精华 4.13集会征集旗杆和英文文章
- 主题发起人 OneChina
- 开始时间
- 注册
- 2002-01-16
- 消息
- 6,037
- 荣誉分数
- 216
- 声望点数
- 0
China and Tibet's history long and connected
David Curtis WrightFor The Calgary Herald
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A few years ago, a fairly prominent Tibetan called me from the United States and asked me to consider writing a book arguing that Tibet had always been a country independent from China. I replied that I could not do this because I do not quite see things this way.
During the winter semester of 2004 I went through Tibet's historical relationship with China with a few very sharp history majors in a senior seminar at the University of Calgary. We read several important recent historical works and covered the basic contours of historical debate about Tibet. By the end of the semester our consensus was that the history of China's relationship with Tibet is more complicated and nuanced than either the Hollywood crowd and the Chinese government care to admit.
I'll briefly give some specifics here. The claim that Tibet has been part of Chinese territory ever since the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) is questionable. This claim is based on a marriage between a Tibetan king and a Tang Chinese princess in 641. But this marriage did not necessarily reflect or imply actual union between Tibet and Tang China.
Further, Indian and Nepali cultural influences were both stronger in Tibet at the time than Chinese cultural influence, and Tibet had previously entered into an alliance with Nepal before the arrival of the Chinese princess. In fact, the Tibetan king's Nepali princess was viewed as senior to the Chinese princess.
The contention that Tibet has always been a sovereign country independent of China is likewise questionable, and on several levels. First of all, the Mongols controlled Tibet during some periods of the Mongol empire, of which China was a part during the Yuan dynasty (A.D. 1279-1368). Secondly, beginning in the late 18th century Tibet was clearly and unambiguously under the military, political, and religious control of China's Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Lastly, and most importantly, the modern concepts of statehood, independence and sovereignty emerged in recent centuries in Europe and should not be anachronistically and uncritically applied to premodern East Asia.
Tibet had de facto independence after 1911, but both the Republic of China (1911-1949; now confined to the Chinese island of Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China on the mainland (1949-present) regarded Tibet as historically Chinese territory that would one day be brought back under Chinese control. The PRC used military force to make good on these intentions in the 1950s, and in 1959 the Dalai Lama's government fled Tibet and took refuge in Dharamsala, India, where it has been in exile ever since.
So we come to the present. Ultimately, China's retention of Tibet is not merely, or even mainly, a matter of history. Beijing has other pressing reasons for retaining control over Tibet, and the most carefully constructed and ingeniously argued historical scholarship will not convince Beijing to quit Tibet.
Beijing's standard caricature of the Dalai Lama as a conniving "splittist" manipulator, a crafty poltroon who pursues political objectives under the cloak of religion while hoodwinking dizzy and gullible western spirituality keeners, is sheer poppycock. The Dalai Lama is committed to the non-violent struggle for greater autonomy for Tibet and no longer advocates outright Tibetan independence. But his sprawling geopolitical conception of Tibet is very difficult if not impossible for Beijing to accept, and so the Tibet issue festers and drags on unresolved, to the frustration of both sides.
The Dalai Lama very likely did not instigate the recent violent unrest, but some other Tibetans less committed to non-violence might have. There are troubling indications that a growing number of young Tibetans are beginning to reject nonviolence, a dark and unsettling trend explored in the recent film We're No Monks. More troubling still are reports by neutral and credible witnesses that the initial disturbances instigated by ethnic Tibetans in Lhasa in March were destructive, threatening, and virulently anti-Chinese.
Beijing's constant refrain about Tibet is that what goes on there is a purely internal matter for China. And indeed it is, but Beijing's sovereignty over Tibet does not, ipso facto, attenuate the human rights of Tibetans. It is incumbent upon China, as the only state actor in the current Tibet fracas, to take the lead in exercising considerable restraint. The whole world hopes there will not be another Tiananmen Square massacre in Tibet and that Chinese security forces will not over-react to the recent rioting. Excessive and vindictive state violence would only further inflame old antagonisms and set back the cause of intercommunal reconciliation and tranquility in Tibet for more decades.
What is more, the world would eventually find out about such state violence. Not even the Great Firewall of China can completely staunch the flow of information into and out of the People's Republic. In the words of Boyang, a gifted mainland Chinese dissident writer and prisoner of conscience in Taiwan for a decade during the island's long White Terror period (1947-1987), "Blood-stained hands can be concealed for a time, but not forever."
David Curtis Wright earned his PhD in East Asian Studies at Princeton University in 1993 and is associate professor of history at the University of Calgary.
China and Tibet's history long and connected
David Curtis WrightFor The Calgary Herald
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A few years ago, a fairly prominent Tibetan called me from the United States and asked me to consider writing a book arguing that Tibet had always been a country independent from China. I replied that I could not do this because I do not quite see things this way.
During the winter semester of 2004 I went through Tibet's historical relationship with China with a few very sharp history majors in a senior seminar at the University of Calgary. We read several important recent historical works and covered the basic contours of historical debate about Tibet. By the end of the semester our consensus was that the history of China's relationship with Tibet is more complicated and nuanced than either the Hollywood crowd and the Chinese government care to admit.
I'll briefly give some specifics here. The claim that Tibet has been part of Chinese territory ever since the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) is questionable. This claim is based on a marriage between a Tibetan king and a Tang Chinese princess in 641. But this marriage did not necessarily reflect or imply actual union between Tibet and Tang China.
Further, Indian and Nepali cultural influences were both stronger in Tibet at the time than Chinese cultural influence, and Tibet had previously entered into an alliance with Nepal before the arrival of the Chinese princess. In fact, the Tibetan king's Nepali princess was viewed as senior to the Chinese princess.
The contention that Tibet has always been a sovereign country independent of China is likewise questionable, and on several levels. First of all, the Mongols controlled Tibet during some periods of the Mongol empire, of which China was a part during the Yuan dynasty (A.D. 1279-1368). Secondly, beginning in the late 18th century Tibet was clearly and unambiguously under the military, political, and religious control of China's Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Lastly, and most importantly, the modern concepts of statehood, independence and sovereignty emerged in recent centuries in Europe and should not be anachronistically and uncritically applied to premodern East Asia.
Tibet had de facto independence after 1911, but both the Republic of China (1911-1949; now confined to the Chinese island of Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China on the mainland (1949-present) regarded Tibet as historically Chinese territory that would one day be brought back under Chinese control. The PRC used military force to make good on these intentions in the 1950s, and in 1959 the Dalai Lama's government fled Tibet and took refuge in Dharamsala, India, where it has been in exile ever since.
So we come to the present. Ultimately, China's retention of Tibet is not merely, or even mainly, a matter of history. Beijing has other pressing reasons for retaining control over Tibet, and the most carefully constructed and ingeniously argued historical scholarship will not convince Beijing to quit Tibet.
Beijing's standard caricature of the Dalai Lama as a conniving "splittist" manipulator, a crafty poltroon who pursues political objectives under the cloak of religion while hoodwinking dizzy and gullible western spirituality keeners, is sheer poppycock. The Dalai Lama is committed to the non-violent struggle for greater autonomy for Tibet and no longer advocates outright Tibetan independence. But his sprawling geopolitical conception of Tibet is very difficult if not impossible for Beijing to accept, and so the Tibet issue festers and drags on unresolved, to the frustration of both sides.
The Dalai Lama very likely did not instigate the recent violent unrest, but some other Tibetans less committed to non-violence might have. There are troubling indications that a growing number of young Tibetans are beginning to reject nonviolence, a dark and unsettling trend explored in the recent film We're No Monks. More troubling still are reports by neutral and credible witnesses that the initial disturbances instigated by ethnic Tibetans in Lhasa in March were destructive, threatening, and virulently anti-Chinese.
Beijing's constant refrain about Tibet is that what goes on there is a purely internal matter for China. And indeed it is, but Beijing's sovereignty over Tibet does not, ipso facto, attenuate the human rights of Tibetans. It is incumbent upon China, as the only state actor in the current Tibet fracas, to take the lead in exercising considerable restraint. The whole world hopes there will not be another Tiananmen Square massacre in Tibet and that Chinese security forces will not over-react to the recent rioting. Excessive and vindictive state violence would only further inflame old antagonisms and set back the cause of intercommunal reconciliation and tranquility in Tibet for more decades.
What is more, the world would eventually find out about such state violence. Not even the Great Firewall of China can completely staunch the flow of information into and out of the People's Republic. In the words of Boyang, a gifted mainland Chinese dissident writer and prisoner of conscience in Taiwan for a decade during the island's long White Terror period (1947-1987), "Blood-stained hands can be concealed for a time, but not forever."
David Curtis Wright earned his PhD in East Asian Studies at Princeton University in 1993 and is associate professor of history at the University of Calgary.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
China and Tibet's history long and connected
推荐此文：
http://bbs.comefromchina.com/forum140/thread556643.html
感觉那篇文章真切可信，应该比较能打动西方读者。
出一份英文报纸说明真相的主意不错，但建议多用些平民百姓的见闻，不要用太多的官方材料（用些数据还是可以的）。另外要尽量避免愤青式语言。
毕竟，在西方民众看来，流亡的西藏人士是有家不能归的弱势一方（事实也大体如此）。大家比较同情他们，也因此而容易信任他们。
http://bbs.comefromchina.com/forum140/thread556643.html
感觉那篇文章真切可信，应该比较能打动西方读者。
出一份英文报纸说明真相的主意不错，但建议多用些平民百姓的见闻，不要用太多的官方材料（用些数据还是可以的）。另外要尽量避免愤青式语言。
毕竟，在西方民众看来，流亡的西藏人士是有家不能归的弱势一方（事实也大体如此）。大家比较同情他们，也因此而容易信任他们。
flyinthesky
新手上路
- 注册
- 2007-08-12
- 消息
- 334
- 荣誉分数
- 20
- 声望点数
- 0
旗杆应该可以用IKEA的窗帘竿子啊。。
才想起来，应该非常合适，便宜而且还长短各样都有。。。
不知道负责这事情的兄弟准备的怎么样了，好像没有需要帮忙的。
才想起来，应该非常合适，便宜而且还长短各样都有。。。
不知道负责这事情的兄弟准备的怎么样了，好像没有需要帮忙的。
- 注册
- 2002-01-30
- 消息
- 11,781
- 荣誉分数
- 578
- 声望点数
- 273
- 注册
- 2002-01-30
- 消息
- 11,781
- 荣誉分数
- 578
- 声望点数
- 273
M.A.Jones writes: "As for the Dalai Lama himself, he seems to spend more time moving around the planet with the skilled opportunism of a political chameleon, preaching mysticism to Western New Agers rather than participating in traditional Tibetan religious rituals."
需要捐款的话早说，不要等到集会当天才发现缺需，捐款我会提供力所能及的帮助的
- 注册
- 2004-07-29
- 消息
- 4,782
- 荣誉分数
- 794
- 声望点数
- 273
nod nod~~~
- 注册
- 2004-07-25
- 消息
- 33,823
- 荣誉分数
- 375
- 声望点数
- 243
March Sunday 23 2008 (15h29) :
[SIZE=+1]The Feudal Serf System in Tibet Before 1959[/SIZE]
A Society Based on a Regime that Combined the Political and Religious Powers, and Divided People into Three Strata and Nine Grades Tibet before 1959 had a society of feudal serfdom. Along with the general characteristics of feudal serfdom, there were many remnants of slavery. This social system was more cruel and reactionary than serfdom in Europe in the Middle Ages. The serf-owners’ economic interests were protected by a political system that combined political and religious powers, ruling over the Tibetan people spiritually as well as politically. The local government of Tibet (in Tibetan, Kashag, and meaning "the institute that issues orders") was composed of powerful and influential monks and aristocrats. It upheld a series of social, political and legal institutions that rigidly stratified society. The Thirteen Laws and The Sixteen Laws divided the Tibetan people into three strata in nine grades according to their family background and social status.
The Feudal Lords’ Ownership of Means of Production
The monasteries, officialdom and the aristocrats owned all the arable land and pastures as well as overwhelming majority of livestock. These means of production were granted to them by the Dalai Lama. They had the right to govern and inherit the land.
The Feudal Lords’ Ownership of Their Serfs
Serfs and slaves accounted for 95 percent of the Tibetan population (peasants 60%, herdsmen 20%, and lower-class monks 15%). They were owned by serf-owners, just like the means of production. They had no political rights or personal freedom. They and their children were freely given away as gifts of donations, sold or exchanged for goods. Their marriages had to be approved in advance by their manorial lords. Serfs who married out of the manorial estate had to pay ransom money to their lords. Those who could not perform corvee or went out to seek a livelihood elsewhere should pay “corvee taxes” to show their dependence on the lords. If a serf lost his ability to work, his thralkang field, livestock and farm tools would be those who died without issue was confiscated.
The Serfs’ Economic Burden
Taxes and levies in Tibetan areas included land rent, stock rent, corvee and taxes.
The main form of land rent was forced labor. In addition, there was a mixed form of land rent, which was paid in kind, forced labor and cash.
The manorial lords generally kept 70 percent of their land under their own management and rented out the rest to their serfs as thralkang land. The serf tenants of the thralkang land also had to till the land managed by the manorial lord, using their own farm animals and tools. The entire harvest on land managed by the manorial lords belonged to them alone.
The serfs had to do corvee for manorial lords and local government and pay taxes in kind and cash. Corvee duties were allotted by the local government.
There were two kinds of stock rent: paid in animal products to the manorial lords according to the original number of livestock rented from them, or in products according to the actual number of livestock.
Other taxes included land tax, corvee tax, and countless others.
The Oppression of the Serfs by Manorial Lords
In Tibet under the serfdom, not only did the local regime at various levels, set up judicial institutions, but the big monasteries, manorial lords and tribal chieftains could also judge cases and had their own private prisons.
If the serfs stood up against the manorial lords, violated the law or could not pay rent or taxes in time, the lords would punish them according to the Thirteen Laws or other laws. They used such inhuman tortures as gouging out the eyes, cutting off the feet or hands, pushing the condemned person down from cliff, drowning, beheading, etc
The Serfs’ Miserable life
The wealth of the society was highly concentrated in Tibet before 1959. More than 80 percent was possessed by the manorial lords and less than 20 percent belonged to the serfs, who accounted for 95 percent of the population. The masses of serfs lived in extreme poverty.
Some statistics about serfdom in Tibet
Many statistics and data show that in Tibet before 1959, production stagnated, the population of the Tibetan nationality diminished, epidemic diseases prevailed, the people lived in misery and society as a whole developed very slowly. The facts cited above give a broad outlines.
[SIZE=-1]By : Tibet
March Sunday 23 2008 [/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]The Feudal Serf System in Tibet Before 1959[/SIZE]
A Society Based on a Regime that Combined the Political and Religious Powers, and Divided People into Three Strata and Nine Grades Tibet before 1959 had a society of feudal serfdom. Along with the general characteristics of feudal serfdom, there were many remnants of slavery. This social system was more cruel and reactionary than serfdom in Europe in the Middle Ages. The serf-owners’ economic interests were protected by a political system that combined political and religious powers, ruling over the Tibetan people spiritually as well as politically. The local government of Tibet (in Tibetan, Kashag, and meaning "the institute that issues orders") was composed of powerful and influential monks and aristocrats. It upheld a series of social, political and legal institutions that rigidly stratified society. The Thirteen Laws and The Sixteen Laws divided the Tibetan people into three strata in nine grades according to their family background and social status.
The Feudal Lords’ Ownership of Means of Production
The monasteries, officialdom and the aristocrats owned all the arable land and pastures as well as overwhelming majority of livestock. These means of production were granted to them by the Dalai Lama. They had the right to govern and inherit the land.
The Feudal Lords’ Ownership of Their Serfs
Serfs and slaves accounted for 95 percent of the Tibetan population (peasants 60%, herdsmen 20%, and lower-class monks 15%). They were owned by serf-owners, just like the means of production. They had no political rights or personal freedom. They and their children were freely given away as gifts of donations, sold or exchanged for goods. Their marriages had to be approved in advance by their manorial lords. Serfs who married out of the manorial estate had to pay ransom money to their lords. Those who could not perform corvee or went out to seek a livelihood elsewhere should pay “corvee taxes” to show their dependence on the lords. If a serf lost his ability to work, his thralkang field, livestock and farm tools would be those who died without issue was confiscated.
The Serfs’ Economic Burden
Taxes and levies in Tibetan areas included land rent, stock rent, corvee and taxes.
The main form of land rent was forced labor. In addition, there was a mixed form of land rent, which was paid in kind, forced labor and cash.
The manorial lords generally kept 70 percent of their land under their own management and rented out the rest to their serfs as thralkang land. The serf tenants of the thralkang land also had to till the land managed by the manorial lord, using their own farm animals and tools. The entire harvest on land managed by the manorial lords belonged to them alone.
The serfs had to do corvee for manorial lords and local government and pay taxes in kind and cash. Corvee duties were allotted by the local government.
There were two kinds of stock rent: paid in animal products to the manorial lords according to the original number of livestock rented from them, or in products according to the actual number of livestock.
Other taxes included land tax, corvee tax, and countless others.
The Oppression of the Serfs by Manorial Lords
In Tibet under the serfdom, not only did the local regime at various levels, set up judicial institutions, but the big monasteries, manorial lords and tribal chieftains could also judge cases and had their own private prisons.
If the serfs stood up against the manorial lords, violated the law or could not pay rent or taxes in time, the lords would punish them according to the Thirteen Laws or other laws. They used such inhuman tortures as gouging out the eyes, cutting off the feet or hands, pushing the condemned person down from cliff, drowning, beheading, etc
The Serfs’ Miserable life
The wealth of the society was highly concentrated in Tibet before 1959. More than 80 percent was possessed by the manorial lords and less than 20 percent belonged to the serfs, who accounted for 95 percent of the population. The masses of serfs lived in extreme poverty.
Some statistics about serfdom in Tibet
Many statistics and data show that in Tibet before 1959, production stagnated, the population of the Tibetan nationality diminished, epidemic diseases prevailed, the people lived in misery and society as a whole developed very slowly. The facts cited above give a broad outlines.
[SIZE=-1]By : Tibet
March Sunday 23 2008 [/SIZE]
