中美贸易战:13轮磋商无果 改成“阶段性”方式继续磋;特朗普和刘鹤于1月15日在白宫签署第一阶段经贸协议 (附中英文版本)

  • 主题发起人 主题发起人 ccc
  • 开始时间 开始时间


总结亦之视频中的主意观点。
贸易战打到现在为止,双方结果如何看?首先看发起人的目的是否达成?

1. 逆差从开打前的3750亿增加400多亿,达到4190亿。

2.制造业回归美国:完全没做到。

3.增加关税是否有效?短期看增加的关税由厂家和美国消费者共同支付。长期看,超过一年后,中国大量企业搬离,前往美国,越南,菲律宾,印度等,说明美国的大棒奏效,否则基本由美国消费者分担。

4.美国增税的大棒基本已经发挥到头,无法复加,只有减免。

5.开放金融市场对中国公司融资,利用外国资本有利。

6.加强知识产权,没有达到美国介入监督的目的,中国承诺自我改善。加强知识产权保护,对未来发展非常必要,因为今后中国的方向主要在高科技,而不是以前的劳动力密集产业,加强知识产权保护势在必行。

7.美国在贸易战中受到的伤害:
盟友不再信任,
敌人不在畏惧。

纽约时报的文章明确指出了贸易战的各方得失。
 
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习近平应约同美国总统特朗普通电话
2019-12-21 00:45:08 来源: 新华网

  新华社北京12月20日电 国家主席习近平20日晚应约同美国总统特朗普通电话。

  特朗普表示,美中达成第一阶段经贸协议,对于美国、中国和整个世界都是一件好事,美中两国市场和世界对此都作出了十分积极反应。美方愿同中方保持密切沟通,争取尽快签署并予以落实。

  习近平指出,中美两国在平等和相互尊重基础上达成了第一阶段经贸协议。在当前国际环境极为复杂的背景下,中美达成这样的协议有利于中国,有利于美国,有利于整个世界和平和繁荣。

  习近平强调,开展中美经贸合作为中美关系稳定发展、为世界经济发展作出了重要贡献。现代经济和现代技术把世界连成了一体,中美利益更加交融,双方在合作中会出现一些分歧。只要双方始终把握中美经贸合作互利共赢的主流,始终尊重对方国家尊严、主权、核心利益,就能够克服前进中出现的困难,在新的历史条件下推动中美经贸关系向前发展,造福两国和两国人民。

  习近平强调,我们对近一段时间来美方在涉台、涉港、涉疆、涉藏等问题上的消极言行表示严重关切。这些做法干涉了中国内政、损害了中方利益,不利于双方互信合作。希望美方认真落实我们多次会晤和通话达成的重要共识,高度关注和重视中方关切,防止两国关系和重要议程受到干扰。

  特朗普表示,我期待有机会通过各种方式与你保持经常性沟通。我相信我们两国能够妥善处理分歧问题,美中两国关系能够保持顺利发展。

  习近平表示,我愿继续通过各种方式与你保持联系,就双边关系和国际问题交换意见,共同推进以协调、合作、稳定为基调的中美关系。

  两国元首还就朝鲜半岛局势交换意见。习近平强调,要坚持政治解决的大方向,各方要相向而行,保持对话缓和势头,这符合各方共同利益。
 
与特朗普通话 习近平称美国干涉内政
2019年12月21日 05:48
  • 美国之音
0D57312A-5BC0-4357-8127-004E5918E440_cx0_cy9_cw0_w1023_r1_s.jpg

2019年6月29日美国总统特朗普在大阪G20峰会期间与中国国家主席习近平举行双边会谈。

华盛顿 —
美国总统特朗普周五与中国国家主席习近平通话。特朗普称在从贸易到朝鲜和香港等问题上取得了进展,但中国媒体表示,习近平指责美国干涉中国内政。

特朗普在推特上宣布与习近平的通话。中国官媒表示,习近平是应特朗普的要求与他进行了交谈。

特朗普在推特上写道:“与中国的习主席就我们的重大贸易协议进行了很好的交谈。中国已开始大规模采购农产品及更多。正在安排正式签署。还谈到了朝鲜,我们正在与中国合作,还有香港(进展中!)”

Had a very good talk with President Xi of China concerning our giant Trade Deal. China has already started large scale purchaes of agricultural product & more. Formal signing being arranged. Also talked about North Korea, where we are working with China, & Hong Kong (progress!).

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) December 20, 2019

中国官媒新华社在报道中表示,习近平对特朗普说,中国对美国在台湾、香港、新疆和西藏等问题上的“消极言行”表示严重关切。

新华社表示:“这些做法干涉了中国内政、损害了中方利益,不利于双方互信合作。”

美国呼吁中国关闭新疆地区的大规模拘留营,并对香港示威者受到的待遇表示关注。中国对此表达了不满。

新华社指出,习近平“希望美方认真落实我们多次会晤和通话达成的重要共识,高度关注和重视中方关切,防止两国关系和重要议程受到干扰。”

在美国最关心的朝鲜核问题上,新华社称,习近平向特朗普强调,各方应在朝鲜问题上寻求政治解决,“各方要相向而行,保持对话缓和势头,这符合各方共同利益”。

随着朝鲜为美国设定的重启谈判最后期限逼近,朝鲜警告说,收到什么样的“圣诞礼物”将取决于美国自己。特朗普和金正恩举行了三次峰会,但未能就解除对朝鲜制裁以换取平壤无核化协议达成一致。

中国和俄罗斯本周提议联合国安理会解除对朝鲜的部分出口禁令,以鼓励华盛顿与平壤的无核化谈判。

作为回应,美国国务院表示,联合国安理会不应考虑对朝鲜“过早解除制裁”,因为朝鲜“威胁要升级挑衅,拒绝会面讨论无核化”。
 
商务部:中美双方正就协议签署等后续工作密切沟通
2019-12-26 16:57:38 来源: 新华社“新华视点”微博
  商务部新闻发言人高峰26日表示,目前中美双方正在履行法律审核、翻译校对等必要程序,并就协议签署等后续工作密切沟通。如有进一步消息,将及时发布。(记者王雨萧、陈炜伟)
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...de4d14-22a3-11ea-86f3-3b5019d451db_story.html

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President Trump’s trade deal with Beijing leaves untouched the marriage of business and government known as China Inc. that American executives for nearly two decades have said tilted global markets against them.

Trump insisted for months that he wanted to resolve all outstanding trade issues with China in a single, comprehensive accord that would refashion the Chinese state’s economic role. As late as September, he rejected talk of a partial agreement, saying instead that he wanted “the big deal.”

The two sides discussed industrial subsidies in the early rounds of negotiations over an agreement that exceeded 150 pages. But Chinese officials resisted making structural changes, and by the time officials settled this month on an 86-page partial accord, any commitments to reduce subsidies had been excised.

Chinese steel mills, solar panel manufacturers, electric battery developers, shipbuilders and oil producers all benefit from a vast web of government support. Officials in Beijing arm Chinese companies against their foreign rivals with discounted loans from state banks, cheap land, low-cost electric power, and cash infusions from officially approved investment funds.

“The Chinese effort is dogged, long-term and very well-funded,” said John Neuffer, chief executive of the Semiconductor Industry Association. “That’s why the subsidy issue is such a big one for us.”

Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, who lacks his predecessors’ enthusiasm for the free market, the state spigot has gushed aid. China now devotes more than 3 percent of its annual output to direct and indirect business subsidies — a share of the economy that is roughly equivalent to what the United States spends on defense, according to economist Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a nonpartisan research group.

Some of that aid is similar to programs in the United States and other advanced nations, encouraging companies to retrain workers, use less energy or otherwise support government goals. But much of it is divorced from any consideration of profit and loss. So it fuels excess production of goods like steel, which spill into global markets, depressing prices and making it hard for American companies to compete.

Trump last year imposed tariffs on steel after the Commerce Department warned that the U.S. share of global production had fallen by nearly two-thirds since 2000, under pressure from heavily subsidized Chinese mills. At the same time, signs that China was lavishing state aid on efforts to supplant the United States as the global leader in advanced technology triggered Trump’s decision to launch his trade war with Beijing.

Subsidies are marbled throughout China’s state-led economy. For Chinese leaders, they are a principal tool of economic management, allowing them to steer credit, land, energy and other resources to favored state-owned enterprises as well as private companies that Beijing sees as strategic.

Whatever the cost, Beijing’s aid gives Chinese companies an important edge in other markets. Peter Navarro, the president’s principal White House trade adviser, calls state subsidies one of China’s “seven deadly sins,” which must be cured before the two countries can enjoy normal trade ties.

In a 215-page report last year, which kicked off Trump’s trade war with China, Robert E. Lighthizer, the president’s chief trade negotiator, identified government financial support as a key element in China’s plan to overtake U.S. technology leadership. China is “grossly subsidizing and taking over our markets,” he complained this summer before the Senate Finance Committee.

But this massive program of government assistance has proved a double-edged sword for China. State help enabled Chinese manufacturers to dominate markets for products such as auto parts, but it also has left the economy riddled with unprofitable “zombie” firms and suffering from pervasive inefficiency, economists said.

“These subsidies are being directed in ways that are really distorting. They are not being directed to dynamic firms,” said Loren Brandt, an economist at the University of Toronto.

Indeed, state-owned firms have become steadily less profitable as they have gotten bigger. Over the decade to 2017, the biggest state-owned enterprises nearly quadrupled their assets. But their returns fell to 2.6 percent from a peak of 6.7 percent in 2007.

Even as they underperform, state companies continue to enjoy easy access to loans from state banks. Meanwhile, private companies with brighter prospects often struggle to obtain credit.

“A lot of money’s getting wasted. There’s a massive misallocation of resources in underperforming state companies,” said Lardy, author of “The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China?”

White House officials have acknowledged that some key issues remain unresolved. Lighthizer has said “a lot of hard things” have been left to future talks, which most analysts say will be arduous and unlikely to bear fruit before the November election.

Bargaining over industrial subsidies is expected to be particularly tough.

Though Trump launched the trade war to get China to change practices including its numerous subsidies, the commercial conflict has only convinced Xi to accelerate efforts to become self-sufficient — no matter the cost.

“The hard-liner view — they’re the ones who seem to have Xi Jinping’s ear or this is the way Xi thinks himself,” said Brandt. “But it’s clear that the more reformist constituency has lost out.”

The World Trade Organization prohibits subsidies that are directly linked to exports or that require the use of domestic goods. The U.S. has won at least three disputes over Chinese subsidies before the global trading body, including in 2011, when China agreed to halt a program of wind turbine subsidies after U.S. complaints.

But the WTO rules are poorly designed for a nonmarket economy of China’s size and importance to global trade. One problem is keeping track of the subsidies, which are often hidden or indirect.

Chinese makers of aluminum products appear to be driven by profits. But they benefit from government policies that provide cheap energy to the smelters that produce aluminum and from export limits that lead to a domestic glut, which keeps aluminum prices down too.

“They can be really effective selling into the U.S. or Europe,” said Chad Bown, another Peterson economist. “It’s just that all of their inputs are subsidized.”

After China labeled shipbuilding a strategic industry in 2006, the government funded several new shipyards and an array of subsidies that saved the industry up to $4.5 billion over a six-year period, according to research by economist Myrto Kalouptsidi of Harvard University.

China quickly doubled its market share from roughly one-quarter of world ship orders to half, grabbing business from Japan, South Korea and Europe. Only after analyzing shipyards in several countries and ruling out alternative explanations was Kalouptsidi able to estimate the extent of Chinese subsidies.

“It is practically impossible to explain the rapid increase in China’s market share” without fingering subsidies, she wrote in a 2018 paper.

Under WTO rules, the U.S. can impose steep tariffs to counteract the effects of a trading partner’s subsidies if they injure American companies. The administration has stepped up its use of trade remedies to counter Chinese subsidies, hitting in the past two months imports of steel staples, diamond saw blades, hardwood lumber and ceramic tiles with defensive levies of as much as 356 percent.

About 10 percent of all Chinese imports — more than $50 billion worth of goods — now face countersubsidy or anti-dumping tariffs, according to Bown. That is apart from separate levies the president imposed on $360 billion in Chinese products over the past 18 months.

Using such tariffs offers little prospect of success, though, against China’s multipronged effort to promote its domestic semiconductor industry.

Chinese central and provincial governments have earmarked about $100 billion for equity investments, credit lines and various grants over the next five years so China will become by 2030 the global leader in an industry now dominated by U.S. firms.

Private equity funds backed by the state are funneling cash into China’s semiconductor industry, helping build and outfit dozens of new fabrication plants. There are now more than 1,600 of these “government-guided funds,” commanding a total of $570 billion, according to Zero2IPO Research Center, a Beijing-based consultancy.

Unlike traditional private equity investors in the U.S., these Chinese funds are willing to accept subpar returns to meet government goals.

Two Chinese companies — SMIC and Tsinghua Unigroup — derive more than 30 percent of their annual revenue from government payments. Yet they offer their government investors below-market returns, according to a new study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris.

Such investments are “probably among the hardest forms of support to identify and quantify,” the OECD concluded.

Despite years of free spending, Chinese semiconductor manufacturers remain far behind the U.S. state-of-the-art. Even failed industrial policy, however, can distort global trade flows and hurt non-Chinese companies.

While the U.S. industry retains a solid lead over aspiring Chinese rivals, the semiconductor industry’s Neuffer says the administration needs a broader response. Along with combating Chinese trade practices, the U.S. should be emphasizing workforce development, competition policy and opening other markets overseas.

“We need an affirmative agenda, too,” he said.
 
时事大家谈:北京至今沉默,美中协议到底签与不签?
美国总统特朗普在2019年的最后一天宣布,美中两国将在2020年1月15日签署第一阶段协议。一个星期过去了,北京沉默不语。此前香港南华早报披露,中国国务院副总理刘鹤将率领中方代表团于1月4日开始访问华盛顿,签署第一阶段贸易协议,但刘鹤显然并未成行。美国贸易代表莱特希泽曾在美中宣布达成协议的当天表示,双方计划于2020年1月的第一个星期签署协议,现在看来这个计划不可能实现了。美中协议最后卡在哪里?为什么看起来像是特朗普急而习近平不急?这项交易有没有最后破局的可能?

主持:许波 嘉宾:北京之春荣誉主编胡平;中国经济学者胡星斗
https://www.voachinese.com/a/voawei...-does-not-respond-to-trump--call/5233776.html
 
时事大家谈:北京至今沉默,美中协议到底签与不签?
美国总统特朗普在2019年的最后一天宣布,美中两国将在2020年1月15日签署第一阶段协议。一个星期过去了,北京沉默不语。此前香港南华早报披露,中国国务院副总理刘鹤将率领中方代表团于1月4日开始访问华盛顿,签署第一阶段贸易协议,但刘鹤显然并未成行。美国贸易代表莱特希泽曾在美中宣布达成协议的当天表示,双方计划于2020年1月的第一个星期签署协议,现在看来这个计划不可能实现了。美中协议最后卡在哪里?为什么看起来像是特朗普急而习近平不急?这项交易有没有最后破局的可能?

主持:许波 嘉宾:北京之春荣誉主编胡平;中国经济学者胡星斗
https://www.voachinese.com/a/voawei...-does-not-respond-to-trump--call/5233776.html


南华早报说刘鹤13日赴美。
 
https://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2020/01/07/9002191.html

中美协议最后时刻现变数:北京拒绝川普核心诉求(图)
文章来源: 多维 于 2020-01-07 10:34:01 - 新闻取自各大新闻媒体,新闻内容并不代表本网立场!

中国大陆媒体“财新网”2020年1月7日报道,中国农业部副部长韩俊在接受采访时表示,中方不会为了满足美方要求的农产品采购量而提高针对大米、小麦和玉米等农产品的年度进口配额。

94ac2b34544a30e2a3bd495b4255fc7f.jpg


知情人士透露,中国贸易代表团暂定于1月13日赴美并于15日同美方签署第一阶段贸易协议,北京仍计划派中国最高谈判代表、国务院副总理刘鹤签署协议。(VCG)

中美两国于2019年12月就两国第一阶段贸易谈判达成协议,中方同意增加进口包括农产品在内的美国产品,而美国则以此为交换保留一部分即将对中国商品加征的关税并降低部分中国进口产品的关税率。

美国总统特朗普(Donald Trump)曾表示,中国在未来两年内将会增加美国农产品进口总量,购买规模将比贸易战前增加一倍。

路透社曾预测中国或许会考虑调整进口配额,例如以1%左右的低关税扩大农产品进口配额,但韩俊明确表示不存在这种可能性,他特别指出,“这是全球配额,我们不会为了一个国家调整”。

根据中国国家发改委此前公布的信息,中国2020年粮食进口配额及分配同上年无变化。小麦配额963.6万吨,其中90%为国营贸易配额;玉米配额720万吨,其中60%为国营贸易配额;大米配额532万吨,50%为国营贸易配额。

韩国《朝鲜日报》2020年1月7日报道指出,可以看到,中美双方在第一阶段贸易协议签署前的“拉锯战”不会结束,双方不会就核心利益关切轻易做出让步,因此双方能否顺利签署贸易协议仍是一个未知数。

但特朗普则不断强调他会于1月15日同中方代表签署协议,中国官方则始终没有任何表态。韩国news1网站认为特朗普的“高调行事”无非想借此向北京施压,迫使北京适应其要求迅速签署协议,并将此作为其为数不多的政绩以参加2020年美国总统大选。但北京十分清楚特朗普的意图,不仅不会轻易宣布同美方签署贸易协议,连事关特朗普关键选票的农业问题也不会轻易松口。
 


美国财政部13日宣布取消对中国“汇率操纵国”的认定。

短短5个月时间,这标签就撕下来了。
 
最后编辑:
不是说好的15日第一阶段贸易协议签字么,咋没动静啊。
 
什么人赶紧去给村长要一张站票!
没有多大新闻,该签了。签完字的时候,床铺说“呀,忘了加拿大的事了,下次再说吧!”
 
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