不可能的境地。 该市指定了一辆假想的火车。 没有火车能够满足这座城市荒谬的矛盾规范。 哪个供应商会告诉他们这一点并终止采购?

因此,该市拒绝接受未经证实的 CAF 列车(因为不存在这样的经过验证的列车),然后在整个灾难中最奇怪的转折中,他们购买了一辆阿尔斯通列车,一辆完全虚构的阿尔斯通列车,匆忙地将来自具有完全不同要求的城市的列车的部件拼凑在一起。

这实际上是一个 PowerPoint,上面写着这肯定是你不可能的火车,并且它已经被证明,因为带有经过验证的火花塞的全新汽车设计已经被证明。

此时还应该有一个专家审查步骤,这也应该让我们回到最初,但没有。

我不会剪切并粘贴每张幻灯片,您可以在“渥太华轻轨交通项目:从 Tunney’s Pasture 到 Blair 站,车辆临时 CCM,2012 年 7 月 18 日”(PDF) 中查看它们,或者查看互联网档案副本 (PDF)。 (CCM 代表商业机密会议。)以下是他们的幻灯片的三个示例:

现在我们完蛋了。

此外,铁轨对于火车来说是错误的,轨道曲线对于火车(或者可能对于任何火车)来说都是错误的,RTG/RTM的工作很糟糕,阿尔斯通正试图在一个大陆上的一个小城市里召唤专家铁路工作人员,而这个大陆上的专家铁路工作人员很少,我们冻结的预算数额太小,限制了整个系统的建设,但这都是在根本上错误的决策链之上的额外好处。

市长、议员、工作人员以及私营部门顾问和承包商都没有受到任何后果,因此我们可以保证,不会有任何阻碍再次重复同样的灾难,这就是我们在公共和私营部门一次又一次大规模实施新服务时不断看到的情况。

4a. 我们还把多伦多搞砸了!

作为奖励,多伦多有两条线路将使用这些根本不适合的火车,这显然是渥太华采购的复制粘贴。 他们可能会通过降低载客量和改善铁路来避免一些灾难,但这似乎不太可能。

4b. 我们搞砸了魁北克市!

令人费解的是,魁北克市也选择了 Citadis Spirit 作为其有轨电车。

5. 为什么 Citadis 精神永远不起作用

我们的火车由一些杂乱的组件组成,试图将轻轨火车(专为轻型郊区使用而设计的火车)并使其执行重型铁路任务(专为密集频繁使用核心系统而设计的火车)。 这是不可能的。 即使在世界上最好的平台上,这也是不可能的,而且有大量迹象表明 Dualis 无论如何都不是最好的平台。

我们应该购买一辆经过验证的地铁(地铁类型)列车,或者最坏的情况下购买卡尔加里的高地板轻轨车辆,或者基本上任何经过验证的比低地板轻轨郊区地面列车更适合我们实际要求的东西。

无论如何,万一你想阅读实际细节,我已经写了其他数千字,包括:

回顾渥太华 2009 年和 2012 年铁路系统选择

渥太华的轻轨还有出路吗?

Citadis Dualis 和 Citadis Spirit 有轨电车

或者,您知道,您也可以阅读有关这场灾难的 600 页完整报告。

渥太华轻轨委员会最终报告和我的建议

我不知道我是否还有更多的话要说,只有这么多方法可以制定一个根本上错误的决定,对任何决策者都没有任何后果,并且使整个公交城市陷入需要数十亿美元(并且广泛承认完全失败)才能修复的情况。
 
针对这个问题啊,我们要紧抓危害性,提高自觉性,提升主动性,紧跟时代性,认识艰巨性,做到不松劲,不懈怠,不退缩,不为难,不罢手,从多层次,多方面,多元素,多措施,找准出发点,切入点,着力点,落脚点,关键点,来解决问题
 
『。。火车永远不会做它应该做的事情,因为它应该做的事情是矛盾的设计元素的不可能组合。。』

真是神翻译!!一语中的,赞一下。
 
最后编辑:
4a. 我们还把多伦多搞砸了!

作为奖励,多伦多有两条线路将使用这些根本不适合的火车,这显然是渥太华采购的复制粘贴。 他们可能会通过降低载客量和改善铁路来避免一些灾难,但这似乎不太可能。

4b. 我们搞砸了魁北克市!

令人费解的是,魁北克市也选择了 Citadis Spirit 作为其有轨电车。
不仅坑了渥太华自己,还把其他城市也坑了。花生很能挖坑啊。
 
不仅坑了渥太华自己,还把其他城市也坑了。花生很能挖坑啊。
样本工程:jiayou:

这边招标,条件是你以前干过什么工程,这炕挖大了,渥太华招标居然不要样板,结果自己的豆腐工程成了别人的样板。总得有人吃螃蟹
 
最后编辑:
1690054030544.png
 
样本工程:jiayou:

这边招标,条件是你以前干过什么工程,这炕挖大了,渥太华招标居然不要样板,结果自己的豆腐工程成了别人的样板。总得有人吃螃蟹
这是侮辱螃蟹,我为味道鲜美的螃蟹鸣不平。也就是个慢性毒性的花蘑菇,看着好看,吃下去完蛋。
 
拆了好!再用废料建一座纪念碑,让市民永远记住这帮王八蛋!:monster:
 
止损,割肉不是没可能。还是不想
 

Manifesto Multilinko 2

Mostly about Ottawa​

Why Ottawa’s Citadis Spirit trains will never work


Summary​

The City of Ottawa bought the wrong trains for Line 1 (Confederation Line), using the wrong process, and then doubled down by buying more of the wrong trains for Line 1 Stage 2, and now we’re fucked.
The train will never do what it is supposed to do, because what it is supposed to do is an impossible combination of contradictory design elements.
The only future for Ottawa LRT Line 1 is to rip up the whole thing and install new tracks with new trains on a new alignment which will probably never happen or if it does is decades away.

Details​

1. Fundamentally the wrong procurement process​

The city should have specified:
  1. A proven system (non-negotiable)
  2. The number of passengers per hour per direction (pphpd)
  3. The frequency of the trains
And that’s it. Then vendors should have provided proposals based on those three priority items, and the city should have picked a proposal based on staff advice and multiple outside experts.
Why multiple outside experts? Because selecting the train type and then the specific train is the most fundamental decision of the entire line. If you pick the wrong train, you’re fucked.
The city absolutely should not have been in the business of specifying the train type.
But instead, the city relied on councillors (who are not rail experts) and staff (who are not rail experts) and a single flawed, skewed expert report that clearly was all designed to select light rail as the vehicle type even though the vendors and other cities universally advised heavy rail for Ottawa’s required passenger volumes.

2. Fundamentally the wrong procurement design​

Once they chose the wrong type of vehicle there’s basically nothing that would have fixed the procurement other than an expert review step that could take you back to the beginning. But there was no such step.
After that everything just cascades into one bad decision after another.
The city apparently created a procurement where the bidders were bound to specific train vendors. So once they selected a bidder, that bidder only has a small number of train vendors it can work with, all other vendors are excluded.
Then the city ridiculously overspecified the train. In particular, the city wanted a light rail train that worked like a heavy rail train, which is just, well, stupid. A sedan is not a truck. They’re just fundamentally different things. You can’t put a different undercarriage on a sedan and it magically becomes a truck. You can’t do some Wile E. Coyote thing and stick a rocket onto a skateboard and it becomes a reliable transit system.
The city trapped itself in a loop where it was asking for a light rail train that could do heavy rail train things, and it wanted a proven train, but there is no such proven train, because what they were asking for is impossible, so RTG proposes some cobbled-together CAF train, which the city rejects, and then we get a last minute substitution of an Alstom train because that’s apparently the only other vendor that RTG has available anyway.
What’s supposed to happen is the vendors tell you what train type based on your few priority requirements and then you have a procurement where you invite ALL vendors to make proposals, then you pick a specific train based on their proposals and then you design the entire system, rails and all, around the train you’ve picked.

3. We literally bought a train off a PowerPoint​

I feel bad for both RTG and Alstom, who are in an impossible position. The city has specified an imaginary train. No train can meet the city’s ridiculous contradictory specifications. What vendor is going to tell them that and kill the procurement?
So the city rejects the CAF train as unproven (because no such proven train exists) and then in the weirdest twist of the entire catastrophe, they buy an Alstom train, an entirely imaginary Alstom train hurriedly cobbled together with components from trains in cities that have completely different requirements.
It’s literally a PowerPoint that says sure here’s your impossible train and it’s proven in the sense that a brand new car design with a proven sparkplug is proven.
There also should have been an expert review step at this point which should also have taken us back to the very beginning, but there wasn’t.
I’m not going to cut out and paste every single slide, you can see them all in “Ottawa Light Rail Transit Project: Tunney’s Pasture to Blair Station, Vehicle Ad-Hoc CCM, July 18, 2012” (PDF) – or see an Internet Archive copy (PDF). (CCM stands for Commercially Confidential Meeting.) Here are three examples of their slides:
RTG Service Proven Vehicle
Different vehicles, different climates, different passenger volumes and still nowhere close to “at least 5 years in revenue service”. (As a side note, when they say SNCF Nantes Citadis, they mean the Dualis, a vehicle that had been in service for barely a year.)
And the city accepts it.
And now we’re fucked.
Also the rails are wrong for the train, and the track curves are wrong for the train (or probably for any train), and RTG/RTM is terrible at its job, and Alstom is trying to conjure up expert rail staff in a small city in a continent with very few expert rail staff to start with, and we froze the budget at an amount that was too small and constrained the entire system build-out, but that’s all a bonus on top of the fundamentally wrong chain of decisions.
And there were no consequences whatsoever for the Mayor, Councillors, staff, and private sector consultants and contractors so we can be guaranteed that there is no disincentive to just repeat this same disaster all over again, which is what we continue to see in big-bang public and private sector implementations of new services over and over again.

4a. Also we screwed Toronto!​

As a bonus, in an apparent copy-paste of Ottawa’s procurement, Toronto has two lines that will use these fundamentally ill-suited trains. They might escape some of the disaster through lower passenger loads and better rails, but that seems unlikely.

4b. And we screwed Quebec City!​

Quebec City has inexplicably also chosen the Citadis Spirit for its tramway.

5. Why the Citadis Spirit will never work​

Our train is some jumble of components that are trying to take a light rail train (a train designed for light suburban use) and make it do heavy rail things (a train designed for intensive frequent core system use). This is impossible. Even on the best platform in the world it would be impossible, and there are plenty of indications that the Dualis wasn’t the best platform to start with anyway.
We should have just bought a proven metro (subway type) train, or at worst bought Calgary’s high-floor light rail vehicles or basically anything proven that would have been more suited to our actual requirements than a low-floor light rail suburban surface train.
Anyway, in the unlikely event you want to read the actual details, I have written other thousands of words including:
Or you can, you know, read the entire 600 page report on this debacle.
I don’t know if I have much more to say, there are only so many ways you can frame a fundamentally wrong decision that had no consequences for any of the decisionmakers and that has trapped the entire transit-using city in a situation that would take billions of dollars (and widespread admissions of total failure) to fix.


原来大家都认为是工程问题,看来不是,而是决策问题,屁股决定脑袋。

不清楚为什么这个会发生在加拿大,咱们开发一块土地,又是公示,又是咨询周围住户意见,时间和金钱更是浪费不计其数,而这种上亿元的基建和项目却被一群民选的外行拍屁股决定了?

都指责中国项目一切领导意志决定,一言堂,起码人家决策快速,出问题要下台坐牢,而且看不出中国大项目出这么大篓子的
 
你们坐过吗?刚开通时候,我去坐过,慢腾腾过个小弯,都哐当哐当,吱吱呀呀,明显是铁轨铺设的质量问题。
不是文章说的选型问题,轻轨也是有一定载荷能力的,而且渥太华目前的客流量负载还没有超出轻轨的设计标准,更别说超过安全余量了。
 
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