BBC 日本核灾废水排海真的安全吗？五大问题一次说清
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别光逼逼，用数据说话，怎么就差别大了。其实所有国家沿海核电站都要接受检查，看看谁的污染大。真要保护环境，就关了这些核电站吧，少用点电，回归传统能源，等待清洁能源是唯一出路。
让别人做人的时候，自己先得是人才行啊
呵呵，怎么如此气急败坏呢，想做人，首先要做个有脑子的人才行。现在的环保就是减碳，但碳真的不算污染啊，为了人类的子孙繁衍，禁核才行，但你做不做人都改变不了这个可悲现实啊。
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狗了一篇日本作者铃木的文章，部分内容谷歌翻译。
截止到今年三月底，处理水只有三分之一达标，其他部分需要进一步处理。
双方立场都声称有科学依据。文章也提到制成水泥是更好的解决方法。
现在的排海法，严重缺乏公共信心支持 public trust。这不单纯是科学技术问题，是典型的跨科学问题。
如何改善这种状况？ 有几种选择可以帮助恢复公众对东京电力和日本政府福岛处理水计划的信任。
首先，日本政府和东京电力公司应该认识到，放射性废水的管理并不是一个纯粹的科学技术问题。 此类公共争议不能仅通过“基于科学”的对话来解决。 是的，科学对话是必要的，但这还不够。 相反，福岛的处理水是阿尔文·温伯格术语中“跨科学”的典型案例，意思是“可以向科学提出问题，但科学无法回答的问题”（温伯格强调）。 东京电力和日本政府的计划还需要以非科学的方法来解决这个问题，并提供额外的措施，包括改进决策过程以及与利益相关者进行真诚的对话（而不是说服）。
其次，为了恢复公众的信任和信心，政府应该首先停止放水，并委托一个值得利益相关者信任的独立监督机构。 国际原子能机构对东京电力计划的审查充其量是有帮助的，但这还不够，因为它只验证了东京电力提供的首次排放样本，而没有审查可能持续未来30年的整个计划。 事实上，国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西在该机构“综合报告”的前言中澄清说，这次审查“既不是对该（政府）政策的建议，也不是认可”。 整个决策过程的完全透明以及支撑数据和信息的披露是提高公众信任的必要条件。
第三，东京电力和日本政府应将当前的释放行动指定为“示范”计划的一部分，并宣布将在研究确认释放对海洋环境和鱼类没有重大影响后就该计划做出最终决定。 。 这意味着政府将停止排放处理过的水，并要求科学界进行此类研究。 与此同时，政府还可以继续探索其计划的技术替代方案，这可能对国内和国际利益相关者更具吸引力。 这除了为日本政府和东电提供一个保全面子的机会，为他们“暂时”停止释放提供理由，也表明他们真诚地倾听了利益相关者所表达的担忧。
日本政府和东京电力显然有能力提高公众对福岛处理水处理的信任度，但这仅要求他们超越“科学逻辑”。
However, according to TEPCO’s data, as of March 31, 2023, of the total of about 1.3 million m3 of treated water, only about a third satisfied regulatory standards and the other two-thirds needed to be re-purified.
But there are scientific arguments against TEPCO’s release plan.
How to improve the situation? Several options exist that could help restore public trust in TEPCO’s and the Japanese government’s treated water plan at Fukushima.
First, the Japanese government and TEPCO should realize that the management of radioactive wastewater is not a purely scientific and technical issue. Public controversies of this sort cannot be resolved by “science-based” dialogues only. Yes, a scientific dialogue is essential, but it’s not enough. Rather, Fukushima’s treated water is a typical case of “trans-science” using Alvin Weinberg’s term, meaning an issue where “questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science” (Weinberg’s emphasis). TEPCO’s and the Japanese government’s plan also needs a non-scientific approach to the issue and provide additional measures, including an improved decision-making process and a sincere dialogue (not persuasion) with stakeholders.
Second, to restore public trust and confidence, the government should first stop the water release and task an independent oversight organization which can be trusted by stakeholders. The IAEA review of TEPCO’s plan was helpful at best, but it was not enough, as it only verifies the samples provided by TEPCO for the first discharge but does not review the entire plan which could continue for the next 30 years. In fact, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi clarified in the foreword of the agency’s “comprehensive report” that the review was “neither a recommendation nor an endorsement of that (government) policy.” Complete transparency over the entire decision-making process and disclosure of supporting data and information are essential conditions to improve public trust.
Third, TEPCO and the Japanese government should designate the current release operations as part of a “demonstration” program and declare that they will make a final decision about the plan after studies confirm that the release has had no significant impacts on the ocean environment and fish. This would imply that the government stops the release of the treated water, and asks the scientific community to conduct such studies. At the same time, the government could also continue to explore technical alternatives to its plan that may be more attractive to both domestic and international stakeholders. In addition to provide a face-saving opportunity to the Japanese government and TEPCO to justify that they “temporarily” halt the release, it would show that they have sincerely listened to the concerns expressed by the stakeholders.
The Japanese government and TEPCO clearly have the ability to improve public trust in their handling of the treated water at Fukushima, but this requires them to go beyond their “scientific logic” only.
thebulletin.org
截止到今年三月底，处理水只有三分之一达标，其他部分需要进一步处理。
双方立场都声称有科学依据。文章也提到制成水泥是更好的解决方法。
现在的排海法，严重缺乏公共信心支持 public trust。这不单纯是科学技术问题，是典型的跨科学问题。
如何改善这种状况？ 有几种选择可以帮助恢复公众对东京电力和日本政府福岛处理水计划的信任。
首先，日本政府和东京电力公司应该认识到，放射性废水的管理并不是一个纯粹的科学技术问题。 此类公共争议不能仅通过“基于科学”的对话来解决。 是的，科学对话是必要的，但这还不够。 相反，福岛的处理水是阿尔文·温伯格术语中“跨科学”的典型案例，意思是“可以向科学提出问题，但科学无法回答的问题”（温伯格强调）。 东京电力和日本政府的计划还需要以非科学的方法来解决这个问题，并提供额外的措施，包括改进决策过程以及与利益相关者进行真诚的对话（而不是说服）。
其次，为了恢复公众的信任和信心，政府应该首先停止放水，并委托一个值得利益相关者信任的独立监督机构。 国际原子能机构对东京电力计划的审查充其量是有帮助的，但这还不够，因为它只验证了东京电力提供的首次排放样本，而没有审查可能持续未来30年的整个计划。 事实上，国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西在该机构“综合报告”的前言中澄清说，这次审查“既不是对该（政府）政策的建议，也不是认可”。 整个决策过程的完全透明以及支撑数据和信息的披露是提高公众信任的必要条件。
第三，东京电力和日本政府应将当前的释放行动指定为“示范”计划的一部分，并宣布将在研究确认释放对海洋环境和鱼类没有重大影响后就该计划做出最终决定。 。 这意味着政府将停止排放处理过的水，并要求科学界进行此类研究。 与此同时，政府还可以继续探索其计划的技术替代方案，这可能对国内和国际利益相关者更具吸引力。 这除了为日本政府和东电提供一个保全面子的机会，为他们“暂时”停止释放提供理由，也表明他们真诚地倾听了利益相关者所表达的担忧。
日本政府和东京电力显然有能力提高公众对福岛处理水处理的信任度，但这仅要求他们超越“科学逻辑”。
Why Japan should stop its Fukushima nuclear wastewater ocean release
By Tatsujiro Suzuki | September 22, 2023However, according to TEPCO’s data, as of March 31, 2023, of the total of about 1.3 million m3 of treated water, only about a third satisfied regulatory standards and the other two-thirds needed to be re-purified.
But there are scientific arguments against TEPCO’s release plan.
How to improve the situation? Several options exist that could help restore public trust in TEPCO’s and the Japanese government’s treated water plan at Fukushima.
First, the Japanese government and TEPCO should realize that the management of radioactive wastewater is not a purely scientific and technical issue. Public controversies of this sort cannot be resolved by “science-based” dialogues only. Yes, a scientific dialogue is essential, but it’s not enough. Rather, Fukushima’s treated water is a typical case of “trans-science” using Alvin Weinberg’s term, meaning an issue where “questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science” (Weinberg’s emphasis). TEPCO’s and the Japanese government’s plan also needs a non-scientific approach to the issue and provide additional measures, including an improved decision-making process and a sincere dialogue (not persuasion) with stakeholders.
Second, to restore public trust and confidence, the government should first stop the water release and task an independent oversight organization which can be trusted by stakeholders. The IAEA review of TEPCO’s plan was helpful at best, but it was not enough, as it only verifies the samples provided by TEPCO for the first discharge but does not review the entire plan which could continue for the next 30 years. In fact, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi clarified in the foreword of the agency’s “comprehensive report” that the review was “neither a recommendation nor an endorsement of that (government) policy.” Complete transparency over the entire decision-making process and disclosure of supporting data and information are essential conditions to improve public trust.
Third, TEPCO and the Japanese government should designate the current release operations as part of a “demonstration” program and declare that they will make a final decision about the plan after studies confirm that the release has had no significant impacts on the ocean environment and fish. This would imply that the government stops the release of the treated water, and asks the scientific community to conduct such studies. At the same time, the government could also continue to explore technical alternatives to its plan that may be more attractive to both domestic and international stakeholders. In addition to provide a face-saving opportunity to the Japanese government and TEPCO to justify that they “temporarily” halt the release, it would show that they have sincerely listened to the concerns expressed by the stakeholders.
The Japanese government and TEPCO clearly have the ability to improve public trust in their handling of the treated water at Fukushima, but this requires them to go beyond their “scientific logic” only.
Why Japan should stop its Fukushima nuclear wastewater ocean release
Japan’s controversial plan for Fukushima tritiated water lacks public trust. It's time to stop it and find better alternatives.
thebulletin.org
茶马盐铁
我想看看自定义头衔到底能有多少字。继续加，看系统什么时候把这个字符串截断。呃，居然还有？那就继续吧。
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其实根本也就没有什么‘废水’ 和 ‘污水’ 之分。
都是一样的废水， 一切都是看排出的各种成分， 以及辐射量。
根本不用纠结什么核污水核废水， 哪怕你排出的是‘核圣水’， 也一样要看辐射量。 不可能因为你改了个名字， 就能老母鸡变鸭。
如果废水的辐射量超过污水， 那么废水就是污水， 如果圣水的辐射量超过了废水， 那么圣水也是污水。
反过来， 如果你把你家的自来水命名为“污水”， 难道你就从此不敢喝自来水了？
名字都是虚妄， 关键是要看成分，玩弄话术没有意义。 在这里瞎逼逼什么咱家的是核”废“水， 邻居家的是核”污“水。。。 不是蠢，就是坏。
我管你污水圣水还是口水？想要排放， 那就把监测数据亮出来看。
茶马盐铁
我想看看自定义头衔到底能有多少字。继续加，看系统什么时候把这个字符串截断。呃，居然还有？那就继续吧。
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左也是你， 右也是你。
刚刚还在强调 ”废水“ 和 ”污水“ 差别大了。
一转眼， 就成了 ”名字当然不重要“。
要不然， 你自己进厕所， 把自己几个人格之间的争论出一个结论先？
metropolis
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实质是放射性元素含量是否达标，积累几十年是否仍然无害。
但是这水的名字，日本强调的是：处理水。
但是这水的名字，日本强调的是：处理水。
metropolis
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根据日本人的文章，这些年一直每天都在产生污染水，从2014年540立方米/天，到2022年90立方米/天。
不要因为无知，不断往日本人脸上贴金。
“Treated” or “contaminated” water?
When underground water, including rainfall, passes through the damaged Fukushima Daiichi reactor site and is used to cool the melted fuel debris inside the reactors, it becomes contaminated with oil as well as many harmful radioactive nuclides, including cesium and strontium. Generation of “contaminated water” has been gradually declining due to various measures, such as pumping up water by sub-drains and the construction of impermeable, land-side frozen walls (see Figure 1). According to TEPCO, contaminated water generation declined from 540 cubic meters (m3) per day in 2014 to 90 m3 per day in 2022.
thebulletin.org
不要因为无知，不断往日本人脸上贴金。
“Treated” or “contaminated” water?
When underground water, including rainfall, passes through the damaged Fukushima Daiichi reactor site and is used to cool the melted fuel debris inside the reactors, it becomes contaminated with oil as well as many harmful radioactive nuclides, including cesium and strontium. Generation of “contaminated water” has been gradually declining due to various measures, such as pumping up water by sub-drains and the construction of impermeable, land-side frozen walls (see Figure 1). According to TEPCO, contaminated water generation declined from 540 cubic meters (m3) per day in 2014 to 90 m3 per day in 2022.
Why Japan should stop its Fukushima nuclear wastewater ocean release
Japan’s controversial plan for Fukushima tritiated water lacks public trust. It's time to stop it and find better alternatives.
thebulletin.org
